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EDITED BY

C. COLBECK, M.A. ; EDWARD F. MORRIS, M.A. ;
AND J. SURTEES PHILLPOTTS, M.A., B.C.L.

The ENGLISH RESTORATION and LOUIS XIV.

OSMUND AIRY, LL.D.

EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY.

Edited by C. COLBECK, M.A.; EDWARD F. MORRIS, M.A.;
and J. SURTEES PHILLPOTTS, M.A., B.C.L.

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Epochs of Modern History

THE
ENGLISH RESTORATION
AND
LOUIS XIV.

FROM THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA
TO THE PEACE OF NIMWEGEN

BY
OSMUND AIRY, LL.D.

ONE OF H.M. INSPECTORS OF SCHOOLS
AUTHOR OF "A TEXT-BOOK OF ENGLISH HISTORY"
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL OF THE SCOTTISH
HISTORICAL SOCIETY

WITH THREE MAPS

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PREFACE.

THE epoch of European history with which I have here attempted to deal is an epoch of Restorations ; Restorations which assume widely differing forms, in correspondence with the varying circumstances of the countries in which they take place.

In France, after a period of fierce internal strife, during which all antagonistic influences exhaust themselves in a vain struggle with the tenacious purpose of Mazarin, and sink into helplessness, the triumphant monarchy emerges as a despotism of an almost oriental type. That despotism is conferred upon a Prince of great capacity and of boundless ambition, with all the instruments of ambition ready to his hand.

In England a different scene is witnessed. The revolution had overthrown three great institutions, the Monarchy, the Parliament, and the Church. All three are now restored, under the old forms ; the Parliament first, and then in natural sequence the Monarchy and the Church. And when the settlement is complete, it is seen that the first and the last have gained immensely, and that what they have gained the Crown has lost. Acting in strict harmony, the Parliament and the Church assume towards the King a dictatorial attitude ; and from their dictation he partially escapes by a gradually deepening subservience to Louis XIV.—a subservience rendered easy from

the fact that Parliament has as yet no direct control upon foreign policy.

The union of the two monarchs leads to a third restoration, that of William of Orange. By the combined attack of France and England, the United Provinces are brought to the brink of destruction. They escape from the peril by throwing off a constitution ill adapted for confronting immediate national peril, and by placing once more the executive power, though with many limitations, in the hands of a single man, the representative of the house under whom independence had been won.

The treatment of this period, in a form as condensed as is required by the plan of the series, has been rendered difficult by two facts. It is in the first place a period of incessant diplomatic intrigue, on the part of every ruler concerned; and all diplomacy is secret and personal. And thus, while avoidance of detail is a prime object, details of which many seem, not merely important, but essential to a clear understanding of the story, press in on every side to an extent scarcely to be appreciated by anyone who has not somewhat attentively considered the subject.

There is secondly the fact that, in England at least, there are no great figures around whom interest and sympathies may gather. No prominent politician acts from a great motive—no one, after the fall of Clarendon, even from an honest or unselfish motive—and no one seems to live in the open light of day. There is no great cause definitely present to men's minds to strengthen the moral fibre, wearied with the tension of twenty years. The Parliament is possessed by vague wants and vaguer terrors; it displays a low moral sense

and is ruled by a spirit of unreason, though by the very law of its being it half unconsciously feels its way towards the goal of 1689. The character and purposes of the King, his detestable private example, the influence of his mistresses, the potency of backstairs intrigue, afford the opportunity for all who unite ambition and capacity with cunning, frivolity, or shamelessness, to come to the front and to prosper.

In writing the chapters devoted to the Fronde, I have drawn largely from the '*Histoire de France pendant la Minorité de Louis XIV.*' and the '*Histoire de France sous le Ministère de Mazarin*,' of M. Chéruel, which from the impartial and exhaustive use displayed by the writer of authorities previously unknown or neglected must be held to supersede former works on the subject. The voluminousness, however, the abundance of detail, and the somewhat provoking looseness of the arrangement of these volumes, render the conception of persons and events in their due proportions a matter of the utmost difficulty. The '*Histoire de France*' of M. Henri Martin, and especially the '*Französische Geschichte*' of Professor Ranke, have been constantly referred to, to lessen this difficulty; while in one or two instances I have been aided by Dr. Kitchin's '*History of France*' and Mr. Perkins's '*France under Richelieu and Mazarin*.'

For the part played by Louis XIV. outside France during the years 1660-1678 I have relied principally upon M. Mignet's '*Négociations relatives à la Succession d'Espagne*,' supplemented, on all questions regarding the connection between Louis XIV. and Charles II., by Ranke's '*History of England* principally

in the 17th Century ;' while with respect to the Dutch Republic, my chief authority has been the 'Jean de Witt' of M. Pontalis. Macgregor's 'Holland and the Dutch Colonies' has also been found useful in enabling me to give a brief description of the commercial supremacy of the Dutch. The Parliamentary debates, as recorded in Vol. IV. of the 'Parliamentary History,' have of course been indispensable in questions of home politics ; while a few facts of interest and importance are drawn from the inspection of original documents, such as the Essex and Sheldon papers, which have not yet been printed.

The plan of the series does not admit of reference to authorities. This requires mention, as not only the statements, but possibly here and there the actual phrases, of the writers who have been consulted may be noticed.

I regret that the assigned limits have forbidden the introduction of an account of Scotland during the period, or of the remarkable scope and activity of English commercial enterprise.

In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge two personal obligations : to Mr. S. R. Gardiner, who in the midst of his own labours has found time, now and continuously during several years, to give advice and ungrudging assistance to one who is but a novice in the craft of which he is a master ; and to my friend Mr. W. L. Sargant, who has aided me with the revision of the proof sheets throughout the book.

OSMUND AIRY.

BIRMINGHAM, *October 2, 1888.*

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THE ENGLISH RESTORATION AND LOUIS XIV.



CHAPTER I.

PEACE OF WESTPHALIA.

I. GENERAL EFFECT.

THE Peace of Westphalia (Oct. 28, 1648), which closed the desolating struggle of the Thirty Years' War, ushered in a new phase of European history. With the exception of Russia, Poland, and Turkey, not yet to be regarded as European nations, and of England, absorbed in her own internal settlement, there was not a country in Europe which did not henceforth work under new conditions. The political map was designed afresh ; the old names indeed were retained, but new conceptions were associated with them ; France, Germany, the Empire, Spain, and the countries of the North, meant from this moment something profoundly different, both individually and relatively, from what they had previously meant.

The power of the Austrian house was worn out. The Spanish branch had lost its old influence in Italy ; its armies had been shattered at Rocroy and Nordlingen ; it had been compelled through sheer weakness to abandon the struggle with the United Provinces, and it was hampered by domestic troubles ; while the German

branch, territorially and politically dissociated from the Spanish, had now to relax completely her failing grasp upon the Princes of the Empire and the Free Towns. Sweden had become dominant in the North, but without a preponderance so great as to render her a danger to European peace. France was for the time more than satisfied with the position in which she was left by the treaties, and was regarded by the secondary states not as a menace, but as a guarantee of their independence.

It was still more important that ideas which had in the past generally ruled the relations of peoples were ostentatiously abandoned, and a new groundwork of international policy was accepted with universal consent.

Hitherto community of religion had been the recognised basis upon which alliances had been made and wars waged. But the Thirty Years' War is the last war of religion in Europe. The Peace of Westphalia did for European repose what Henry of Navarre had done for French unity. Waves of religious emotion, indeed, did afterwards from time to time momentarily influence a country's policy, but only as incidental adjuncts to secular considerations. For the first time in the history of Christendom the wishes and decrees of the head of the Catholic Church were openly ignored. In vain the papal nuncio strove to maintain the influence of Rome; in vain he protested in her name against the attacks which by the toleration of heretics and the secularisation of ecclesiastical property were dealt to the Church; and in vain, when the treaties were concluded and had become the law of Europe, the Holy See declared them 'null, invalid, disavowed, without force, and without effect.' The thunders of Rome fell upon unheeding ears; the ecclesiastical idea had been replaced by a policy which boldly declared its national

The new
principle.

and secular origin. Henceforward it is the independence of individual states, or, to use a phrase as old as the reign of Elizabeth, the 'Balance of Power,' which becomes the ruling principle of international life.

2. GERMANY.

For Germany three things were done. In the first place there was granted an amnesty, partial indeed within the hereditary domains of the Emperor, Political amnesty. but complete and comprehensive over the rest of the Empire. This amnesty was no mere pardoning of political offences on the one side or the other, but an absolute re-establishment of those who had been dispossessed of their territories during the war.

The religious difficulty was overcome by a compromise, based on the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, Compromise on religion. between the rival faiths and between the rival branches of Protestantism. All questions of ecclesiastical property were determined by actual possession in 1624, that year being chosen as lying between 1618, the year when the Thirty Years' War began, and 1627, when Catholicism was again in the ascendant; while a reconstitution of the extraordinary commissions of the Diet with equal representation of Catholics and Protestants provided for the settlement of all future disputes.

Finally, the relations of the Emperor to the States of the Empire were so revised as to modify profoundly the political constitution. Under Ferdinand II. Independence of the States. and Ferdinand III. the increasing power of the Austrian house had gone far to stifle the independence of the Princes of the Empire, and this independence they now recovered. At the very base of the new settlement lay the condition that henceforth the

free consent of the States of the Empire assembled in Diet should be necessary for all action on the part of the Empire as a whole. Still more important was it that each State now secured the right of making foreign alliances, so long as these were not directed against the Emperor, the Empire, the public peace, or the treaty itself. This was the work of French diplomacy. French influence in this settlement. Mazarin took care to do in Germany the reverse of what he was bent upon doing in France. There we shall see him ready to sacrifice all to render the central power supreme over every form of independent and local action; at home his aim was to weaken the central power to the utmost. He followed the steps of Richelieu in crushing the feudal idea in France; he replaced and supported it in Germany. His object was that when occasion should arise it might be easy to create, among these independent Princes, leagues which should paralyse the Emperor's power of offensive action against France, whilst they opened the way for her arms to the heart of the Spanish Low Countries.

3. FRANCE.

Treaties of peace usually betoken a step in the rise or fall of nations. For the power of the Austrian house the Peace of Westphalia was a striking mark of decline; for France it was the visible completion of a great bound to European supremacy. Advantages gained by France. It was emphatically a French triumph; and as her efforts had been great, so, for her patronage of the new Germanic federation, France reaped a rich reward. She was enabled at length to relinquish victoriously one part of her life-and-death struggle with the house of Austria; while, by the condition that the Emperor and Empire were not to interfere in the war still to be fought out with Spain, she was set free to con-

tinue and to bring to a glorious termination twelve years later a conflict which had lasted with varying fortune since the time of Francis I.

The defenceless position of Paris, within but a few days' march of an enemy's fortresses, had ever been a source of anxiety to French statesmen. To make her strategically, as she was historically, the heart of France, was the principal aim of their diplomacy. That aim was now in a great measure realised. By the cession of

Aim of
French
diplomacy :
the eastern
frontier
secured.

Upper and Lower Alsace, with Sundgau and the prefectures of ten imperial towns, France gained the coveted Rhine frontier. By the possession of Old Breisach and the right of placing a garrison in Philippsburg, she secured two advanced posts in Germany; while the stipulation that between Basel and Philippsburg no fortress might be established on the right bank of the river, several existing strongholds being dismantled, placed the whole of the Upper Rhine, with the exception of Strassburg and places belonging to immediate vassals of the Empire, unreservedly in her hands. At the same time commerce and navigation were made free throughout its course. Thus, while Austria was no longer able to join hands with Spain in the Netherlands, inasmuch as the intervening States were now independent, and the Emperor could not march through them without their leave, France had secured a riverway into the heart of the United Provinces. The whole Rhine valley indeed was at her mercy, for the great ecclesiastical electorates of Trèves and Mayence were in her interest. She obtained moreover the full recognition of her rights to the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, with their 'districts,' a right which she had claimed and practically exercised since their conquest by Henry II., and she thereby secured a new and easy road, avoiding the strong fortress of Stenai, to the frontier

of the Spanish Low Countries. Lastly, the undisputed possession of Pinerolo, which she had acquired in 1632, opened to her a path through the passes of the Alps into Piedmont.

By all these acquisitions France had placed herself beyond the possibility of a sudden attack on her eastern frontier. For the full accomplishment however of her ambition she had to wait. To the north-east lay the Spanish Low Countries, with their line of well-nigh impregnable fortresses. For securing them, or at least for neutralising the danger which they threatened, every French minister had his scheme. Richelieu had proposed to form of them a free state ; Mazarin desired to conquer them ; the Dutch proposed to divide them with France. It will be seen that in this direction the ambition of France was for a time frustrated ; that, though a great step was made at the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), the Spanish Low Countries were to form the object of thirty years more of intrigue and of war.

The north-eastern frontier not yet secured.

4. SWEDEN.

Sweden, supported by France, made good her claim to a heavy share in the spoils of victory. She obtained the whole of nearer and part of further Pomerania, with the reversion of the rest on the extinction of the male branch of the Brandenburg house. She thus secured the towns of Stettin, Gartz, Dam, and Golnau, with the islands of Rügen and Wolin, which gave her complete command of the mouths of the Oder on both banks, while the cession of the town and harbour of Wismar, the archbishopric of Bremen, and the bishopric of Verden, placed in her power the navigation of the Elbe. All these she held as immediate fiefs of the Empire, and thus claimed for Bremen, Verden, and Pomerania three voices in the imperial Diet.

She was also allowed to erect a sovereign court at Wismar, with a university at Greifswald. She had thus assured to her a communication with the Scandinavian States and her dominion of the Baltic ; and not only was placed in a position of marked though not crushing supremacy in the north of Europe, but gained a distinct hold upon Germany, both territorially and consultatively, which lasted until the Treaty of Stockholm in 1720.

5. SPAIN.

From all participation in that part of the Peace of Westphalia which concerned France and the Emperor Spain was rigorously excluded. Exhausted and bankrupt from the war with France and the struggle with the Dutch, she had long been anxious for peace. But the terms demanded by Mazarin in 1646 had been too much for her pride. That minister was bent upon wresting from her the barrier of fortresses which made French safety or extension to the north-east impossible. For Mazarin's offers. this purpose he proposed to exchange the Spanish Low Countries for Catalonia and Roussillon, then in the possession of France. But Spain hoped, in view of the confusion caused in France by the civil troubles, then nearly at their height, to regain Catalonia and Roussillon by force of arms. The Spanish Netherlands she determined to save in another way. She resolved to bow to necessity, and to close her long and profitless struggle with her rebellious subjects. The Dutch on their side were at the time not unwilling to dissolve their long-standing alliance with France. They were alarmed at her rising power, and at the prospect of a French army in occupation of the Spanish Low Countries, which at present formed a barrier between themselves and French ambition. Spain sedulously fostered this feeling, and on January 30, 1648,

concluded a treaty at Munster whereby she at last acknowledged the complete independence of the United Provinces. She ceded to them all the places Spain makes peace with the Dutch. in Brabant, Flanders, and Limburg, of which they were then in possession, afterwards known as the 'Generality ;' and she even granted liberty of conscience to all Dutch subjects in her territory. Lastly, she consented to close the navigation of the Scheldt and adjoining waterways, and so to ruin Antwerp, her great commercial centre, for the benefit of its Dutch rival Amsterdam.

Germany reconstituted upon a decentralisation basis, under the protection of France, which now became the Summary of the peace. foremost European power ; the supremacy of Austria in central Europe destroyed ; Sweden in a position of commanding strength in the north ; the Spanish monarchy severed from Austria and left face to face with France ; Switzerland formally detached from the Empire ; the United Provinces a new and independent kingdom : such is a rough political map of Europe after the Peace of Westphalia.

CHAPTER II.

PRELUDE TO THE FRONDE.

I. RICHELIEU AND PRIVILEGE. THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP.

UPON turning our eyes from the external grandeur of France to her internal condition we behold a strange contrast. It well illustrates the tenacity of purpose which was the leading characteristic of Mazarin, that even while the last formalities of the treaty which made France the arbiter of Europe were taking place, he with the youthful

King and the Queen mother were voluntary exiles from the seat of government. So completely occupied indeed were the minds of all but the minister himself and a few of his fellow workers with the beginnings of civil discord, that this great settlement passed almost without remark. To ninety-nine out of every hundred Frenchmen the treaty between the Crown and the malcontents of Paris, under cover of which the court returned to the capital, was of infinitely greater interest than the Treaty of Westphalia, which was signed on the same day, and which expressed the change which had passed over the face of Europe.

To realise the meaning of the disturbances which, under the name of the 'Fronde,' went far during five years to render France powerless to take advantage of the position she had just gained, it will be necessary to refer somewhat in detail to the principle which had consistently guided the policy of Richelieu and of his pupil Mazarin.

This principle was by all means and at all costs to render the Crown supreme over every rival influence. Henry IV. had understood that what France needed was national unity. Richelieu had felt that the first condition of national unity was the unquestioned and unlimited authority of the central power. His whole career was one unfaltering struggle with the spirit of privilege. He determined to turn the great feudal dignitaries into courtiers, the *Parlements* into mere courts of registration of the royal will. Beneath the Kingship all ranks of society were to occupy one common level of subservience. From the King was to issue all national activity; in him were to centre all national aspirations.

His earliest and most critical struggle was against the governors of provinces. These *grande*s had during the

Richelieu
determines
to make the
monarchy
supreme.

wars of religion well-nigh shaken off even the semblance of submission to the royal authority; they raised troops, levied taxes, administered justice, made war or alliances, and were in every respect independent sovereigns of their provinces. They had even learned to regard their governments as hereditary rights. They thus formed a barrier to all attempts at centralisation.

Richelieu therefore endeavoured to make their functions purely military, and to render the governorship as costly and as powerless as possible. Every opportunity was taken to replace the governors whom he found in office in 1624 by men devoted to himself. Exile, the prison, and the scaffold were ruthlessly used. By their readiness to engage in plots against him they played into his hands. Of the nineteen governors whom he found in 1624, four only remained at his death; the other fifteen posts had been filled by men devoted to his interests, or had been absorbed into the monarchy.

A still more effective blow against the genius of feudalism was the revival of the institution of 'intendants.' These officers, chosen from the *bourgeoisie*, nominated and dismissed at will by the King, were devoted to the power to which they owed their existence, and it was specially laid down that they might not be the relatives or dependents of the governors. Their power was immense, extending at first only to matters of justice and police, but before long to finance, taxation, and every department of government. By 1648 there were thirty-five of these officers with fixed posts in all the provinces, who, grasping little by little the whole provincial administration, and guided and supported by the central authority in their resistance to the governors and all local bodies, were the essential machinery of the central system. As such they were always the first object

of attack at the hands of the classes whose privileges they had destroyed.

Richelieu's task was an easy one in dealing with the general body of the *noblesse*. He had indeed
 The no-
blesse. no intention of destroying their privileges.

Equality before the King was his main object, and he judged that the surest way to secure that equality was a separation of classes so decided that union was an impossibility. The 5th chapter of his 'Testament politique' is thus headed: 'Combien il est important que les diverses parties de l'état demeurent chacune dans l'étendue de ses bornes.' He therefore did all in his power to confirm them as a superior caste; while, as the means of sustaining their position, he gave them the exclusive right to almost all offices of dignity and emolument, and allowed them to engage in commercial undertakings without derogation to their rank. But he had no intention of permitting them to remain a political power. The conspiracies which they raised against him were crushed or nipped in the bud, and their leaders coldly and inexorably put to death, while the executions of De Boutteville and Des Chapelles, who had insolently defied the edict against duelling, taught their whole body that the King's commands might not be lightly disobeyed. The blow however which strikes the imagination most was one which marks in a vivid

manner how great a space of time separated
 Destruction
of the
castles. the political and social conditions of England and France.

The France of Richelieu is the England of Henry II. By the 'ordonnance' of July 31, 1626, it was commanded that throughout the kingdom the fortifications of all towns and castles not needed for the defence of the frontiers should be destroyed. As in England, these castles were the haunts of oppression, and formed the greatest burden of the peasant class.

Accordingly 'an immense outburst of joy rose from the common people, first throughout Brittany, and then throughout France. Since the days of Louis the Fat the monarchy had struck no greater blow for national unity against feudal oppression and anarchy ; all that remained of feudalism was stabbed to the heart.'

Richelieu's dealings with the Church were conceived with the same view. Whilst he vehemently upheld the Gallican liberties, as the concrete expression of national life, against the papal claims, he was equally determined to allow no such independence in regard to the Crown. More than once he attacked in detail all the clerical immunities from taxation, and compelled holders of benefices to recognise the full lordship of the King, while on several occasions ordinances of a sweeping nature were issued, without consultation with Rome, for the reform of both the regular and secular clergy. New and frequent restrictions were also applied to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the civil power intervened in many matters hitherto considered to be purely religious in their nature.

The clergy. The *bourgeoisie*. of national life, against the papal claims, he was equally determined to allow no such independence in regard to the Crown. More than once he attacked in detail all the clerical immunities from taxation, and compelled holders of benefices to recognise the full lordship of the King, while on several occasions ordinances of a sweeping nature were issued, without consultation with Rome, for the reform of both the regular and secular clergy. New and frequent restrictions were also applied to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and the civil power intervened in many matters hitherto considered to be purely religious in their nature.

The local governing bodies had by the time of Richelieu ceased in a great degree to possess political power ; and the cardinal, faithful to his policy of balancing class against class, had no desire to compass their further degradation. Occasionally however they formed centres of disturbance, and they were then put down with a high hand. Thus Troyes, Dijon, and many other towns suffered the loss of part of their liberties, while at La Rochelle, where in 1628 the Protestant schism in its political aspect was finally destroyed, the municipal institutions were completely remodelled. Privas, Uzès, Nismes, Anduze, and Montauban suffered the same treatment in 1629. The revolt through sheer distress of the *croquants* in Guienne

in 1637, and of the *nus-pieds* in Normandy in 1639, led to a general annulling of privileges in these two provinces.

The jealousy of Richelieu was still keener with regard to assemblies of a wider scope, such as the *États Généraux* *États Gén.* and the *États Provinciaux*. The former indeed, which corresponded with our English *Parliament* and *Provinciaux*, were never summoned throughout his career; while the latter, which after 1626 were the only political bodies remaining with the right of approaching the sovereign, were diligently suppressed. The absence of any union or real legislative power among them rendered his task easy, and at his death Burgundy and Languedoc were the only two provinces where the *États Provinciaux* retained so much as their old constitution.

With the *Parlements* of the provinces, and especially with the *Parlement* of Paris, the conflict was more severe and prolonged. Originally this latter body *The Parlements* was merely a part of the royal council, charged with the administration of justice, and with the duty of recording the decisions of the council itself. It was also allowed the right, called the *droit de remontrances*, of making observations upon these decisions. From this right, in the middle of the fifteenth century, had sprung the claim to refuse to record the edicts unless their 'remontrances' were acted upon. At the same period the members acquired fixity of tenure of their offices, and, a little later, hereditary right. The *Parlement* of Paris naturally became the incarnation of privilege in its most selfish and aggressive form. Taking advantage of every moment of weakness on the part of the central authority, it had grown in strength until it had assumed the right of direct intervention in State affairs, and of representing the *États Généraux* when that body was not sitting. To

Richelieu this pretended sovereignty formed a permanent obstacle to the national welfare, and he determined to crush it. The struggle lasted without cessation for fourteen years. In vain Richelieu endeavoured by menaces, by creations of new offices, by the exile and imprisonment of leading members, to bend the *Parlement* to his will. So incessant and so galling was its opposition, especially in the refusals to register the financial edicts rendered necessary by the enormous expenses of the Declaration of 1641. war, that in 1641 he determined on a decisive step. In his famous manifesto of that year he set forth the principles upon which alone the State could prosper. The complete equality and entire submission of all men before the King is the first condition for national grandeur and stability; whensoever this had been lost sight of, as in the evil days of Henry III., misfortune had followed. The royal authority was now again threatened by the exorbitant claims of the *Parlement*. They were thereupon forbidden in the most express terms to take henceforward any cognisance whatsoever of State affairs. Whilst allowing the ancient *droit de remontrances*, the declaration insisted upon the immediate registration of all edicts and declarations put forth from a *lit de justice*, or formal sitting of the King and *Parlement*, whether those *remontrances* were attended to or not. The application moreover of this right was confined to matters of pure finance; in all questions of State administration the edicts were to be published and registered without any deliberation whatsoever. And to emphasise the determination of the court, the offices of several members who had been forward in resistance were suppressed by the King 'de notre certaine science, pleine puissance, et autorité royale.' From this moment the *Parlement* ceased to be, constitutionally, a political assembly. We shall indeed see it during the disturbances which followed the

great Cardinal's death raising itself for a few years, only to sink into a dependence upon the central authority still more complete than before.

It is probable that the events which were passing in England contributed to this decisive action of Richelieu ; in any case it is an interesting commentary upon the relative positions of the Crown and its subjects in the two countries, that during the months of the imprisonment of Strafford and Laud, and less than three months before the execution of the prime minister of Charles by the English representative Parliament, the prime minister of Louis was able by an act of masterful despotism to reduce to the position of a mere court of record of the royal will a turbulent and dangerous body of hereditary magistrates, who had nothing in common with an English Parliament but the name.

Thus, then, before he died, Richelieu had altered the whole face of government. Every element of local or corporate resistance had well-nigh disappeared, or existed only in name. He left two ideas occupying the whole field—the old idea of the absolute monarchy, and the new idea, which he created in France, and which Mazarin after a hard struggle sustained, of the irresponsible prime ministership. It was in the fact that to Louis XIV., at the death of Mazarin, there descended both of these—the prestige and power of royalty, and the prestige and power of the premier-ship, that his extraordinary position was in a great degree owing. And it was the struggle, the selfish and frivolous struggle, of the privileged classes against the new creation, and not against the monarchy, that constituted the Fronde.

Summary of
Richelieu's
work. The
Prime
Ministership.

2. MAZARIN AND THE REACTION.

The absolutism established by Richelieu had lasted too short a time to crush out of his opponents the memory of their former influence. The instincts of privilege were awake and vigilant, and their opportunity speedily came. Louis XIII. died but a few months after his great minister. He had faithfully carried out Richelieu's policy ; but even during those months the iron rule had been relaxed so far as to awaken the hope of a great reaction. The State prisoners were released. The *Parlement* began at once to reclaim and to exercise that interference in State affairs off which Richelieu had so haughtily warned them ; the banished members returned to Paris and the suppressed offices were re-established. A declaration issued by the *Parlement*. Louis had imposed upon the Queen, at his death, a council by which her regency would be entirely controlled, and this declaration had been registered by the Parliament on the following day without resistance. Only four days after the King's death however the *Parlement*, by way of asserting its authority, abolished this council on the ground that such a limitation of the regent's functions was contrary to the principles of the French monarchy, and placed the whole power unreservedly in the Queen's hands. Both Richelieu and the *Parlement* had deceived themselves. The Cardinal, to whom the Queen had naturally enough been a life-long enemy, and who expected that her first wish would be to make peace with the house of Austria, of which she was a daughter, and for the overthrow of which he had striven so fiercely, had hoped by Louis's declaration to fetter her independence of action. The *Parlement*, anxious to assert its strength, and hoping to find in the enemy of Richelieu the enemy

Partial
reaction.

Claims of
Parlement.

The Queen
regent made
supreme.

of Richelieu's policy, had now placed her by their own action in a position from which she was able before long to complete his work.

They were soon enlightened. Thoughtful men looked forward with dread to a policy of revenge. The Queen was advised to choose a councillor committed to no faction, and she chose, to the surprise and disgust of Richelieu's opponents, his pupil and confidant Mazarin. A Princess of Spain, guided by an Italian adventurer of low birth, was to complete the ruin of the Spanish monarchy and the consolidation of the French people. From first to last Mazarin served the Queen through every crisis with unflinching skill, and she sustained him against all assaults with unswerving fidelity.

The fame of Mazarin has suffered from the fact that he followed Richelieu. Undoubtedly he will always occupy a lower place in the world's history than his great predecessor. His character was not so heroic, his personality so imposing, his energy so fierce, his conceptions so grandiose, his grasp so comprehensive, or his spirit so high; where Richelieu struck, he bribed; where Richelieu defied, he bent the knee. The contrast at the outset of his career is thus described by the master hand of the Cardinal de Retz: 'L'on voyait sur les degrés du trône, d'où l'âpre et redoutable Richelieu avait foudroyé plutôt que gouverné les humains, un successeur doux et bénin, qui ne voulait rien, qui était au désespoir que sa dignité de Cardinal ne lui permettait pas de s'humilier, autant qu'il l'eût souhaité, devant tout le monde.' None the less Mazarin stands before us throughout his career as the one man of his time in France; alone not merely in coolness and clear sight and good sense, but in that which most distinguishes a man from the mass of men, the distinct perception of a distant goal, and an unflinching deter-

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mination to reach it. If he had not the force of Richelieu, he was at least as supple and vigilant ; if he did not show himself so masterful of the present, it was perhaps because he saw the future more clearly, and fixed his eye too exclusively upon that. His patience, fertility of resource, and tenacity of purpose were exhaustless. Brought up in the Italian school of policy, expediency was his only guide. All lines of conduct were of merit in his eyes, whatever moral verdict might be passed on them by others, according as they tended, even while apparently leading him far from the direct road, to bring him in time nearer to his object ; he knew neither close friendships nor lasting hatreds, for either of them might prove a hindrance to this progress. And if, in founding a great policy, Richelieu had to overcome colossal difficulties, he had advantages which Mazarin, in his conflict to carry that policy to a triumphant conclusion, conspicuously lacked. Richelieu was a Frenchman of gentle birth, and he was the irresponsible minister of a King in the plenitude of his power. Mazarin was a foreigner, scarce able to speak the language of the country he aspired to rule, and his task was, while his mind was filled with a far-off design, to uphold without flinching, sometimes in exile and in danger of his life, at a period when every turbulent and selfish element of political life held riot, the authority of an infant King.

At the outset of their career the hands of Mazarin and the Queen Regent were strengthened by an opportune event. On May 19, 1643, the desperate valour of Enghien and his horsemen swept away the renowned Spanish infantry at Rocroy. By this feat of arms, which marks the transference of military supremacy from the Spanish to the French race, a lustre was thrown upon the policy of Richelieu which was of course reflected on the new government. At the same

Battle of
Rocroy,
May 19,
1643.

time the support of the King's uncle, the fickle and characterless Orleans, and of Enghien's father, Condé, were for the present secured for the court by liberal promises.

The first attack upon Mazarin came, not from either of the great interests which had been depressed, but from a faction of persons who, while without judgment or principle, were active and unscrupulous enough to be dangerous. The Duke of Beaufort, grandson of Henry IV. and Gabrielle d'Estrées, whose only respectable quality was that of personal courage, had collected around him his father Vendôme, his insignificant brother Mercœur, and a number of the less reputable *noblesse*, who had not dared to raise their heads under Richelieu. With the most paltry designs they mingled the most high-sounding maxims, and called themselves after the Roman patriots whose deeds they professed to emulate. The ridiculous side of the affair was soon recognised by the ready wit of the laughter-loving Parisians. It was the age of nicknames; Beaufort, whose handsome figure and licentious life made him popular among the lower *bourgeoisie*, was soon known as the 'Roi des Halles,' 'King of the Market-place,' while his adherents were styled the 'Importants.' With them were joined the returning exiles, Guise, Elbœuf, Épernon, and others; while the court ladies, delighted at a new excitement, and led by the famous Duchess of Chevreuse and Mme. de Montbazon, threw themselves eagerly into the plot. Gallantry, as was fitting, caused the breaking up of the intrigue. A quarrel for precedence between Mme. de Montbazon and Enghien's sister, Mme. de Longueville, led to the disgrace of the former. Beaufort, who was her lover, determined to avenge her by the assassination of Mazarin. Warned of the danger, and recognising the feebleness of the conspiracy, Mazarin at once struck his

Beaufort
and the 'Im-
portants.'

blow. Beaufort was arrested and imprisoned ; Vendôme, the Duchess of Chevreuse, and the other leaders were exiled from Paris, and the party disappeared amid universal ridicule. Mazarin now felt strong enough to resist with steadiness the claims of the *grandeess*. Elbœuf and Épernon indeed received governments ; but Bouillon was refused Sedan, and though Vendôme demanded the important government of Brittany, the queen took it into her own hands.

Meanwhile the *Parlement* was eagerly exercising its reasserted claim to interfere in State matters. The aristocracy of the robe was a more dangerous enemy than that of the *noblesse*, and a powerful means of attack was now furnished them.

It was no fault of Mazarin that the finances of France were in a desperate condition. The expenses of the war had been enormous, and the constitutional machinery of taxation was not calculated for the strain. At Richelieu's death the revenue had been anticipated for three years, supplies having been borrowed at exorbitant interest. Nor can the prodigality of the first year of the regency, when the current phrase, ' *La Reine est si bonne* ' well expressed the incapacity of Anne of Austria to resist the importunity of the courtiers, and when the indispensable support of Orleans and Condé could be secured only by enormous bribes, be laid to his charge. The state of things that had to be faced at present was that the expenditure, which in 1642 was 99 millions of livres, had risen in 1644 to 124 millions, of which no less than 59 millions were absorbed by the rapacity of the courtiers and the farmers of the taxes. But it was the manner in which these sums were raised, more than the sums themselves, which led to opposition. The bankers who provided the loans had duties assigned to them in repayment, which they them-

selves collected. There was thus every opportunity for oppression and embezzlement. The bankers grew enormously rich. What however most roused the anger of the people was the knowledge that Émery, the controller-general of finance, a man of the vilest character, was the worst trafficker in the spoil, and that he was protected by Mazarin.

The *taille*, a direct tax upon property, which was levied almost entirely upon the peasantry, and which was peculiarly vexatious in its incidence, had at first been excluded from the bankers' operations. It now however fell into their hands, and became a terrible burden. Provinces which had never seen an enemy were devastated as though a destroying army had passed over them, and popular revolts broke out in several quarters. Expedients still more desperate were resorted to: twelve millions were borrowed at twenty-five per cent.; two hundred fresh offices were created for sale; a tax of *joyeux avènement* was levied upon all royal officers, the towns, communes, corporations, persons exempted from the *taille*, and innkeepers. Permanent dues to the Crown were redeemed for cash; grants of domain lands revoked; dues for bequests rigidly exacted from the clergy. And when all was done, the greater part of the money thus raised was swallowed up in the repayment of loans.

Émery now took the step which led to the first direct collision with the *Parlement*. Charles I.'s abuse of the law of ship-money may have suggested to him a similar abuse of the law called the *toisé*, by which in 1548 the building of houses outside the walls of Paris had for a special purpose been forbidden. In January 1644 a tax of 40 sous was laid on every *toise* of land thus built upon; and the government declined to allow appeals to be carried before the *Parlement*. *Parle-*

ment at once declared this to be a violation of their privileges. The refusal of the court to give way was met by what came perilously near to an armed revolt. The mob threatened to burn down Émery's house. The more violent section of the *Parlement* openly avowed that a general rising was what they wished to bring about.

The government recoiled before the danger. Some other method had to be found. The *toisé* had fallen upon the poorer classes; Émery now proposed to raise the necessary supplies from the rich, and by the *taxe des aisés*, a kind of forced loan, he hoped to obtain eighteen or twenty millions. The *Parlement* willingly gave up the detested money-lenders to be spoiled. But they insisted on complete exemption for themselves and for all officials connected with them or with the university, as well as for merchants of only moderate wealth.


These exceptions reduced the receipts to insignificance. Émery once more fell back in March 1645 upon the *toisé*. The riotous opposition of the younger members was this time met with firmness by the court. The deputation which was summoned by the Queen to give an account of their conduct received a scolding as from our own Queen Elizabeth. Barillon, one of the presidents and an adherent of the 'Importants,' was arrested, and three other leading malcontents were exiled.

In this state of things Mazarin looked anxiously abroad; again Enghien came to his aid by the victory of Nordlingen (August 3, 1645). The prestige thus gained was at once turned to advantage. On September 5 the boy-king was brought to Paris to hold a *lit de justice*. From any decrees passed at this, the most solemn ceremony known to the constitution, there was no escape short of

Battle of
Nordlingen,
August 3,
1645.

The *lit de
justice*.

TABLE SHOWING THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONDÉ TO LOUIS XIV.



Gaston, Duke of Orleans, having no son, Condé was next in succession to Louis XIV. and his brother Philip I., Duke of Orleans.

To face page 23.

civil war. For such an extremity matters were not yet ripe, and the *Parlement* ceased open opposition. The government wisely withdrew both the *toisé* and the *taxe des aisés*. But an immense number of new offices were created; taxes on divers trades, and many other expedients for raising money were registered; the clergy, the great trading companies, and the officials of the sovereign courts, were compelled to contribute largely. For a year no further difficulty was experienced

3. THE PRINCE OF CONDÉ.

Great as was the service which the successes of Enghien (now to be known as Condé, his father having died) had rendered the Government, his position was the cause of much anxiety to Mazarin. Condé and the *Petits-maitres*. Whether for generalship or personal prowess he formed the most brilliant military figure of the time. As a great cavalry leader he has had no equal. Marlborough was not more calm nor Rupert more impetuous. To him were given the face and figure that beseeem the warrior, the ringing voice to rally a squadron reeling from the charge, the 'eagle eye' which notes every desperate chance, the instantaneous decision which compels the fate of battle. He became the idol of the proud and warlike youth who had fought and conquered with him at Rocroy and Nordlingen, and who, emulating his cool carelessness in danger and his desperate valour in action, formed the nucleus of that household brigade which earned for itself so terrible a fame throughout Europe. Supreme as he was however in the battlefield, Condé's character was marred by unfortunate weaknesses: he was foppish, irritable, intemperate in thought and language, and inordinately vain. His followers imitated the defects of their 'master,' and what was pardonable in the great

soldier became absurd in them. With their wonted readiness the Parisians took hold of the poorer side of their character, the supercilious airs, the foppishness of dress, and they have come down to us as the *Petits-mâîtres*. Intoxicated with his well-earned glory and with the adulation of this band of worshippers; influential alike by the enormous wealth and power which he had inherited, and by his near relation to the throne; Condé now began to evince a dangerous ambition. In this ambition he was firmly withstood by Mazarin and the Queen; to allow one man to become so powerful was to throw up the game. The check sank deep into Condé's mind. To the contempt of the noble for the *bourgeois* and of the warrior for the statesman, was now added a feeling of active hostility which at no distant time was to bear fruit.

4. ENCROACHMENTS OF THE *PARLEMENT*.

This however was not the danger that was momentarily pressing upon the government. The financial troubles were again urgent. In addition to indirect taxation, which raised no opposition from the people, Émery now put in action one of the edicts of 1645 by which all possessors of lands held on an annual rent to the Crown were ordered to redeem that rent by payment of a year's revenue. The peculiar sting of this lay in the fact that while the rent had not been changed since the middle ages, and was therefore practically nominal, the revenue had continually increased. The *bourgeoisie* were at once in arms against the 'rachat.' For three days the Palais Royal was besieged by a crowd of angry citizens. The announcement that a *lit de justice* was to be held to bear down opposition intensified the excitement. Dangerous talk was heard. The successful

insurrection of Massaniello in Naples was quoted. During the night the firing of musketry was heard in the streets; the *bourgeois* were trying their arms. Urged on by their necessities the government nevertheless were firm; the *lit de justice* was held; the operation of the 'rachat' was indeed postponed, but money was again raised by new creations, especially of *maîtres de requêtes*. The

Condition of the country. young King and Mazarin had to listen to some plain speaking. 'For ten years, sire,' said Omer Talon, the president, 'the country districts have been ruined, the peasants compelled to lie upon straw, their furniture sold for the payment of taxes. And for ten years, to minister to the luxury of Paris, millions of innocent folk are obliged to live upon rye and oat bread, and their only protection is their poverty. Their souls, and nothing else, are their own, and that is only because they cannot be sold.' The historian of the French Revolution finds its direct cause in the state of misery to which the peasantry were reduced under the administrations of Richelieu and of Mazarin.

Over the creation of *maîtres de requêtes* serious opposition again broke out. The existing officials loudly denied the right to create new offices during the minority of the King. Belonging as they did to the *haute bourgeoisie*, officially connected with the *Parlement*, and in some cases allied to the *noblesse*, they were a dangerous body to attack. The *Parlement* gladly made their cause its own. It now went a step further than hitherto in its encroachments. It refused at first to vote the edicts registered at the *lit de justice*, except that of the *rachat*, and some others which it allowed with modifications. In the end however it shrank once more from open conflict. None the less it continued its examination of the edicts 'sous le bon plaisir du roi.' The example told upon the provinces.

Continued encroachments of *Parlement*.

Both in Brittany and at Toulouse there was open and violent resistance.

A last resource was now discovered by the ingenuity of Émery. The 'Paulette,' so named after its originator, Paulet, who lived in the reign of Henry IV.,
 The 'Paulette.' was an annual tax paid by all officials who had a right to the hereditary of their offices. Once in every nine years it was subject to revision before renewal, and 1648 was the year at which a fresh revision was due. Émery now, in addition to ceasing all payments to the creditors of government for a year (a device afterwards imitated by Charles II. in the 'Stop of the exchequer') and of salaries to the inferior officials, determined to demand as a condition of renewal a fine of four years' salary. In the hope of avoiding the opposition of the *Parlement* the fine was not to be levied upon that body. But the bribe was refused. On the contrary the *Parlement* signed a bond of union, May 13, 1648,
 Bond of union. with the other sovereign courts, and decided to send deputies to a conference in the Chamber of St. Louis. The court immediately recognised the significance of such a step, and determined to oppose the meeting with resolution. It was not to be imagined that an assembly so formed would limit its action to the single purpose for which it was ostensibly convened. Two leading deputies were arrested, others were exiled from Paris, and threats of severer measures were thrown out.

Suddenly, at the moment when the court seemed in command of the situation, events occurred which compelled Mazarin to temporise. Orleans joined
 The court yields. the malcontents; Beaufort, the leader of the 'Importants,' had escaped from Vincennes; the provinces were stirring for revolt. Abroad, too, matters were going ill: the Spaniards had taken Courtrai, and were gaining ground fast. A conference was therefore

opened with the *Parlement*, at which Mazarin made a striking representation of the danger of its action. Discord, he said, was giving to Spain greater advantages than she could gain by force of arms. The refusal of supplies would speedily make useless all the expenditure of blood and treasure already incurred. Catalonia must be abandoned; the alliance with Sweden and other powers to whom France gave subsidies must be broken off. His words were vain. Personal and selfish interests were supreme. Mazarin saw that resistance at the moment was useless. He succeeded in inducing the haughty Queen to bend before the 'canaille,' as she called them in her anger, to promise the release of the imprisoned members and the acceptance of the demands of the *Parlement*. *Parlement* at once sent deputies to the Chamber of St. Louis; and thus, at first in defiance of the Queen, and at length, on June 30, 1648, with her consent, was formed a body which became, as was anticipated, a permanent political assembly, sitting during its own pleasure, like our Long Parliament, for the reform of the kingdom. The aristocracy of the robe had won a definite victory over the ministerial power.

The
Chamber of
St. Louis.

5. THE ENGLISH REBELLION AND THE FRONDE.

Between the five years' barren turmoil of the Fronde, and the contemporary struggle of the English Parliament with Charles I., there are points of superficial similarity sufficiently striking to suggest comparison. In both cases the conflict arose from the ill-defined character of the prerogative in relation to the other powers of the State, and in both the prime-ministership, the special characteristic of absolutism, was in the first instance the object of attack. In both, the contending forces, under the stress of war,

each summoned to its help foreign aid ; and in both, the anti-absolutist party established in defiance of the constitution a permanent assembly, the one in the Chamber of St. Louis, the other in the Long Parliament.

But here resemblance ceases. The differences between the two movements were radical and profound. How real was the one, how purposeless in comparison was the other, may be inferred from the fact that whereas the English movement reacted constantly upon the French, the events of the Fronde received not the slightest attention from, even if they were known to, those who in England were engaged in a conflict which absorbed every quality of heart and brain.

The English contest was at once accentuated and ennobled by religious and intellectual antagonism of the intensest character. It was a contest of modes of thought. An earnest faith in the righteousness of their cause, an enthusiastic conviction in the direct interposition of God in their behalf, sustained the noblest of Charles's antagonists in every reverse, and carried them forward to every victory ; and it is this which clothes the English rebellion with tragic dignity. To the Fronde this religious element was utterly wanting. And so there was in it no trace of heroism. For Falkland, eagerly welcoming the death which saved him from witnessing longer the agony of his country ; for Hampden, praying with his last breath for her relief ; for Milton, sanctifying rebellion by a divine eloquence, it has absolutely no figures to show.

So, too, in face of the struggle of great principles which constituted the English rebellion, family ties were unhesitatingly if mournfully sacrificed, and gallantry and intrigue were powerless ; in the whole annals of the civil war scarcely a woman's name occurs. But the pages of the Fronde are crowded with the names of women, beautiful, clever, and brave, but licentious and unprincipled,

who swayed the fortunes of the fight at the caprice of their amours or the ambition of their families, who had each of them her price, and to gain whom occupied the constant attention of Mazarin and his opponents alike. We look in vain to the leaders of the Fronde for self-sacrifice or the idea of duty, for far-reaching sight or for controlling force. We look in vain for an Eliot, a Pym, or a Cromwell. We find instead De Retz, whose highest ambition was to be a leader of faction, and whose strongest motive was personal hatred of Mazarin ; who, despising his dupes, merely amused himself with revolt ; we find Beaufort, vain, silly, and petulant, the darling of shopkeepers' wives ; Condé, leading more than once the hereditary enemies of his country against his King with no higher object than the satisfaction of his vanity ; Orleans, slothful, timid, and blown about with every varying wind of fortune. Beside them there flash across the stage, with all the picturesque garb and incident of the time, many gay and gallant figures, as brilliant in their contrast with the sombre men of the English revolution as the causes for which they contested were light and fleeting in comparison with the stern purposes of that great fight. The contrast is expressed in the names. A *fronde* was a sling used by boys in their play. The English movement was indeed a Revolution. The French movement was but a mischievous burlesque of a revolution ; and as such it is fitly known by a name derived from the sport of *gamins* and school-boys.

To these, the profoundest of the differences which forbid comparison, there are others little less striking to be added. The English Parliament represented freely and directly the whole English people. The *Parlement* of Paris was a body of permanent officials, who, though they had acquired considerable power, possessed con-

stitutionally no legislative or even deliberative functions, represented no interests but their own, and discovered in every action the inveterate selfishness of a narrow and grasping caste. In England the intimate connection between all the members of the social body, the sympathy—the comradeship indeed—between nobles and commoners, governed and governing classes, made co-operation not merely feasible but natural, and enabled the whole nation from highest to lowest to take in the struggle an eager and a constant part. In France the baneful division of classes, long existing and sedulously encouraged by Richelieu, was fatal to all such common action. The *bourgeoisie* had no support in an impoverished and despairing peasantry, and though for a time officialism might enlist the scornful support of an idle and arrogant *noblesse*, the unnatural alliance gave way as soon as a common danger was removed. The English movement was national, the French was personal.

One more difference of far-reaching import must be noticed. Old and venerable as was the idea of monarchy in England, its place in the English mind was disputed and in many cases occupied by the representative idea, which had grown up with it side by side. And so it happened that, though destroying for ever all hope for royal absolutism, the English revolution was eminently constructive. The Parliament saw more clearly than the King what they wanted, and this they were able to obtain without a King. The machinery of government was ready to their hand. The destruction of monarchy, as a temporary measure, was therefore possible without national disintegration. Very different was it in France. Even previous to the ministry of Richelieu the idea of the sacredness of monarchy had been all-pervading, and he had striven to raise it to the rank of a religion. It had absorbed into itself all other ideas of government,

and it never entered into any Frenchman's head that monarchy could be dispensed with for a day. And thus the French movement was as eminently destructive. It is impossible to see even now what could have taken the place of the French absolutism except disastrous and illimitable confusion, had either officialism or grandeeism triumphed. It was the sense of this that led to the final failure of the Fronde. How different were the issues in the two countries may be judged from the party cries. In England the Royalist cried 'God and the King !' his opponent answered with 'God and the Parliament !' In France, even while the King was a child, there were but two serious variations upon 'Vive le Roi !' ; they were 'Vivent le Roi et les Princes !' and 'À bas le Mazarin !'

CHAPTER III.

THE PARLIAMENTARY FRONDE.

I. CONCESSIONS OF THE COURT.

THE first, or Parliamentary, period of the Fronde possessed a certain title to respect. Amid the mob of interested officials, turbulent nobles, intriguing priests, and clamorous *bourgeois*, were to be found men who represented the highest type of citizen life, whom neither Anne of Austria nor the mob of Paris could terrify, nor Mazarin cajole. And though violence, folly, selfishness, and confusion marked its course, and though all zeal for the welfare of the country was soon forgotten in the indulgence of an unreasoning hate of Mazarin, this movement had nevertheless the merit of attacking, however interestedly and however inopportunately, a taxation that had become ruinous, and an administration of reckless waste.

For a while Mazarin appears not to have recognised the gravity of the situation. He was ignorant in a great degree of the constitution of the country, and it was the intrigues in the court which appeared important to him. And now, at the very moment when the Chamber of St. Louis had established its position as an *imperium in imperio* of the most threatening character, he was occupied with the endeavours of the Duke of Longueville, who had married the sister of Condé, to acquire the right to sit among the Princes of the blood. He was however soon awakened. The thirty-two delegates were already busy in claiming the control of every branch of the administration. With a just instinct they first fell upon the Intendants, by whose appointment Richelieu had dealt so severe a blow to vested interests and local privileges. They demanded the dismissal of these officers, and the transference of their duties to the 3,000 petty officials whom they had superseded. They then asked for the remission of a quarter of the *taille*, and of all arrears since 1647, the annulling of all contracts with the financiers regarding it, and the strict appropriation of the supplies gained from it to the purposes of the war. A Chamber of Justice was to be created to investigate the extortions of the farmers of the taxes. The proposal that no tax should in future be levied unless previously voted by the Parliament was doubtless prompted by the action of the Long Parliament in England, as was also the claim that no one should be detained in prison for more than twenty-four hours without being brought to trial before his proper judges. The trading classes demanded the abolition of all monopolies and abuses in the sale of necessities, and the protection of native industries. No new offices were to be created without the consent of Parliament, and there should be no diminution of salaries. All these demands of the

Demands of
the Chamber
of St. Louis.

Chamber, which were endorsed and presented by the *Parlement*, were in direct denial of the doctrine that to the Crown alone belonged all legislative authority.

Furious at the arrogance of the 'canaille,' Anne of Austria for a time refused to listen to these demands.

Concessions of the court. But Mazarin, now fully alive to the danger, and especially to the precariousness of his personal position, induced her to temporise. Émery was dismissed. The Intendancies, all but three, were revoked. A diminution of one eighth of the *taille* was offered, and the desired Chamber of Justice was decreed. The late appointments which had caused so much jealousy were revoked, the diminished salaries restored to the original sums, and the Paulette renewed. The right of the *Parlement* to verify financial edicts was acknowledged. The Queen, in her own phrase, 'threw roses at the *Parlement*.'

In return for these concessions the court demanded that the Chamber of St. Louis should be dissolved, and that the *Parlement* should return to its purely judicial functions, which had lately been much neglected. The Frondeurs, in reply, pointed out the omission of any satisfactory mention of the point upon which they felt most strongly, arbitrary arrest; and they urged the summoning by the Crown of a general assembly composed of the different Chambers. Again Mazarin had great difficulty in calming the Queen, who, as he told her, was valiant as a soldier who does not recognise danger, and who was for immediate conflict. He himself was looking eagerly abroad, and was waiting only until his hands should be again strengthened by a striking military success.

2. BEGINNING OF REVOLUTION.

In the end of August great news arrived. On the 20th Condé gained the victory of Lens, which well nigh completed the ruin of the Spanish military strength. The opportunity was instantly seized. While the 'Te Deum' was being chanted for the victory, Broussel and Blancmésnil, two of the councillors who had been foremost in opposing the court, were arrested by the Queen's orders. Within an hour the people, sedulously nursed for sedition by Mazarin's opponents, were in uproar. They thronged the city, threw up barricades, and let down the chains which barred the narrow streets. In an incredibly short time Paris was an impassable camp, and the whole city was in arms. And now, while the cry of 'Vive le Roi!' was shouted as loudly as ever, was heard with it the watch-word of the next five years, 'Point de Mazarin!'

3. THE CARDINAL DE RETZ.

During all the troubles that had now opened upon France, no influence was more actively exerted for mischief than that of Jean François Paul de Gondi, better known by his later title of Cardinal de Retz. Of Italian birth, he had risen by the favour of Richelieu and by his own talents and craft, until, having taken Orders, he became, after a youth of dissipation, coadjutor to his uncle the aged Archbishop of Paris. A duellist and a libertine, with no spark of religious feeling, and hating his profession, he looked to it nevertheless to secure for him an eminent place in the turmoil of politics. To increase the importance of his

office he asserted and maintained his right of precedence even over the Duke of Orleans, and insisted upon the fullest recognition of his ecclesiastical rank. By the careful performance of all the outward duties of his place, by a well-feigned humility, by profuse almsgiving, and by an ostentatious attention to the interests of the poor, he secured among them a dangerous influence. Diminutive in stature, and with signal disadvantages of person, he possessed a charm of tongue with which it was as easy for him to sway the passions of the mob or the councils of the Parliament, as to seduce women or entice men into conspiracy. Conspiracy, indeed, was the aim of his existence. He is the unique example of a man of great and powerful mind deliberately setting before himself as the highest attainable object the position of a successful faction-leader. Such a title, he declared, was the most honourable that he could find in 'Plutarch's Lives.' At the age of eighteen he had written a history of the conspiracy of Jean Louis de Fiesque, in which are laid down all the rules of successful treason. Higher qualities were, he declared, needed to form a successful faction-leader than to form a great emperor of the universe, and Catiline was a greater man than Cæsar. For the career of his adoption he was admirably suited by the endowments of his Italian birth. He had the supple resoluteness, the ready resource, and the absolute unscrupulousness of his countrymen. He was free from all personal ties other than that of a licentious but calculating attachment to one or two of the women whose names are notorious among the female leaders of the Fronde. Of statesmanship he possessed no trace ; and the cause for which he fought, so long as it was the cause of confusion, was a matter of indifference to him. His action was at present decided by an intense jealousy of Mazarin, and by the perception that in opposition to him

could be found the fullest opportunity for the exercise of his powers. But he valued good taste in treason as he valued it in any art. His natural feeling for the fitting in time and place had made him keep aloof from the 'Importants,' for whom, as for many of his later associates, he professed a hearty contempt.

Now however he considered his time was come. Arrayed in his ecclesiastical vestments he went to the Palais Royal and urged upon the Queen the release of Broussel. 'Rather would I strangle him with my own hands,' was the passionate reply. The royal guards were ordered out to disperse the crowd, but they were stopped by the first barricades. De Retz accompanied them and endeavoured, he says, to soothe the tumult. On his return to the court he was received by Anne with bitter sarcasm: 'Vous avez bien travaillé, Monsieur; allez vous reposer.' The insult sank deep, and henceforth he pursued a course of bitter enmity to the Queen and Mazarin.

For two days the mob remained under arms; loss of life took place, and the royal officers were insulted and attacked. The *Parlement* passed in a body through the seething streets to demand the release of the prisoners. Twice they were repelled with anger by Anne. On their third visit the president Molé informed the Queen that if she did not give way he would not answer longer for the consequences. At the entreaties of Mazarin and Orleans she at length consented to a compromise. The *Parlement* gave up its pretensions to interfere in State administration, with some minor exceptions; and in return Broussel was set at liberty. His entry on August 28 was one long triumphal procession; the people, in a delirium of joy at their victory, flung themselves at his feet, and addressed him as their saviour and protector. Having offered his

The court
gives way.

thanks at Notre Dame, he was escorted to the Grand Chamber and there received the congratulations of the *Parlement*. The frenzy-fit which had seized the people then passed off with the picturesque rapidity which had marked its beginning. Within a few hours the barricades had disappeared, the mob had melted away, and Paris was in absolute repose. It was as if a troubling dream had come suddenly to an end.

4. MAZARIN'S MEASURES. THE COURT LEAVES PARIS.

But Mazarin was not deceived. He foresaw further attacks; and he resolved to be beforehand with his opponents. On the very day after the return of Broussel he drew up for the Queen notes of the course of action to be pursued. An agreement with De Retz and the other leaders of the opposition must be ostentatiously concluded. The court must then leave Paris. Suspicion must be lulled until Condé's return, and a blow must then be struck which should at once restore the royal authority. In the meantime the malcontents were to be divided by all possible means. Circumstances were favourable to this design. To the whole trading class these troubles meant confusion and loss. Already the guilds had met the principal shopkeepers, and had determined to meddle in nothing against the King's service. The Queen took pains to gain over the provost of the merchants, the commander of the city militia, and the captains of the quarters. Mazarin himself treated directly with many members of the *Parlement*, and was so successful that even Broussel and Blancménil appeared at court. This however served only to exasperate the younger members. Acting under the instigation of De Retz they met privately and determined to attack Mazarin personally by

agitating for the revival of the edict of 1617, which proscribed all foreigners who interfered in the government of France.

Mazarin now carried out his plan. At six in the morning of September 13 the court left Paris for Ruel, ten miles distant, where it was joined by Orleans, Condé, and the Duke of Longueville. This was followed by the dismissal of Châteauneuf and the arrest of Chavigni, old rivals of Mazarin, who were caballing with the disaffected members of the *Parlement*. Far from intimidating, this blow served only to irritate that jealous body. A deputation was sent to the Queen to demand the release of Chavigni, the return of the court, and the presence of the Princes of the blood at the deliberations of the *Parlement*. These demands were angrily rejected, Condé especially distinguishing himself by the violence of his language. The decrees of the *Parlement* were annulled by the Council, and it was half decided to supplant that body by royal commissions. The *Parlement* on its side prepared for defensive war. All business was discontinued, the city was secured against a surprise, and provisions were laid in for the expected siege

5. MAZARIN AND CONDÉ.

Everything in this contest is spasmodic, except the will and the design of Mazarin. The uncertain temper of Condé, to whom all men looked as possessing the power of the sword, had especially to be reckoned with. It was well known that, much as he despised the Frondeurs, his hatred of Mazarin was a still more powerful feeling. He had hitherto passionately refused to join in harassing the Crown. But now De Retz had little difficulty in persuading him to consent to a conference at which his jealousy of the Cardinal should be gratified

by the latter's exclusion. Mazarin did not care to contest the point. Whether the hatred against him was genuine may be doubted, but there is no doubt as to the vehemence of its expression at this time. No story of his crimes was too wild for credit ; he was a robber, a traitor, a gambler, a usurer, an atheist, and a debauchee ; to sack and burn Paris, to ruin France for his own greed, and to keep her at war with foreign nations that he might the better maintain himself in his usurped authority, were represented to be the objects of his life.

Condé consents to a conference from which Mazarin is excluded.

The conference lasted ten days. It resulted in the declaration of Oct. 22, 1648, in which the greater number of the claims made by the Chamber of St. Louis were conceded. But the root idea of the constitution, that in the King's presence nothing could be refused or combated which he personally announced, was preserved in the retention of the power to hold *lits de justice*, while as to arbitrary arrests a verbal promise, never intended to be kept, was all that could be wrung from Anne. 'If I consent to such requests,' said the Queen, 'my son would be no better than the King of a pack of cards.'

Declaration of Oct. 22, 1648.

Mazarin now devoted himself to again fixing the fickle humour of Condé. The task was not an easy one. But the Prince could not yet forget that he was of royal blood, and he had the true caste contempt for the 'gens de chicane' of the Parliament who pretended to tutor the King of France. His own interests moreover had not yet been awakened against the court. Mazarin, ever watchful and patient, was therefore before long successful. Condé yielded to the flatteries of the Queen and to the assurances of the Cardinal that the government should be conducted solely by his advice. In December the compact was closed by

Condé secured by Mazarin.

the cession to Condé of the governments of Stenai and four other important places. Bribery on a similar scale was equally successful with Orleans.

6. THE COURT LEAVES PARIS A SECOND TIME. BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR.

The court had meanwhile at the desire of the merchants returned to Paris. But the atmosphere was no less charged with trouble than before. Disappointed at the non-fulfilment of the Declaration of October 22 the *Parlement* were again in uproar. De Retz, fully in his element, stirred up the flame of sedition to the utmost. He found assistance from the authors of the innumerable pamphlets known as 'Mazarinades,' libellous writings against the Cardinal and the Queen, which, without pretensions to literary merit, tickled the ears of the Parisians with their mendacious and brutal allusions. Mazarin pointed out to the Queen that the revolution in England had been preceded by a similar phenomenon, and bade her remember that when, in order to stop such writings, Charles I. had sacrificed Strafford, he had but begun his own downfall by encouraging the Parliament to cry for further concessions.

Secure for the time in the support of Condé and Orleans, the court now determined upon force. Mazarin had long planned to retire to St. Germain, occupy the strategic points, and prevent the entrance of provisions into Paris. At three in the morning of January 5, 1649, the Queen left the Palais Royal a second time in haste and secrecy. At St. Germain she was joined by Mazarin, the Princes, and the court. 'Paris, on its awakening, heard with stupor and affright of the departure. The citizens saw war, siege, and famine at their gates.' Undismayed however the

Return of
the court.

The 'Ma-
zarinades'

Second
withdrawal
of the court.

Parlement met. All available measures of defence were taken ; provisions were hastily collected ; the gates were shut and guarded. The civil war had begun.

7. THE TWELVE WEEKS' WAR.

Mazarin had been quietly preparing for this decisive action by collecting troops in the neighbourhood of Paris ; and although they were yet too few to form any real blockade, he was able so far to hinder the entry of supplies that serious inconvenience was soon felt. The shopkeepers, with a considerable body within the *Parlement*, were anxious to come to terms. But the earnest opponents of absolutism, with the discontented *noblesse* and the lower classes, were bent upon resistance. De Retz was ceaselessly active, and under his influence the mob was soon in a state of wild excitement ; the houses of known adherents of the court were pillaged, and any who attempted to escape to Ruel ran serious risk of their lives. An army of 12,000 men was raised, ^{Organisation of Paris.} De Retz furnishing a regiment of cavalry at his own expense ; and a heavy war-tax was voted for their payment. A royal edict ordering the *Parlement* to retire to Montargis was met by a vote to demand the immediate dismissal and banishment of Mazarin.

The Frondeurs had indeed raised an army, but it was one that could not be trusted to meet the regular troops, and it was without leaders who could be opposed to Condé, the *général du Mazarin*, as he was now called. The want was partially supplied by the arrival of the Duke of Elbœuf, an old opponent of Richelieu ; he was at once named commander-in-chief. His dignity, however, was short-lived. The divisions within the Condé family and the jealousy of Mazarin were skilfully made use of by De Retz and the Prince's sister, the Duchess

of Longueville. They sent secretly to St. Germain to offer the post to Conti, Condé's brother, a youth both physically and mentally infirm; and on the night of January 7 Conti, Longueville, Marsillac, and La Mothe Houdancourt deserted the court. They were soon joined by Beaufort and by Bouillon, the brother of Turenne.

Danger threatened from two other quarters. Turenne, the general of greatest repute in France after Condé, and greatly Condé's superior in tactical skill, was on the frontier with a large body of troops, partly French and partly Alsatian mercenaries, whom he was endeavouring to induce to follow him against the royal forces. Normandy, where the Longueville family was powerful, was preparing for revolt. The dangers however were well and coolly met. Normandy rose, but the Duke of Longueville, who had been sent thither by his wife, was completely kept in check by Harcourt for the King. And when Turenne had resolved to march to Paris, he found that before he could do so he should have to fight his own troops. The mercenaries had been made safe by the distribution of 300,000 livres. Never had Mazarin applied money to better purpose. Turenne at once retired to Heilbronn, and thence to Holland, until the end of the twelve weeks' war.

Meantime, within Paris, the insurrection was in full swing. The Bastille and the arsenal had been taken by the Frondeurs; while the surprise of Charenton at the junction of the Marne and Seine secured for a time a free entry for provisions. But here the successes of the Frondeurs ceased; an attempt by Beaufort to take Corbeil was ignominiously defeated. More than one sortie was driven back, and Charenton was recaptured by Condé on February 8.

A natural reaction, headed by the clergy, began to

declare itself. For a time the violent section fought hard to keep the upper hand. An emissary of the court who was found distributing loyal literature was closely imprisoned. A herald from the King to the *Parlement* was refused admittance on the curious ground that heralds could pass only between enemies and equals, and that to receive him would be to admit that the *Parlement* was the enemy and the equal of the King. Still the credit of the irreconcilables was daily growing less, the process of disintegration being aided by the vexatious nature of the devices for raising money.

To provide a fresh stimulus for this flagging spirit De Retz now began to intrigue directly with Spain. The Spaniards were ready enough to meet these advances, for they were anxious to avenge their defeats in the field at Rocroy and Lens, and their discomfiture in diplomacy by the Treaty of Westphalia. On February 19 Conti informed the *Parlement* that an envoy of the Archduke Leopold, the governor of the Low Countries, prayed for audience. This envoy was a monk, sent indeed by the archduke, but whose address to the *Parlement* was actually prepared for him by De Retz. His admission however roused forcible protests from the moderate party. 'Can it be,' exclaimed the president de Mesmes, 'that a Prince of the blood proposes to grant, amid the *fleurs-de-lis*, an audience to the representative of the bitterest enemy of the *fleur-de-lis*?' Further checks in skirmishes with the royal troops led to bickerings among generals who were rebels from selfishness alone, while the inconvenience and positive distress which were now beginning to be felt were doing their natural work. An event moreover had occurred abroad which had a remarkable effect. The execution of Charles I. in England,

Reaction in
Paris in
favour of the
court.

Intrigues
with Spain.

Effect of the
execution of
Charles I.

so far from encouraging the Frondeurs, shocked the conscience of a people who, whatever else they might be fighting against, had no thought of fighting against monarchy; while the presence of Henrietta Maria in Paris, in need so great that she owed to De Retz the provision of a fire in the bitter winter weather, served to heighten the effect. Moreover, the news of Longueville's fiasco in Normandy and of Turenne's flight to Holland had by this time reached the harassed and disheartened city. Tired of rebellion which was not suc-

A conference determined on.

cessful, of exactions from which no results

were forthcoming, and of leaders who showed no capacity for leadership, the *Parlement* on February 28 decided to send deputies to treat with the court, though forbidden to hold communication with Mazarin.

It was characteristic of Mazarin that he never at any time took public notice of personal slights. He was perfectly willing now to humour the more violent members of the Parliament when they refused to treat with him in person. An arrangement was made by which the parties to the conference met on March 4 in separate rooms, and communicated with each other only through their secretaries.

Mazarin's treatment of personal attacks.

The following conditions were agreed to. The *Parlement* was to show its obedience by coming to St. Germain to attend a *lit de justice*; it was to hold no assembly without the royal permission during 1649; all its *arrêts* passed since January 6 were to be annulled, including those against the Cardinal, as also those by the Council against the *Parlement*; the troops in Paris were to be disbanded, and the inhabitants were to lay down their arms; the Bastille and arsenal were to be given back to the King; and a second envoy who had come from the Archduke was to be at once dismissed. On the other

Conditions of the agreement.

hand the King was to set all prisoners at liberty, to grant a general amnesty, and to return to Paris as soon as his affairs would allow ; the declarations of July and October were to be confirmed ; the claims of the Parliaments of Rouen and Aix were to receive favourable treatment ; and finally the right of the *Parlement* to take part in State affairs was at length to be admitted by the appointment of a member of the *Parlement* to assist in the negotiations with Spain.

Nothing but necessity would have wrung this from Mazarin. He knew however that Turenne had again offered an army to the insurgents, that the Archduke was about to invade France, and that if he did so the siege of Paris would have to be raised. For a moment it seemed as if even now the concessions were to no purpose. The energy of De Retz still kept up the violence of the extremists. The signature of Mazarin to the treaty made them furious ; they inveighed against the weak compliance of their representatives ; they demanded that the treaty should be burnt. Language borrowed from England was for the first time heard : ‘ The Kings made the Parliaments, it is true, but the people made the Kings.’ The cry for a republic was actually raised.

Once more it appeared prudent to give way. Leopold was already on French soil ; his vanguard had reached Pontavert on the Aisne. The court receded so far as to relinquish the *lit de justice* and the interdiction of the assemblies. Should this concession not satisfy the Frondeurs, it was determined to attack Paris with all possible force, while the Weimarian general Erlach with the mercenaries in the pay of the court faced the Archduke. Meanwhile every effort was made to detach the generals of the Fronde from the *Parlement*. It was a mere question of money.

Further
concessions
of the court.

With the single exception of De Retz, they handed in the personal demands upon the concession of which they offered to come over to the court. 'Roche-foucauld demanded the tabouret for his wife, and for himself eighteen thousand livres; Conti claimed a position in the Council and the government of some strong place; Longueville wanted an important government in Normandy, with reversion to his children; Elbœuf asked for the payment of large sums which he claimed to be due to him and his wife; Beaufort demanded Brittany for his father, Vendôme, and money for himself; Bouillon asked for himself a vast sum of money as compensation for the loss of Sedan, and for Turenne the government of Alsace and Philippsburg; Houdancourt required 700,000 livres.' Their greed was satisfied sufficiently to win them for the time. Mazarin steadfastly refused to grant away provinces or strong places, and they like true hagglers took what they could get in money and in promises. On April 1, all coherence of resistance being thus at an end, the *Parlement* met under a strong guard, for fear of the mob, and ratified the peace. It was obvious, however, that an arrangement which had been brought about by necessity on either side and by which neither party had gained its objects, was destined to be but a truce. The discontent with Mazarin remained as it was, the nobles were neither contented nor intimidated, and the Government felt that it had succeeded in obtaining a virtual victory less by its own strength than by the weakness of its enemies.

Had the provinces to any considerable extent espoused the cause of the Fronde, Mazarin could scarcely have escaped complete discomfiture. But Brittany, the most important, had remained thoroughly loyal; Champagne and Poitou, though excited, were easily kept in submission, and the revolt in Normandy had no popular

basis. In Aix in Provence the Frondeurs had taken up arms. By wise conciliation however Mazarin had secured their submission without bloodshed, and had induced the *Parlement* of Aix, by some increase of its privileges, to annul all the acts passed during the late troubles. The really serious outbreak was in Guienne, where a feud was raging between Épernon, the governor, and the *Parlement* of Bordeaux. The result was disastrous to the Bordelais. On May 16 the rebels were defeated in a battle which soon became a massacre in which three thousand men were slaughtered. Mazarin seized the opportunity to endeavour to re-establish the Intendants in the provinces. Foiled in this, he partially gained his end in another way, by choosing commissioners from the Parliamentary families, and by thus associating the *Parlement* itself with the reorganisation of the provincial administration.

During the daily complications of this struggle Mazarin had with unwavering firmness been conducting the negotiations for peace with Spain. Firmness indeed was needed; for Spain, relying upon his difficulties, had been endeavouring to impose hard conditions. It is significant of his confidence in the momentary character of those difficulties that from the Treaty of Westphalia he steadfastly refused the slightest concessions. Even now, though the Spaniards were on French soil, and though Ypres and St. Venant had both fallen into their hands, his only thought was to win some brilliant success in the field, which, like the victories of Rocroy and Lens, should smooth the path at home. Harcourt therefore, the ablest of the royal officers after Condé, was sent to besiege Cambrai, while in order to be near the seat of war the court took up its quarters at Amiens. The Spaniards

Behaviour
of the
provinces.

Outbreak in
Guienne.

The war
with Spain.
Firmness of
Mazarin.

however were able to throw reinforcements into the place and the siege had to be raised. The check was brilliantly redeemed by the capture of the fortress of Condé, commanding the junction of the Aisne and the Scheldt. And although this place had in turn to be abandoned, the great point had been gained of proving that France was still in a state of elastic vigour.

Mazarin meanwhile continued his dealings with the leaders of the Fronde. His first step was significant of the character of the time. Through the agency of one of her lovers he secured the Duchess of Chevreuse, the chief instigator of the plots with Spain, and through her he gained over in turn the support of many of his most dangerous opponents. Two important exceptions however occurred to his conquests. Beaufort declined all bribes. He preferred to remain the 'Roi des Halles.' De Retz, though he attended the court, steadfastly refused to see Mazarin.

At length, on August 18, 1649, it was thought safe for the court to return. The King's cortège was accompanied through the streets with enthusiastic cries of welcome. Even the hatred against Mazarin, always probably more fictitious than real, appeared to have vanished, and he was everywhere received with respect. The Parliamentary Fronde was at an end, and to all appearances the danger and confusion were past. As a matter of fact a storm, to which the last had been child's play, was about to break upon Mazarin

Negotia-
tions with
the leaders
of the
Fronde.

Return of
the court to
Paris.

CHAPTER IV.

THE NEW FRONDE.

I. DEFECTION OF CONDÉ.

HITHERTO the government had been on the whole supported by Condé. This support was now to be withdrawn. The great captain, with no sound cause of complaint, was literally in the sulks. He considered the reward of his merits and services insufficient; he was jealous of the permanent political support which, by the marriages of his nieces, Mazarin was acquiring among the great families, especially that of Vendôme, and he could not brook the supremacy of the Cardinal in the councils of the Queen. Regarding himself as the first man in the kingdom, within measurable distance of the crown; urged on by the adulation of the young *noblesse*, and by the comparison which De Retz drew between himself and the great Duke of Guise; he now determined to break with Mazarin. It is the course of folly and treason into which he was led by this enmity that constitutes the struggle of the New Fronde.

Unlike the Parliamentary Fronde, this movement had absolutely no title to respect. The ostensible and in some respects the real cry of the former was the cry for reform. But the leaders of the New Fronde never even pretended to desire reform. Their contempt for the *bourgeois* magistracy was as deep as was their hatred for the patient minister who stood ever in their path. It was a barren, aimless, and intensely selfish struggle for power, the last riot of the feudal spirit in France.

Character of
the New
Fronde.

An opportunity for a quarrel was soon found. Condé, besides presenting demands on his own account, required that Longueville should have the government of Pont de l'Arche in Normandy, a fortress which practically dominated Rouen. Steadfast to his policy of refusing to weaken the royal authority by the grant of fortresses, Mazarin braved the prince's anger. Condé, furious at the rebuff, publicly quarrelled with the Cardinal when asked to sign the contract between Mercœur, Vendôme's son, and Laura Mancini, Mazarin's niece. In a moment all the Cardinal's enemies rallied to the attack. Condé determined to strike his blow by inducing the *Parlement* once more to bring forward the proscription law of 1617 (see p. 38). Mazarin met the danger in characteristic fashion. He advised the Queen to write a letter to himself, ordering him to take Condé's advice regarding the nomination of all generals and principal officers of the Crown. No one was to be removed, no benefices to be filled up, no important resolution come to, without his assent; and Mazarin was to promise to support Condé's interest under all circumstances. Finally the minister was to require the Prince's consent to any marriage of members of his family. These terms were accepted by Condé, who in return promised Mazarin his support and friendship. The submission was in appearance complete, and the result was probably what Mazarin had intended. The Frondeurs, indignant at this treaty with the common enemy, broke with Condé. Mazarin at once turned the feeling to his own advantage. He bought up Mme. de Montbazou, Beaufort's mistress, and under her influence the Duke at length promised all that was asked him. Through the Duchess of Chevreuse, who had an old grudge against Condé's sister the Duchess of Longueville, and who recognised that in the end the Prince would have to

Quarrel of
Condé with
Mazarin.

Temporary
reconcilia-
tion.

yield to the astuteness of Mazarin and the firmness of the Queen, he secured the inactivity of De Retz (to whom, it is said, the Duchess sacrificed her daughter's honour in payment), and of those who followed his lead. Condé himself by two intemperate acts came to his aid.

Condé
estranges the
noblesse. By his demand for the title of 'Prince' for his friends, La Rochefoucauld, Bouillon, and La Trémouille, he insulted the rest of the *noblesse*;

and the Queen and Mazarin did their best to encourage the opposition which was excited. Still greater was the irritation caused by the admission of two of the friends of Mme. de Longueville to the privilege, most coveted of all distinctions by the ladies of the court, of being seated

*Guerre des
tabourets.* in the presence of the Queen. The *guerre des tabourets*, as it was called from the 'tabouret' or footstool placed before the chair, divided the court. The *noblesse* appealed to the Queen; Condé passionately defended his sister's friends. The Queen and Mazarin desired nothing better than to throw upon Condé the odium of asking for the distinctions objected to, and to acquire the credit of suppressing them. They therefore revoked the nominations, and earned the formally expressed gratitude of the whole body of the *noblesse*.

Not content with these acts of arrogance, Condé was now showing a reckless want of patriotism in encouraging the *Parlement* of Bordeaux to a second revolt, thus weakening France in the part most open to Spanish attack. This was the more culpable, as the Spaniards had been making way on the north-east. They had taken La Motte-au-Bois, and were threatening Dunkirk and Bergues. To preserve these two important places was, in all the agitations of the moment, Mazarin's constant anxiety. It was in this attitude of anxious hope and of unwavering determination to yield no inch of

Progress of
the war.

ground to the foreign enemies of France that the real greatness of Mazarin's character was most conspicuous.

Meanwhile the breach between the Frondeurs and Condé had been rendered complete. A fictitious plot was enacted, the authorship of which was equally ascribed to, and equally denied by, the Cardinal and the Frondeurs. A riot was excited among the Paris mob, during which a shot was fired into Condé's carriage, and one of his retainers wounded. Condé was persuaded that his own assassination had been intended. He demanded justice, and Mazarin affected eagerly to espouse his cause. Beaufort, De Retz, La Boullaille, and Broussel were formally indicted for conspiracy. Each day they appeared in court with their friends and retainers, all well armed. Condé and Orleans brought bands of gentlemen similarly prepared for fight into the great hall of justice. It seemed momentarily probable that the trial would be changed into a sanguinary conflict. In the end the Frondeurs managed so to prolong the proceedings that the whole affair was postponed to December 29.

But before that day another change had come over the shifting scene. Condé by his insolent egotism was incessantly playing into Mazarin's hands. He now roused to exasperation the haughty spirit of Anne of Austria, who had long been chafing under his control. By his threats and violence he had compelled her to undergo the humiliation of consenting to receive at court one of his most vicious dependents, who had insulted her by a declaration of love. He had, too, in the face of her commands, supported the Duke of Richelieu, grand-nephew of the great Cardinal, in a marriage which brought him entirely under his own influence, and in an audacious seizure of Havre, the most important harbour and fortress of the kingdom. The danger of allowing this power

to remain in Condé's hands was too great to be permitted to continue. Anne and Mazarin, supported by Orleans, whose jealousy of Condé had been sedulously fostered, determined on a step for which the isolation which Condé had created for himself rendered the moment favourable. They determined to arrest the Prince. Heavy prices had of course to be paid for the support indispensable to the success of so bold a stroke. The interest of Beaufort was gained by the gift of the admiralty to his father Vendôme, after it had been refused to Condé, with reversion to Beaufort himself, and by that of the viceroyalty of Catalonia to Mercœur. The nomination to a cardinalate was promised to De Retz, and heavy gratifications were given to his friends and to those of Mme. de Condé, Conti, and Longueville. The utmost secrecy as to the intention of the court having been maintained, Condé, Conti, and Longueville were then suddenly arrested on January 18, 1650, and imprisoned at Vincennes. 'The net has been thrown well,' said Orleans, 'it has caught at once a lion, a monkey, and a fox.' An attempt of Condé's immediate friends to create a tumult in Paris served only to show how little he could count upon support there. On the 19th the Queen informed the *Parlement* of the reasons for the step, and that body, as tired as herself of Condé's masterfulness, received the communication with the utmost respect. The *bourgeois*, mindful of the destruction of their houses and gardens in the suburbs during the siege, were equally inclined to concur, and Paris remained absolutely peaceful.

2. THE FRONDE IN THE PROVINCES.

The capital had been secured ; it remained to pacify the kingdom. Condé had warm partisans in Normandy, Burgundy, Guienne, Berri, Champagne, and Limousin ;

while Turenne at Stenai, a strong fortress commanding the Meuse, and the great roads to Luxemburg and Sédan, was a constant danger.

But Mazarin's activity was all-sufficing ; and his skill and patience in dealing with the danger, in conciliating where conciliation was possible, and in pressing the advantage he had gained by the imprisonment of Condé, were remarkable. He was well aware that that imprisonment could not last long ; he was determined therefore that when the Prince was again at liberty he should find himself deprived of his former sources of mischievous power. Normandy presented the most pressing danger. Any disturbance there, closing as it did the highway of the Seine, threatened distress and even famine to Paris. The Duke of Longueville's officers held the fortresses of Pont de l'Arche, Dieppe, Rouen, Caen, St. Lo, Cherbourg, and Granville. The Duchess had escaped thither and was doing her best to excite resistance. Following the plan he ever afterwards adopted, Mazarin decided, while taking ample measures for the safety of the other threatened quarters, to lead the Queen and the young King into the province. Before starting he made sure of the fidelity of Paris by the distribution of heavy bribes to the leading members of the *Parlement*. Orleans was left in command, but a devoted adherent of the Cardinal, Michel le Tellier, was placed at his side.

The court reached Rouen on February 5, having received on the way the submission of Pont de l'Arche, the governor of which was easily won by a heavy bribe. Within fifteen days Normandy was safe. The Duchess of Longueville had been compelled to fly ; Dieppe had been secured by force of arms, and Havre had been obtained from Richelieu by the gift of the *tabouret* to his wife. A bribe of 12,000 crowns bought the submission of the Château of Caen ; and the title of

Lieutenant-Governor of Lower Normandy to the head of the turbulent family of Matignon secured St. Lo, Cherbourg, and Granville. All disaffected garrisons and officers were changed, and the fortifications of Pont de l'Arche were destroyed. Titles of nobility, judiciously distributed among the members of the *Parlement* of Rouen, gained the sympathies of the *bourgeoisie*. On the 21st the court returned to Paris, bringing in their train the Duke and Duchess of Richelieu, with several of the leading *noblesse* of Normandy, as virtual hostages for the fidelity of the province.

Similar successes had been obtained in the other parts of the kingdom. Dijon, the capital of Burgundy, had surrendered, with many more of Condé's strongholds. Stenai, and Bellegarde on the Saône, were the only strong places in the north of France which still defied the royal authority.

In spite of the submission of Dijon, the temper of the people in Burgundy still threatened disturbance, and Mazarin at once decided to try there also the effect of the King's presence. By lavish bribery he again assured the steadfastness of his jealous and temporary allies. The Duchess of Chevreuse was especially insatiable in her demands and Mazarin was as ungrudging in satisfying them. During the whole of this expedition, his correspondence shows him incessantly occupied with keeping unbroken the brittle cords which bound for a time De Retz, Beaufort, Orleans, and the Duchess to his designs.

The court reached Dijon in the middle of March. The siege of Bellegarde was at once undertaken in spite of the difficulties attending the rainy season. Mazarin strengthened his force by calling to its aid the troops from Weimar who had refused to follow Turenne, and he heightened the enthusiasm of the soldiers by bringing the young King within the lines.

The court in
Burgundy.

The siege
and capture
of Belle-
garde.

A curious scene, very characteristic of the nature of the fight, now occurred. The cries of 'Vive le Roi !' which went up from the royal troops were raised with equal enthusiasm by the besieged upon the walls. They sent word to Louis that in honour of his arrival the fire from the place would be suspended for the whole day, nor would it be directed towards the quarter where his tent was placed. On April 11, thanks to Mazarin's good sense in giving the most favourable conditions, the place surrendered. The commander was taken into favour, and the garrison of 800 cavalry was incorporated with the royal army.

Stenai now remained the sole rampart of the rebel cause in the north of France. There Turenne had been joined by the adventurous Duchess of Longueville, who was indefatigable in keeping the spirit of confusion awake among the Frondeurs in Paris, the discontented Bordelais, and wherever opposition to Mazarin was possible. She negotiated, too, an alliance with Spain, which was met by a royal declaration, registered by the *Parlement* on May 16, that the Duchess, Bouillon, Turenne, and La Rochefoucauld, were guilty of high treason and outlawed, and that their property was confiscated to the Crown. This new alliance had little effect. The Spaniards indeed took Catelet on June 2 ; but they failed before the heroic resistance of the governor of the town of Guise. No common purpose existed between Spain and Turenne : the former cared only for the enfeeblement of France ; the latter for securing the family government of Sedan.

Scarcely had the court returned from Burgundy, when it was called away to Guienne, where, under the assistance of the mother of Condé, the hatred of Épernon the governor, and offers of help from Spain, the smouldering mass had broken into open flame

Treaty
between
Spain and
Turenne.

Revolt in
Guienne.

Bordeaux shut its gates against the royal forces, and refused to accept an amnesty from the benefits of which were excluded only those who had treated with Spain. For all acts of severity on the part of the Government they exacted full reprisals, and prepared for a vigorous resistance to a siege. That this should last but a short while was for Mazarin of the utmost importance, for he was confronted by dangers on every side. Intercepted despatches proved that Bouillon was directly communicating with Spain. In Italy things were going badly, for Porto Longone and Piombino had fallen before the Spanish attack. In the north the Spaniards had taken La Capelle, Vervins, and Marle ; Turenne had captured Rethel and Château Porcien, and the flying peasantry were carrying dismay into Paris itself. There too the Progress of the Spaniards and Turenne : agitation in Paris. faction of the Princes was continually strengthening itself, while the streets were placarded by still another party, who appealed to the people to seek their safety in the reconciliation of the various members of the royal family and in the banishment of Mazarin. Orleans was wavering once more, and conspiracies had been discovered in Normandy. Mazarin felt the urgent necessity of having his hands free. At length, on September 29, he secured his end with the appearance of victory, by a treaty with the Bordelais that, in token of obedience, the town should suffer a royal entry at the head of the army, should lay down their arms, and should raze their fortifications ; while in return Épernon was removed, the exiled councillors restored, and a complete and comprehensive amnesty granted to the city. Agreement with Bordeaux.

Mazarin at once turned to face his enemies at Paris and to take the offensive against Turenne. He refused further bribes to De Retz, and he determined at all costs to reconquer Rethel and to check the alarming advance.

of Spain. With infinite pains he managed to keep the Frondeurs still divided, and having removed the pri-

soners to Havre for greater security, set out with the court for the seat of war, reaching Reims on Dec. 5. Siege was at once laid to

Rethel. Mazarin himself, though suffering severely from gout and gravel, took up his quarters in the camp to encourage the soldiers, and displayed the utmost activity in providing not only for the greater matters of organisation, but for all those details in which the well-being of an army consists, down to the men's great-coats. So vigorously was the place attacked that it surrendered on Dec. 13. Scarcely had the garrison marched out when Turenne appeared to relieve it. His men however were tired, and, vigorously pushed by the royal troops, he retreated to an impregnable position on rising ground about twenty-two miles from Rethel. It appeared, however, not for the first or last time, as though when engaged in this unpatriotic warfare the greatest masters of the art lost their skill and judgment. Turenne allowed

his army to descend from the heights and spread itself over the intervening valley. Without an instant's hesitation the royal

marshal, Du Plessis-Praslin, dashed at them with his whole force. Turenne was in a few minutes utterly routed. Almost the whole of his infantry, 3,500 strong, were slain, the royal troops refusing quarter to all of French blood. Champagne was cleared of the enemy, and even Stenai itself prepared for a siege. One thing in especial was proved by this campaign. With

or without Condé, the royal troops could be counted upon. That this was due to Mazarin's

ceaseless care to render the service popular, that the tendency of a standing army to rally to the Crown had been strengthened vastly by his management, is clear. He

Campaign
of Rethel,
Dec. 1650.

Battle of
Rethel, Dec.
15, 1650.

Character
of the royal
army.

doubtless felt that, come what might, he would have to depend upon force in the end. It was for this reason that he had caused the young King to live among the troops. It was for this, too, that he was eager for a brilliant success at Rethel, and that he displayed such care for the personal comfort of his soldiers. That care did not cease with success. 'I despatched last evening,' he wrote to Le Tellier on the 16th, 'a great train of bread, wine, lint, and medicines, with surgeons to help the wounded, and in addition I have sent my own carriages to convey the disabled persons of quality, with money for distribution among the officers.'

Mazarin might well look back with pride upon what he had accomplished. Tortured as he was with disease, What Mazarin had accomplished. surrounded by open and secret enemies, and only wielding his power in the name of an infant King, he had allowed no note of weakness to escape him, and had met every danger with wary and supple resolution. By the imprisonment of Condé he had declared that the Crown should no longer be defied by any subject, however powerful. By dexterous management he had secured temporary quiet in the capital, and he had then, first in Normandy, next in Burgundy, afterwards in Guienne, and now in Champagne, stifled intestine war and driven the stranger from the soil; and as he returned to Paris he could boast that no town in France save Stenai refused obedience to the King. He had created an army devoted to the Crown; and while stretching conciliation to its limits in the endeavour to unite all Frenchmen to labour for one object, he had steadfastly refused during the worst periods of danger and doubt to yield the slightest concession to Spain. Mazarin was a great card-player, and it was said that he always rose from the table a winner, whatever might have been his losses during the game. This aptly illustrates his conduct

of great affairs. No view of his character is more false than that which represents him as a mere political adventurer. That is the view which contemporaries, blinded by the storms through which his piercing eye saw land and safety, might fairly take. But ultimate success in designs far distant and hidden from the eyes of others was all he cared for; in his determination to compass that he never wavered, and he played the great game of politics with a patience, a coolness, and a dexterous use of every turn of statecraft that compel our wonder even now.

CHAPTER V.

THE REBELLION OF CONDÉ.

I. FAILURE OF CONDÉ. MAJORITY OF LOUIS XIV.

MAZARIN returned to Paris as a conqueror. He might well have hoped to find his path easy. But the jealousy of ministerial absolutism turned his very successes to his disadvantage. Before the year was out, De Retz was attacking him with all the old vehemence before the *Parlement*, which passed a vote demanding his dismissal. It was sustained by the assemblies of the clergy and of the provincial nobility which De Retz had brought together in Paris, and by Orleans, whose fickle support had once more been secured by this master of intrigue. The authority of the regency had from the first rested upon the alliance of Mazarin with either Condé or Orleans; it now stood defenceless.

Once more the Queen, mindful of Charles I. and Strafford, refused to give up her servant. But Mazarin, who recognised that it was in hatred of himself alone that the various parties were united, with calmer wisdom

determined to withdraw. On the night of February 6, 1651, he secretly left Paris. At Lillebonne, on the 10th, he heard from Anne that she had been forced to give orders for the release of the Princes. Before the messenger had reached Havre he was there in person. If the Princes were to be set free, he was determined to secure if possible their gratitude by releasing them himself. This done he left France, and sought the protection of the Elector of Cologne. But though absent, he was none the less powerful. More than once, while in the thick of the confusion, he had appeared partially bewildered. From a distance he had a far more complete control of the situation, and the skill with which he guided the Queen through all her difficulties was most remarkable.

For the moment it doubtless seemed to Condé, as he entered Paris amid the enthusiasm of the streets, that the game was in his hands. To wrest the regency from the Queen, summon the *États Généraux*, and frame a new constitution, appeared well within his power. He soon recognised that such a scheme was hopeless. The *Parlement* feared that their privileges would be weakened; De Retz, the Duchess of Chevreuse, and their friends, had no intention of subordinating themselves to Condé. Longueville, Molé, Bouillon, and many others, were alienated by his arrogance, while the house of Vendôme was divided through the affection of Mercœur for Mazarin's niece, whom he shortly married. Condé was soon driven to see that his only chance of supremacy lay in coming to terms with the Queen herself.

His conditions were such that, had they been granted, he would have been virtual King of France. Without hesitation Mazarin urged the Queen to reject them, and to form in turn a close agreement with the Frondeurs.

They demanded a Frondeur ministry, and the nomination to a cardinalate for De Retz ; and on these terms they engaged to further the recall of Mazarin, and to allow the court to leave Paris. The mere suggestion of Mazarin's recall however brought about in turn an alliance between Condé and the *Parlement*. The Prince left Paris and refused to return until the chief official adherents of Mazarin had been dismissed. The Queen replied that she would sooner go into a cloister. Once again Mazarin succeeded in persuading her to give way. He felt the necessity of not allowing the understanding between Condé and the *Parlement* to become permanent, and he knew that with time his best friend would probably be Condé himself. His hopes were fully justified. By his insolent refusal to visit the Queen and the King, and by his general arrogance, the Prince rapidly alienated his friends in the *Parlement*, and thus robbed himself of his only support.

Alliance of
the Queen
with the
Frondeurs
against
Condé,

and of
Condé with
the Parlia-
ment.

Across the troubled scene of the last five years the monarchy had been guided up to an event of supreme importance. On September 7, with the full concurrence of the *Parlement*, which had been gratified by a fresh decree against Mazarin, and with every circumstance of rejoicing, was celebrated the majority of Louis XIV.

Majority of
Louis XIV.
Sept. 7,
1651.

The proceedings of the day, in which royalty appeared to the people in all its splendour, as the personification of the unity and power of France, are recorded in great detail. From one of the tribunes of the *Parlement* the ambassadors of the foreign powers looked down upon the inauguration of the epoch which was to establish the supremacy of France ; from the other the exiled widow of Charles I. gazed upon a scene which must have added by contrast a bitterness to the downfall of all her hopes. From the

crowd of great nobles one figure alone was absent. As Louis prepared to set out for the *Parlement* a letter was handed him, in which Condé expressed his regret that fear for his personal safety prevented him from attending the ceremony. The contemptuous refusal of the young King to open the letter well illustrated the changed conditions of the contest. From the moment the majority was declared, the Princes of the blood, until now rivals of the Crown, became subjects and subjects alone. Nothing was left for Condé but submission or fighting. Should he choose the latter he would no longer be fighting only against evil advisers; he would be a rebel against a King in the plenitude of his authority, supported by the instincts of a nation.

2. REBELLION OF CONDÉ.

Into rebellion however he threw himself with characteristic impetuosity. At Bordeaux he was enthusiastically received. The great families of La Roche-Condé takes up arms. foucauld, Rohan, La Force, La Tremouille, also upheld his cause in the south of France; Daugnon brought him a fleet; Marsin, the royal governor of Catalonia, carried over his best troops. Thus strengthened, and liberally supplied with money and men by Spain in return for the possession of a harbour on the Dordogne, he determined to defy the Crown. A royal declaration was at once issued depriving the Prince of all his honours and governments, and attainting him of high treason; and the declaration was registered by the *Parlement* on December 6.

Condé had underrated the resources of the government. An immediate progress through Poitou, Saintonge, and Anjou secured the quiet of these districts. Harcourt defeated La Roche-foucauld, relieved Cognac, and took La Rochelle from

Successes of
the Govern-
ment.

Daugnon. Condé, who had hastened to succour La Rochelle, was himself beaten at Tonnai-Charente, and was compelled to fall back upon the Dordogne. He now sought for allies.

In one powerful quarter he had great hopes. There had for long been existing among the Bordelais a strong Republican feeling, and this had been carefully encouraged by agents from England. As early as 1650 the help of England had been formally asked against the government, and an offer made in return of a port on the Gironde, and of La Rochelle. These offers were now renewed.

Cromwell however prudently sent to the south of France to ascertain the real position of affairs. His messenger reported that, secure in their religion through Mazarin's wise observance of former promises, the Huguenots gave no sign ; that the Fronde was a frivolous and discredited faction ; and that as for Condé himself, 'stultus est et garrulus, et venditur a suis Cardinali.'

In another direction Condé was equally unsuccessful. The Duke of Lorraine, for eighteen years a duke without a duchy, was always ready to sell himself and the army with which he wandered on the frontier to the highest bidder. Condé now applied to him, and Spain seconded the request. But Mazarin, by holding before him the prospect of a re-possession of his estates, succeeded for the time in baffling this design.

The moment had now come for Mazarin to reappear on the scene. Since the middle of October he had transferred his quarters to Dinant, on the frontier. Thence he had kept up an active correspondence with such of the governors of the provinces and commanders of the northern fortresses as were in his interest, and he had collected there a well-

equipped force of 7,000 men—the *Mazarins*—devoted to himself. With this army he crossed the frontier on December 24, and undeterred by the fulminations of the *Parlement*, which went so far as to set a price upon his head, marched rapidly through France and joined the King and Queen at Poitiers on January 30, 1652. He had brought with him, as the first-fruits of the King's majority, something more important than even his army or his counsel: he had brought Turenne.

Turenne
joins the
court.

They came at a critical moment. Condé indeed had again been outmanœuvred on the Dordogne. But danger was threatening from the north. The Duke of Nemours had collected a mixed army of French and Spaniards, and was now marching to join the forces under Beaufort, which Orleans, who had once more changed sides, had raised between the Loire and the Seine.

Critical
state of
affairs.

The emergency was boldly met by Mazarin. He led the court to the Loire, and at once took the offensive.

Battle of
Jargeau,
March 29,
1652.

On March 29 Beaufort and Nemours were beaten by Turenne at Jargeau. They immediately marched to Montargis to place themselves between Paris and the royal forces.

At this moment Condé suddenly arrived in their camp. Disheartened at his failure in Guienne, and warned of the danger on the Loire, he determined to take the command there. He at once made his presence felt. Falling by night upon one division of the King's army, he routed it, and almost captured the court. The skill of Turenne, who came up in haste, and who with numbers not a third of those of Condé prevented him from pursuing his advantage, alone averted a complete disaster to the royal cause.

Battle of
Bléneau,
April 7,
1652.

Condé hereupon betook himself to Paris. Orleans

was there in his interest, with a considerable force. But the *Parlement*, though still hating Mazarin, was unwilling to oppose directly a King whose majority had been declared. And above all, there was steadily forming itself among the wearied *bourgeoisie* a fresh party, who saw in the success of the Crown their only chance of the repose for which they longed. Thus foiled Condé turned to the mob. Anarchy was soon raging, for Turenne was gradually hemming in the city, and the people were furious with the *Parlement*, which seemed powerless to bring their miseries to an end. The news that Turenne had avenged Bléneau by a brilliant victory over Condé's Spanish forces at Étampes on May 4 increased the frenzy. The populace clamoured for something that should end their suspense, and turned their anger against the *Parlement* and Condé alike. An attack by the royal forces enabled Condé to draw the people into participation in the rebellion. With an armed but undisciplined mob he inflicted a serious check at St. Cloud upon Turenne, who thereupon undertook instead the siege of Étampes, in which the remains of Condé's force were shut up. The siege failed through a strange intervention. The Duke of Lorraine marched from the frontier, and appeared before Paris with his bandit army of 10,000 men, wasting the country as he came. He had come in the pay of Spain to help the princes. He kept his word by a peaceful agreement with Turenne that the siege of Étampes should be raised, and then, outmanœuvred by that commander, and moved by a bribe from Mazarin higher than Condé could offer, returned to the frontier after a fortnight's stay. The troops of Condé succeeded in escaping from Étampes and reached the suburbs of Paris. But the city guards, angry at the devastation which they

Condé goes
to Paris.
State of the
capital.

Battle of
Étampes,
May 4, 1652.

Appearance
of the Duke
of Lorraine.

witnessed, shut the gates, and refused them entrance. They encamped therefore at St. Cloud, and there Condé joined them.

Meantime Paris was given up to anarchy. The members of the *Parlement* were attacked in the streets, and at length that body suspended its sittings. Many fled to the court. Mazarin and Turenne, reinforced by 3,000 men, now determined to strike the long-deferred blow. On July 2 Condé's army was caught on the march in the streets of the Faubourg St. Antoine. A murderous conflict of several hours, in which the Prince displayed his accustomed bravery, resulted in his total defeat. Hemmed in between Turenne and the walls of Paris, he would have been utterly crushed had not his friends within the city, at the moment when Turenne was preparing a final attack, thrown open the gates to his shattered troops, and checked the further advance of the royalist forces by a cannonade from the Bastille. The immediate result was further violence and massacre in Paris, encouraged by Condé himself. The Hôtel de Ville, in which the general assembly of the city, which had replaced the *Parlement*, was in session, was set on fire by the mob, and many of the notables were cut down as they endeavoured to escape from the flames. Condé then coerced the Provisional government. remnants of the *Parlement* to consent to an administration, in which Orleans was Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, himself Commander-in-chief, Beaufort Governor of the town, and Broussel Provost.

The court had meanwhile to meet a fresh danger. At the beginning of July the Archduke Leopold, who had just taken Gravelines, and was besieging Dunkirk, sent a large force with Lorraine's troops to the aid of Condé. Turenne retired to Compiègne, and determined to defend the line of the

Spanish
invasion,
July 1652.

Oise with his 8,000 men. The enemy numbered 20,000, and had the Spanish general listened to the prayer of Condé and, with the Prince's help, attacked the royal troops, the result could hardly have been in doubt. But thus decisively to end a war which was every day weakening their great enemy was far from the interests of Spain. At the critical moment she recalled her army, and the danger thus disappeared as soon almost as it had arisen. Lorraine and Condé were easily held in check during the whole of September by the superior generalship of Turenne.

3. REACTION IN PARIS. ROYAL ENTRY.

In other ways the sky was brightening. The massacre of the Hôtel de Ville had disgusted all reasonable men.

Reaction in Paris. A great reaction took place in Paris. The *bourgeoisie* refused to pay the taxes demanded by the provisional government. Condé's army rapidly dwindled away ; on August 9 he could muster only 1,200 men. To separate their friends in the *Parlement* from

The *Parlement* of Pontoise. their enemies, the court now ordered that body to leave Paris and resume its sittings at Pontoise. Molé, the president, and some thirty members obeyed the summons, and their numbers increased day by day. The court thus gained the advantage of securing the registering of their acts according to the constitution. So greatly did Louis appreciate their services that to the end of his reign he paid all the members who attended the session of August 7—October 20 a pension of 6,000 livres, under the title of *Pensions de Pontoise*.

It did not at first appear that this step was for the interest of Mazarin. The *Parlement* of Pontoise demanded his dismissal. This however was obviously a prudent step, as it removed Condé's last excuse. The demand was acceded to with the old readiness, and on

August 19 Mazarin left the court to reside at Bouillon. Within Paris the party of order continually improved its position. So strong was it that on September 24 the *bourgeoisie* and the clergy determined to invite Louis

Growth of
the reaction. to return. The provost of the merchants, the principal magistrates, the six trade companies, with De Retz at the head of the priesthood, carried the invitation to St. Germain. Turenne meanwhile had once more outmanœuvred the Duke of Lorraine, and compelled him to lead his bands from France.

Flight of
Condé. Condé, bitterly disappointed, hastened with the remnants of his army to do the same. The fickle resolutions of Orleans were easily overcome.

Beaufort was induced to give up his governorship for 100,000 livres, and on October 21, 1652, amid a scene of the wildest rejoicing, Louis XIV. at last entered his capital. An amnesty was passed for all occurrences since February 1651, and all decrees issued in the interval, including those against Mazarin, were cancelled. Mazarin, however, did not at once return. He was busy in putting the army of Champagne into such order that Turenne was shortly able to drive Condé to La Capelle and to retake all the towns held by the prince except Rethel and St. Ménéhould. He was too perhaps

Return of
the court, unwilling again to appear prominently until he had heard of the exile of his rival Châteauneuf, of the complete dispersion of the leaders, male and female, of the Fronde, and of the arrest of De Retz. He entered Paris on February 3, 1653. The earliest opportunity

Humiliation
of the
Parlement. was taken for asserting the triumph of the principles of Richelieu and Mazarin. On the very day after the entry a *lit de justice*

was held, at which the *Parlement* was once again forbidden to assume any control over State affairs, or to meddle with finance.

Paris was now secure ; but the provinces were still agitated. In Provence, Burgundy, and Saintonge quiet was soon restored. The struggle in Guienne however was serious and prolonged. Bordeaux was under a reign of terror, and the violent section of its *Parlement*, known as the *Ormée*, from the fact that its meetings were held in a grove of elm trees, refused all the offers of the Crown. Its tyranny however became intolerable to the respectable citizens, and led to a dispersion of Condé's faction. On August 3, 1653, Bordeaux, vigorously pressed by the royal troops, opened its gates.

With this submission the long struggle of the Fronde came to an end. Its result was to leave the monarchy supreme. The conflict between royalty and the spirit of feudalism had ended in the complete triumph of the cause which best satisfied the yearning for order and the sentiment of national unity. The great nobles had failed because as time went on it became more clear that they had nothing to offer the nation, and that their cause was the cause of civil confusion. They now exchanged their fruitless pretensions to independence for the high commands, the titles, and the pensions which Mazarin showered among them, for all the gilded servitude of the court. The heads of great houses who had stood in arms against the King henceforth found their chief honour in filling the numberless offices which were created in the household, while the younger members of the *noblesse* were encouraged to seek a career in the one profession which was not beneath the dignity of their order. The *Parlements*, the only other bodies whose pretensions could be dangerous, were sternly kept within the original limits of their constitution. But while henceforth they were allowed to occupy themselves with the judicial

Submission
of the
provinces.

Conclusion
of the
Fronde. Its
main results.

functions alone, Mazarin was ever careful that no cause should be given them for discontent by interference with those functions. They became once more bodies of magistrates, constituting a legal caste. All the machinery of a purely centralised administration was rapidly reorganised, and in especial the Intendants, the favourite institution of both Richelieu and Mazarin, were immediately restored.

Even now, before she could claim that supremacy in Europe to secure which had been throughout all the troubles the guiding ambition of Mazarin as it had been of Richelieu, France had much to accomplish and many dangers to overcome. She had to win back the conquests which Spain, nerveless and inefficient as she had become, had been able to wrest from her during the years of confusion : Piombino, Porto-Longone, and Casale, in Italy ; Dunkirk, Mardyck, Gravelines, Furnes, and other towns, in Flanders ; Catalonia in Spain. And she had first to face the final efforts of Condé.

CHAPTER VI.

CLOSE OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

I. DEFEAT OF CONDÉ AND SAFETY OF FRANCE.

THE Prince had now taken the last step in treason. He had formally enlisted in the service of Spain, and

<p>Condé's invasion.</p> <p>Sieges of Arras and Stenai, June 1654.</p>	<p>with a mixed force of 30,000 men appeared in France in the spring of 1654. Turenne could only bring 16,000 to oppose him, but the spirit of his troops was high. Soon the interest of the war centred around two places, Arras and Stenai. The latter was besieged by the French on June 19, while Arras was at the same moment attacked</p>
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by Condé. All Europe stood watching the strife, for the first success would probably decide the war. Paris was in a ferment of expectation ; while circumstances known only to Mazarin invested the issue with singular importance. Condé was indefatigable, but he was feebly seconded by his Spanish colleagues whose punctilious pride had been annoyed by his arrogance. Within Arras a very different spirit reigned. The defences of the town were weak and the inhabitants were Spanish ; but the governor had no thought of surrender, and the officers of the garrison swore to one another to die at their posts. Meantime their brethren outside Stenai, encouraged by the presence of Louis, pushed the siege with such vigour that on August 5 the town capitulated ; and the besiegers at once hurried off to attack Condé before Arras. A desperate effort of the Prince to carry the place before these forces came up failed. On the 24th Turenne by a night attack forced his lines, and compelling him to retreat in confusion, pursued him almost to the walls of Brussels.

Complete
success of
the French.

The northern frontier was now safe. The treason of Harcourt, the governor of Alsace and Philippsburg, who had taken possession of Breisach, and had assumed the position of an independent prince, gave Mazarin an opportunity of securing also the frontier of the Rhine. Unable at first to bribe the commander, the Cardinal bribed his men. Harcourt, finding himself defenceless, listened to the minister's offers of 50,000 livres, and Mazarin took the governments of Alsace and Philippsburg into his own hands.

Before the beginning of the next campaign took place a scene which marked the distance over which the monarchy had moved since the beginning of Mazarin's career. On March 20, 1655, a *lit de justice* was held for imposing taxes, rendered necessary by the war. Louis

Security of
the frontiers.

was hunting at Vincennes when the news reached him that the *Parlement* was discussing the new acts with the view of remonstrating. Suddenly he appeared unannounced in the Palais de Justice, in the dress in which he had ridden hard from Vincennes, and with marks of anger in his face. Intervening at once in the discussion, he expressed his surprise at this audacity, curtly forbade the continuation of the proceedings, and then left the hall as abruptly as he had entered it. The *Parlement* never again ventured to incur a similar rebuke.

The same lesson was taught in a still higher quarter. The Pope refused to declare that a vacancy had been caused in the archbishopric of Paris by De Retz's forced resignation in prison. A compromise was arranged ; but the Pope insisted that the terms of the agreement should receive the sanction of the assembly of the clergy and of the *Parlement*. Mazarin unhesitatingly refused the condition. In the most emphatic terms he laid down the doctrine that the absolute and despotic power in France was with the King, and that no organisation whatsoever in the kingdom could pretend to the smallest share ; and it illustrates the national and anti-papal character of the Gallican Church that Mazarin was strongly supported by the clergy in this position.

The summer campaign of 1655 was little more than a military parade on foreign ground. Everywhere France was now on the offensive. Fortress after fortress was captured ; and in November the leaderless army of the Duke of Lorraine, who had been arrested by the Spaniards and imprisoned in Madrid, was taken into French pay. Fortune had been more evenly balanced in Italy and Catalonia, though there too the French had more than held their own.

Assertion of
the royal
authority.

Campaign
of 1655.

2. THE ENGLISH ALLIANCE.

Mazarin was now bent upon an enterprise which, if successful, must finish the war. A deadly blow would be struck at the strength of Spain if Dunkirk, Mardyck, and Gravelines—the possession of which was of vital importance to her communication with Flanders as well as enabling her to ruin French commerce on that coast—could be wrested from her. For this the co-operation of some maritime power was necessary, and Mazarin determined at all costs to secure England. With Cromwell, the only diplomatist by whose astuteness he confessed himself baffled, he had been negotiating since 1651, but up to this moment with no result. In 1654 the Protector found himself courted by both the great powers. He told them the terms on which his help might be had. In each case they were dictated by the two main principles of his policy—the desire to make England mistress of the seas, with a foothold on the continent, and the desire to protect Protestantism. From Spain he must have Calais, when taken from the French, freedom of trade with the American colonies, and a cessation of all attacks by the Inquisition upon English merchants in Spain. The first condition met with no favour in Spain, since it would place her communication with the Netherlands at the mercy of England. To the second and third she returned a flat refusal; to grant them, she said, would be giving up the King's two eyes. From France Cromwell demanded Dunkirk, when captured from the Spaniards, and promise of toleration for the Huguenots; and Mazarin was ready to accede to these terms. Mutual jealousies however and varying interests hindered an understanding, and the massacre of the Protestant Waldenses in Piedmont by the Duke of Savoy would have caused the negotiations

to be broken off had not Mazarin yielded to Cromwell's demand and compelled the Duke to grant the survivors favourable terms.

At length on November 3, 1655, a treaty was signed at Westminster, based upon freedom of commerce and an engagement that neither country should assist the enemies or rebels of the other; Mazarin consented to expel Charles II., James, and twenty named royalists from France. Cromwell similarly agreed to dismiss from England the emissaries of Condé.

But Mazarin was soon anxious for a more effectual bond. The French army had sustained a grievous disaster by a victory of Condé at Valenciennes, which threatened the loss of all the advantages of the campaign. The financial embarrassments too were very great. The army was unpaid, and peasant risings were taking place in various parts of the kingdom.

Cromwell had equally good reasons for drawing closer to France, for Spain was preparing actively to assist Charles II. French and English interests thus coinciding,

Treaty of an alliance was signed at Paris on March 23, 1657. Gravelines and Dunkirk were to be at Paris, March 23, 1657. once besieged both by land and sea. England was to send 6,000 men to assist the French army. Gravelines was to become French and Dunkirk English; should the former fall first it was to be held by England until Dunkirk too was taken. Mazarin disarmed the hostility felt by the French clergy to such an alliance with heretics by a clause preserving the Catholic religion in any towns taken by the English. The danger that England might gain too strong a hold on the continent was guarded against by her promise to attack no other towns in Flanders.

The alliance was not a moment too soon. The campaign of 1657 had opened disastrously. The tide was however turned by the arrival of the English contingent. Montmédy was immediately besieged, and capitulated on August 4. The effect was again to make Mazarin hang back from further effort, since it seemed possible now to make peace with Spain, and thereby avoid an English occupation of Dunkirk. But Cromwell would stand no trifling, and his threats were so clear that Mazarin determined to act loyally and without delay. On September 30 Turenne laid siege to Mardyck, which protected Dunkirk, and took it in four days. It was at once handed over to the English.

Capture of
Mardyck,
October 3,
1657.

Mazarin had meanwhile gained an important diplomatic success. The Emperor Ferdinand III. had died on April 1, 1657. Mazarin knew that in breach of the Treaty of Westphalia he had been constantly sending help to Spain, and that Leopold, his son, was now doing the same. He determined to seize the opportunity of depriving his enemy of so important a source of support. For the next eighteen months he exhausted all the resources of diplomacy to oppose Leopold's succession to the imperial title, putting forward first Louis XIV., and then the Elector of Bavaria, as rival claimants.

To secure his election Leopold found himself compelled by the electors whom Mazarin had won by wholesale bribery to sign a 'capitulation,' by which he bound himself to observe with scrupulousness the terms of the Peace of Westphalia. And on August 14 Mazarin managed further to form the Rhine League, by which six of the electors, with the King of Sweden, joined with France in an engagement to compel Leopold during three years faithfully to observe his word. The expense incurred by France was ruinous; but the need of neutralising Leopold's

Formation
of the
Rhine
League,
July 1658.

sympathies with Spain was immediate, and the value of the influence gained in German affairs was of vital importance to Mazarin's future plans.

Meanwhile the great blow had been struck in the north. At the demand of Cromwell a fresh agreement had been made in the spring of 1658 by which the siege of Dunkirk. the siege of Dunkirk had without further delay been begun. Under Turenne's command, and encouraged by the presence of Louis, the combined English and French forces worked with desperate energy against the almost insuperable difficulties of the position, aggravated as they were by bad weather, want of provisions and munitions of war, and irruptions of the ocean. On June 10 Turenne learned that Don John of Austria and Condé, accompanied by the Dukes of York and Gloucester at the head of some English royalist regiments, had arrived at Furnes, intending to force his lines. Leaving sufficient men to continue the siege he at once marched to meet them. So confident were the Spanish commanders in their numbers, and so inefficient was Don John himself, that all proper precautions were neglected. Condé, knowing to whom he was opposed, foresaw the coming disaster. Turning to the young Duke of Gloucester he asked him if he had ever seen a battle. The Duke replied that he had not. 'Then,' said Condé, 'in half an hour you shall see how one can be lost.'

He was not deceived. The picked Spanish infantry, supported by the English and Irish auxiliaries under James, held the dunes or low sandhills on the right. Straight up against them, sinking deep in the sand at each step, went the Ironsides with an impetuous valour which was the wonder of all who saw. Condé on the left met Turenne's onslaught with such desperate energy that he twice repulsed him, and nearly broke through his lines. But in the end the

Battle of
the Dunes,
June 13,
1658.

discipline of the Ironsides and the skill of Turenne won a crushing victory.

Dunkirk immediately surrendered, and on the 25th was in Cromwell's possession. Two months later Gravelines also fell. A short and brilliant campaign followed, in which Don John and Condé, shut up in Brussels and Tournai respectively, were compelled to remain inactive while fortress after fortress fell into French hands.

A few days after the fall of Gravelines Cromwell died ; but Mazarin was now near his goal. Utterly defeated on her own soil, beaten too by the Portuguese at Elvas, and threatened in Milan, her army ruined, her treasury bankrupt, without a single ally in Europe, Spain stood at last powerless before him. The rest he felt was but the work of diplomatic skill, and in diplomatic skill, now that Cromwell was dead, he had no master. To him the prospects of peace were at least as welcome as to Spain ; for France, so terrible was her exhaustion after thirty years of ceaseless foreign and civil war, maintained only by taxation of crushing severity, was from every corner of her devastated departments literally crying aloud for repose.

3. PEACE OF THE PYRENEES.

The treaty between France and Spain dealt in the first place with accomplished facts. By a preliminary arrangement in February 1659, all the conquests made by France previous to the English alliance were to remain hers for ever ; but the places captured by Turenne in the last campaign (except Mardyk which was held by France, and Dunkirk which was retained by England), with Valence and Mortara in Italy, and several towns in Catalonia, were to be restored to

Spain. Artois (with the exception of Aire and St. Omer), Roussillon, and Alsace, became French soil ; while by the cession of many fortresses in Luxemburg, Hainault, and Flanders, her foot was planted firmly in the Low Countries.

Bound in honour and gratitude to do what they could for Condé, the Spanish ministers urged his restoration, not only to all his possessions, but to his governments and dignities as well. The demand was at this stage formally and decisively refused by Mazarin.

But it was the future rather than the present which as usual most occupied Mazarin's thoughts. Just as in the Peace of Westphalia he had been looking to the future weakening of the power of Austria when he helped to secure the independence of the separate German States, so now he was looking to the future absorption of the Spanish monarchy into that of France, when treating for what had long been looked to as a foremost condition of peace between the two kingdoms, the marriage of Louis with the Infanta.

The grounds of his expectation lay in the peculiarity of the Spanish law of succession, a peculiarity which dated from the eleventh century. Not only did the crown descend to the daughter where no male heirs in direct descent were living, but, contrary to the custom of Europe, it was by her carried to her husband. It was this law by which in 1217 Castille and Leon, and in 1479 Castille and Arragon, were united ; and which by the marriage of Jeanne la Folle, the heiress of the Spanish monarchy, to Philippe le Bel, the heir to the Austrian dominions and the Low Countries, made their son Charles V. the sovereign of nearly half the known world.

But in 1612, when the marriage of Louis XIII. and Anne of Austria opened up the possibility of a combina-

tion still more threatening, the union namely of the French and Spanish crowns, the general alarm of Europe and the national jealousy in Spain brought about a breach of this law. The contract of marriage then drawn up contained an entire renunciation by Anne of all pretensions to the Spanish throne for herself and for her descendants, and this renunciation was after the marriage reaffirmed both by herself and Louis XIII. A similar renunciation was now insisted upon on the part of Marie-Thérèse and Louis XIV.

Mazarin exhausted all his art to evade the Spanish demand. The prospect of this succession had been foremost in his mind ever since 1646, when he was hoping to come to terms with Spain before the Peace of Westphalia. And now although there seemed no present likelihood of the renunciation being referred to, since in 1658 and 1659 two sons were born to Philip IV., and the claims of the Infanta would be dormant during their lives, yet, these sons being both delicate (one died in 1660 and the other in 1661), his anxiety to avoid the renunciation was as great as though no such obstacle existed.

Failing in this, Mazarin as usual gained his ends by indirect means. He demanded a dowry of 500,000 crowns with the Infanta, of which one-third was to be paid on the day before the marriage, and he refused to proceed with the treaty until this demand was agreed to. He then instructed his secretary Lionne, to whom was entrusted along with Don Pedro Coloma the task of drawing up the contract, to procure the insertion of a clause setting forth that the validity of the renunciation should be dependent upon the punctual payments of these sums. After much diplomatic fencing, the skill of Lionne overcame the reluctance of


Renuncia-
tion of Anne
of Austria
and Louis
XIII.

Renuncia-
tion of
Marie-Thé-
rèse and
Louis XIV.

Insertion of
clause re-
lating to
dowry.

TABLE OF RELATIONSHIP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CLAIM OF LOUIS XIV.
TO THE SPANISH SUCCESSION AND TO THAT OF THE
SPANISH LOW COUNTRIES.

Philip III.



- (1) With regard to the succession to the Spanish monarchy, Louis XIV. declares all renunciations invalid, as contrary to a fundamental law of Spain, and that of himself and Maria Theresa invalid on the additional ground that the dowry was not paid according to treaty.
- (2) With regard to the succession to the Spanish Low Countries, Louis XIV. upheld the claim of his wife against that of Charles II. on the ground that she was born of Philip IV.'s *first* marriage, while Charles II. was of the second.

Coloma, and this condition, which contains the key to the French policy of the next four years, was duly included in the contract. Whether from inability to raise the money, or more probably because, Coloma having died in the interval, the condition was overlooked by the

The renunciation invalid. Spanish ministers, the first sum had not been paid when the marriage took place, and the renunciation was therefore invalid. On the next day Mazarin and Lionne were able to congratulate one another upon having thus completely outwitted Spain.

The question of Portugal had next to be settled. That kingdom had in 1640 recovered its independence, and the Duke of Braganza, under the title of John IV., had since worn the crown. He had from that time been a thorn in the side of Spain, and had been actively assisted by France. So anxious was Mazarin not to lose this source of support in the future, that he actually offered to restore to Spain all the French conquests in the Low Countries if the independence of Portugal might be recognised in the treaty. But Spain had set her mind

Mazarin gives way regarding Portugal. upon reducing this rebellious province. All that Mazarin could obtain for her was a truce of three months, while on the part of the King of France it was promised that he would never, directly or indirectly, give to her any aid whatsoever, public or secret. It will however be seen that when a convenient time came, this promise was easily evaded.

On one other point Mazarin found himself compelled to give way. Condé's future again occupied a large part of the conferences which he held with Don Restitution of Condé. Luis de Haro at the Isle of Pheasants in the Bidassoa river. De Haro threw over the preliminary treaty in this respect, and demanded in the most pressing manner that Condé should be fully restored. Mazarin at length yielded. The Prince was reinstated in his

possessions, honours, and dignities, receiving the government of Burgundy, with possession only of Dijon and St. Jean de Losne, instead of Guienne, and the dignity of Grand Master of the Household for his son. But Mazarin gained an ample equivalent. Avesnes, one of the most valuable towns in Hainault, with Philippeville and Marienburg, as well as the territory of Conflans under the Pyrenees, were ceded to France, while the Duchy of Juliers was restored to her ally the Duke of Neuburg. Moreover, as Mazarin said, Condé now gained no more than he certainly would have received after giving in his submission to the King.

Finally, the Duke of Lorraine was provided for. He was re-established in his duchy, with the exception of
 Duke of Moyenvic and the districts of Bar and Cler-
 Lorraine. mont, Stenai, Dun, and Jarmetz, which became French. He was compelled to promise that he would join no league against France, and would allow her armies to pass freely through his territory.

The importance with which this settlement was invested throughout Europe was seen in the presence at the place of conference of deputies from Sweden, Austria, Germany, the Commonwealth of England, and the exiled Charles II. Sweden and the Rhine League were clamorous for the aid of France against the Emperor, who again, in defiance of the Treaty of Westphalia, had invaded Pomerania. The affairs of England, too, received much attention.

Both Spain and France were well disposed towards Charles. But it was important for France to have the
 Arrange- good-will of England in view of a possible
 ments renewal of the war; and England at present
 regarding England. meant the Commonwealth. Mazarin therefore declined Charles's offers (including his proposal to marry the Cardinal's niece Hortense Mancini, and, when re-

stored, to hand over the government of Ireland), and refused to help in his restoration; further, he satisfied Lockhart, the English ambassador, by agreeing that Charles should not be allowed to employ the forces which Condé would leave when taken back into favour. With respect to the war which continued between Spain and England, it was agreed that France should preserve a complete neutrality.

Such were the principal provisions of the Peace of the Pyrenees, which gave a short period of repose to southern Europe. For Spain it was what the Peace of Westphalia had been for Austria, a confession of weakness and mark of decline. For France it was, as that Peace had also been, a fresh step towards European supremacy. But France, though she had gained much, though her boundaries were now the Rhine and the crest of the Pyrenees, though she had prepared for the future by the formation of the Rhine League and the Spanish marriage, and though she had established a foothold among the fortresses of the north-east, had, unhappily both for herself and Europe, been unable to force from Spain that complete rampart for Paris, the determination to secure which had been the main reason for the earnestness with which throughout all the difficulties of the last fifteen years she had bent herself to the war. And so it was that what might have been a lasting peace was indeed only a truce. The attempt to make good this unfulfilled desire forms the subject-matter, so to speak, of the intrigue and the fighting of the next eighteen years.

Incomplete
fulfilment of
the desires
of Mazarin.

CHAPTER VII.

RESTORATION OF MONARCHY IN ENGLAND.

I. CONDITIONS OF THE RESTORATION.

LOUIS XIV., after the fever fit of the Fronde, had entered upon his sovereignty by the right of conquest, unshackled by any constitutional authority, and unbound by any conditions. In England, too, monarchy was within a year after the Peace of the Pyrenees, re-established amid all the signs of popular rejoicing, and with greetings as apparently servile as those offered to Louis himself. And yet Charles was bound hand and foot by conditions the failure to fulfil which would in all probability have relegated him once more to a wandering life among the courts of Europe.

Charles II. restored without written conditions, and yet upon sufferance.

That this was so arose from the all-important fact that, speaking roughly, he was restored by those who had overthrown his father and who were responsible for his own exile. The fleet, the army, the fortresses, were in their hands. England had, it is true, shaken off at length the military despotism by which Cromwell had cut right athwart the most cherished traditions of English life. Like an unstrung bow, she had fallen back upon her old ways of life. She had restored her Parliament, and then, Parliament and monarchy being co-ordinated in the English mind, she had restored her King. 'This government was as natural to them as their food or raiment, and naked Indians dressing themselves in French fashion were no more absurd than Englishmen without a Parliament and a King.'

But having thrown off, first the despotism of Charles I., and then the despotism of military force, the country had no thought of taking another. The new reign must take account of the feelings which had grown up during the overthrow and abeyance of monarchy. That Charles fully recognised the position was seen in his own words some months later to the House of Lords, when he spoke of 'those who brought or permitted us to come here.' The people might, it was hoped, in their impatience be deceived by the professions made; but made they must be. The Declaration of Breda was admirably suited to the object in view. By the most careful expression of deference to the authority of the Parliament Charles trusted to lull suspicion until he was steady enough upon the throne to use his constitutional power of dissolution at a favourable moment, and thus to secure a parliament more to his wishes.

The foremost question in men's minds was, how far the spirit of retaliation was likely to go. Had the Restoration, instead of being the re-establishment of Parliamentary government, been the work of a victorious Royalist movement, the passions roused would have been quenched, the accumulated injuries of years avenged in torrents of blood. But the Declaration granted a general pardon to all who within forty days after its publication should by any open act return to loyalty and obedience, *excepting only such persons as shall hereafter be excepted by Parliament.* The King's word was indeed solemnly passed for an absolute oblivion of all acts committed against him or his father. In the letter to the Speaker accompanying the Declaration, however, a significant hint was given, 'If there be a crying sin for which the nation may be involved in the infamy that attends it, we cannot doubt that you will be as

solicitous to redeem and vindicate the nation from that guilt and infamy as we can be.'

The question of the Church was treated under the same conditions. The Presbyterian was looking forwards
 The Church. with eager anxiety, the Anglican Churchman with exultant hope. To quiet the one, but in terms which might afterwards leave the field clear to the other, Charles proclaimed on his own account a complete 'liberty to tender consciences,' declaring himself ready 'to consent to such an Act of Parliament as, *upon mature deliberation*, shall be offered to us for the full granting that indulgence.'

The re-settlement of the land was next dealt with. During the wars many estates had changed hands. The
 The land. Crown lands and those of Church dignitaries had been confiscated by the Commonwealth and sold. About them nothing was said in the Declaration. As to private estates, either granted away by the Commonwealth or sold by distressed Royalists, the decision was left absolutely in the hands of Parliament.

In another matter the Declaration expressed how completely the Restoration was one of sufferance. It
 The army. concluded with a promise to consent to any Act of Parliament 'for the full satisfaction of all arrears due to the officers and soldiers of the army under the command of General Monk,' and to receive them into the royal service 'upon as good pay and conditions as they now enjoy.'

The recognition of the absolute authority of Parliament in questions regarding the Church and the land, the complete waiving of a desire for personal vengeance, the satisfaction of Monk's army, these were the conditions under which Charles was allowed to return to England.

The composition of the executive government expressed the nature of the compromise. The Privy Council

was really nominated by Monk, and was composed in a great degree of leading Presbyterians. Out of this however was formed a small committee, which ^{The} ^{ministry.} practically had the whole control of affairs. Edward Hyde, now Earl of Clarendon, was Lord Chancellor, and was so supreme that the years from 1660 to 1667 are fitly named the 'Clarendon administration.' With him was Ormond, who projected into this reign the high-toned virtues of the old Cavalier stock; Southampton the Lord Treasurer, and Nicholas the Secretary; these four representing the principle of legitimacy in its purest form. On the other hand Monk and his confidant Morrice were included, while Lord Robartes, who had fought against the king, was made Viceroy of Ireland. Scotland was placed under Middleton, a rude soldier of fortune who had served on both sides.

2. PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE DECLARATION OF BRED A.

The Indemnity Bill was taken up at once. Charles and Clarendon were determined that in this respect the ^{Partial} ^{indemnity.} Declaration should be carried out as loyally as the prevailing temper might allow; and they managed at least to confine the spirit of retaliation within intelligible lines. A broad distinction was drawn between the regicides, those namely who had committed the 'crying sin,' and all others. About the former the majority of the House of Commons had little hesitation; the true Presbyterian abhorred the crime of the king's death as much as the Royalist. They began on June 5 by excepting from the benefits of the Act five of the judges 'for life and estate'; on the 8th three more were added; and the next day twenty more, 'for pains and penalties not extending to life.' It was not until July 11, and then only in consequence of an urgent message from Charles,

that with some further additions the bill passed the Lower House. In the Lords a far more savage spirit reigned. The Earl of Bristol was the spokesman of the majority, when he complained that the bill was miserably inadequate, though he thought that delay was even a worse evil than an incomplete revenge. On July 20 the Lords resolved that all who had signed the warrant should die ; and three days later they included 'all who were concerned' in the murder. Once more Charles intervened. But for his promise, he told the Lords plainly, neither he nor they would have been there ; his own honour and the public security alike demanded an indemnity for all except those immediately guilty of his father's death. With amendments which the Commons would not accept

the bill passed the Lords on August 10. In
 Feeling in the Lords. the conferences between the Houses the feeling of the Lords was expressed in a demand for the death of four members of Cromwell's High Court of Justice in revenge for the death of four of their own number condemned by that court, the victims to be chosen by the relatives of the slain peers. The Commons however refused to entertain the proposal, 'hoping,' in full accord with Charles and Clarendon, 'that their Lordships would not have the sacrifice of the King's blood to be mingled with any other blood.' At length, on August 29, the bill passed. Besides the exceptions already mentioned, Hacker and Axtell, who were not among the King's judges, were excepted for life ; while in the case of Vane and Lambert, though they, as men of mischievous power and activity, were excepted, it was understood that a pardon should be granted them ; and it was further determined that those who had given themselves up should be tried, but, if convicted, should not be executed without a special Act of Parliament.

The trial which followed is famous because Orlando

Bridgeman, interpreting the events of the last thirty years, then established the present view of monarchical immunity and ministerial responsibility. The king's person, he laid down, is inviolable ; he is directly subject to God alone ; and no authority whatsoever can exercise coercive power over him. The full responsibility of ministers was affirmed with equal emphasis.

With the exceptions mentioned every act against the State committed between June 1, 1637, and June 24, 1660, was forgotten. At the price of some twenty lives the universal fear was removed. It should not be forgotten that it was principally owing to Charles and Clarendon that, after a civil war which had its roots in the deepest feelings which can stir men's minds, after a despotism which, triumphant as it placed England among European nations, had roused the bitterest resentment, the restoration of the old order was accomplished with bloodshed which, when compared with the provocations which seemed to call for vengeance, was well-nigh insignificant.

Life was now safe ; it remained to give the same security to property. With regard to the Crown lands, those of the Church dignitaries, and in a few cases those of private owners who had been forcibly dispossessed, no action was taken either by the court or the Parliament until the dissolution ; they then in the natural course of law, since their confiscation had been illegal, reverted to their original owners. The question of private estates however was a different one. Those Royalists who had voluntarily sold their lands looked eagerly forward to regaining them. But here, to their indignant disappointment, Clarendon stood firm in his assertion of the sanctity of private contract, and the Bill of Sales decreed the confirmation of all transfers made with the owners' consent. Probably to no act of his administration did Clarendon owe more odium, as for

none did he deserve more credit, than to his integrity in this affair.

Another matter of the first importance for the stability of the restored government was then taken in hand. Both Charles and the Commons were eager for the disbanding of the army. To the King, principally composed as it was of the soldiers who had served Cromwell, and whose acquiescence in Charles's return was largely mingled with sullen jealousy, it formed a standing menace; in the presence of such a force the monarchy could not breathe freely. But Charles had another reason, little guessed at the time. It is now known that he had formed the deliberate intention of dissolving Parliament as soon as the troops were disbanded, wresting all the power from the Presbyterians, and with the help of foreign money raising an army for himself, independent of any other authority. His people were as eager for the disbanding as he was. The cost of maintenance alone, 70,000*l.* a month, was no light burden. But of all the feelings roused by Cromwell's rule, hatred of his military despotism was the deepest; it finds eloquent expression throughout the reign, and has entered the statute book in the Mutiny and Riot Acts. In the debate on August 30 William Morrice aptly expressed the general feeling when he said that as long as the soldiery continued there would be a perpetual trembling in the nation; they were inconsistent with the happiness of any kingdom. The keeping of the army on foot was like a sheep's skin and a wolf's skin, 'which, if they lie together, the former loses its wool.' 'The nation,' he said, 'can not appear like itself whilst the sword is over them.' Monk willingly co-operated in the step, though it at once robbed him of his extraordinary position. His utmost wishes were satisfied. The rude soldier of fortune had fallen upon times which gave ample scope

Disbanding
of the
army.

for his peculiar genius. He had played the game with incomparable dexterity, and had won the stakes. He had been made Gentleman of the Bedchamber, Knight of the Garter, Master of the Horse, Commander-in-chief, and Duke of Albemarle, with a pension of 7,000*l.* a year ; and he had nothing more to desire.

In England fourteen regiments of horse and eighteen of foot, in Scotland one of horse and four of foot, were disbanded. Charles however took advantage of the sudden rising of a few fanatics in the streets of London to retain the Coldstream Guards and a regiment of horse, with one of the regiments which formed the garrison of Dunkirk, in all about 5,000 men.

One instance of the growth of modern constitutional ideas was the doctrine of ministerial responsibility laid down by Bridgeman. Another was the adoption of the principle that the whole nation should pay to get rid of an abuse, even when a single class is benefited by its abolition.

In settling the royal revenue the feudal tenures, which pressed solely upon the landed interest, with the Court of Wards were swept away, and the money was raised instead from the excise which, having been raised originally by the Long Parliament to defray the expenses of the war against the King, was now perpetuated. It is no wonder that vehement debates took place upon the proposal, and that while political economists like Ashley Cooper and Maynard were supporters of the change, it was opposed both by crotcheteers like Prynne, and by statesmen like Annesley.

There remained but one question, but that a question of supreme importance -- the settlement of Church government. The Restoration had been the joint work of Episcopalian and Presbyterian ; would it be possible to reconcile them on this question too ? The Presbyterian indeed was willing enough for a compromise, for he had

Abolition of
feudal
tenures.

an uneasy feeling that the ground was slipping from beneath his feet. Of Charles's intentions he was still in doubt ; but he knew that Clarendon was the sworn friend of the Church. The Churchman on the other hand was eagerly expecting the approaching hour of triumph. It soon appeared that as King and Parliament, so King and Church were inseparable in the English mind ; that indeed the return of the King was the restoration of the Church even more than it was the restoration of Parliament.

In the face of the present Presbyterian majority however it was necessary to temporise. The former incumbents of Church livings were restored, and the Commons took the Communion according to the rites of the Church ; but in other respects the Presbyterians were carefully kept in play ; Charles taking his part in the elaborate farce by appointing ten of their leading ministers royal chaplains, and even attending their sermons.

The state of things was faithfully reflected in Parliament. As early as July 9 words had been used which concisely expressed the determination of the Church. 'There was,' said Heneage Finch, the Solicitor-General, 'no question as to her religion ; and, for the rest, he knew of no law for altering the government of the Church by Bishops.' In any case, he hoped, 'they would not cant after Cromwell.' It was not to be expected that a Presbyterian majority should tamely fall in with this ignoring of past years. After prolonged debate, and amid a scene of unusual disorder, the question was shelved by a resolution desiring Charles to select a number of divines to debate the whole matter. He willingly undertook the task, but was soon undeceived regarding the likelihood of a compromise. A barren discussion was begun in writing, between the Anglican and Presbyterian divines.

'We agree with you in the main,' said the Presbyterians, 'but we wish certain minor matters altered.' 'If you agree with us in essentials,' the Anglicans replied, 'it is mere "scruple-mongering" to dispute about trifles.'

Charles now took the matter more completely into his own hands by issuing a Declaration. Refusing on the ground of constraint, to admit the validity of the oaths imposed upon him in Scotland, by which he was bound to uphold the Covenant, and not concealing his preference for the Anglican Church as 'the best fence God hath yet raised against popery in the world,' he asserted that nevertheless, to his own knowledge, the Presbyterians were not enemies to Episcopacy or a set liturgy, and were opposed to the alienation of Church revenues. The Declaration then went on to limit the power of bishops and archdeacons in a degree sufficient to satisfy many of the leading Presbyterians, one of whom, Reynolds, accepted a bishopric. Charles then proposed to choose an equal number of learned divines of both persuasions to discuss alterations in the liturgy; meanwhile no one was to be troubled regarding differences of practice.

The majority in the Commons at first welcomed the Declaration. The scheme was indeed wide enough to take in all but an insignificant fraction of the Presbyterians, and a bill was accordingly introduced by Sir Matthew Hale to turn the Declaration into a law. But

Clarendon at any rate had no intention of thus baulking the Church of her revenge. Anticipating Hale's action he had in the interval been busy in securing a majority against any compromise. The Declaration had done its work in gaining time, and when the bill was brought in it was rejected by 183 to 157 votes. Parliament was at once (December 24) dissolved. The way was now open for

Royal
Declaration
on ecclesiastical
affairs.

Failure of
attempt to
turn the
Declaration
into a law.

the riot of the Anglican triumph. Even before the new House met the mask was thrown off by the issuing of an order to the justices to restore the full liturgy. The conference indeed took place in the Savoy Palace. It failed, like the Hampton Court Conference of James I., because it was intended to fail. Upon the two important points, the authority of bishops and the liturgy, the Anglicans would not give way an inch. Both parties informed the King that, anxious as they were for agreement, they saw no chance of it. This last attempt at union having fallen through, the Government had their hands free ; and their intentions were speedily made plain.

CHAPTER VIII.

TRIUMPH OF ANGLICAN CHURCH. RELATIONS WITH THE CONTINENT.

1. PERSECUTION OF DISSENT.

THE extent of the reaction which had followed far more than it caused the Restoration, was disclosed when the new Parliament met on May 8, 1661. Its composition was ominous to the Presbyterians. A Parliamentary movement had become a Royalist revel. There now appeared, in a House of more than 500 members, but fifty-six of the old majority. The great mass of the members were prepared to go all lengths in favour of the Church, and Clarendon in his opening speech looked forward with confidence to their providing that 'neither King, laws, nor Parliament may be so used again.'

For a time the existence of an assembly actuated by

such a spirit was a source of the greatest danger. The decrees of the Convention Parliament were in the eye of the law illegal until confirmed by a constitutionally appointed body. Among them was the Indemnity Bill, and there now appeared a serious prospect of some tampering with this, the primary condition of the Restoration settlement. Fortunately Charles was firm to this part at least of his engagements. His earliest message to the House—and the need of such a message marks the danger—was a distinct refusal to pass any bill whatsoever until this Act should be put beyond dispute.

The Commons then applied themselves to repairing the breaches of the constitution. Having imposed the taking of the Sacrament according to the prescribed liturgy on all their members, they first ordered the 'Solemn League and Covenant' to be burnt by the hangman. They then restored the bishops to their seats in the House of Lords, a step to which Charles was personally opposed as tending to raise a serious obstacle to the accomplishment of his desire for toleration of the Catholics. An Act was next passed strengthening the law of high treason, and rendering incapable of public employment anyone who should affirm the King to be a heretic or a papist; the Long Parliament was declared to be dissolved, and the assertion that there could be any legislative authority in either or both Houses without the King was rendered a penal offence. Parliament then, in the full tide of loyalty, declaring it to be their duty to 'undeceive the people who have been poisoned with an opinion that the militia of the nation was in themselves or in their representatives in Parliament,' handed back to the King the entire control of the sea and land forces. With 1641 in their minds, they passed a bill to limit the

Confirma-
tion of the
Bill of
Indemnity.

Reconstruc-
tion.

Control of
the militia
given to the
king.

right of petitioning, and declared that no war, offensive or defensive, could be lawfully levied against the King, to whom also the power of veto was restored. At one point however they stopped short. There was not the slightest intention of making the Crown independent. The Convention Parliament had already given Charles a life revenue of 1,200,000*l.* It was well known that this was insufficient, but there was no proposal to increase it.

On November 20, 1661, the Houses reassembled in a state of great excitement. Rumours had been spread of Presbyterian plots in various parts of the country ; and even without this incentive the majority were eager for a drastic expression of Anglican supremacy. The chief seats of Presbyterian feeling were the corporations of towns, and it was these bodies which in many cases returned members to Parliament. By the Corporation Act (December 19, 1661) this source of Presbyterian influence was swept away at a blow, and a cogent argument offered to weak-kneed Presbyterians to reconcile themselves with the dominant Church. Three conditions were declared essential for admission into any municipality : the renunciation of the Solemn League and Covenant ; the acceptance of an oath denying the lawfulness of taking arms against the King, and especially of 'that traitorous position of taking arms *by his authority* against his person or against those commissioned by him ;' and finally the taking the Sacrament according to the English Church. The bill passed in the Commons without difficulty ; in the Lords however it met with considerable opposition at the hands of Ashley Cooper, now Lord Ashley, and other noblemen of the old Presbyterian party, helped in this instance by the Lord Treasurer, Southampton.

The determination of the Commons was increased by the knowledge that Charles himself, in spite of his con-

currence in this Act, was opposed to stringency towards the Dissenters. His financial necessities gave them the complete control of the situation, and they now used their power to wring from him a personal declaration of allegiance to the Church. On March 1, 1662, he addressed the House, complained of the unworthy suspicions against him, declared himself as zealous for the Church and as much 'in love with the Book of Common Prayer' as could be wished, and expressed his desire that the House should pass an Act of Uniformity at once. He was supplied with money, and was then called upon to fulfil his part of the bargain.

The Corporation Act had practically destroyed Presbyterianism in the State. The Act of Uniformity now destroyed it in the Church. It first declared that no one might hold a living in the Church unless he had, before St. Bartholomew's Day, August 24, 1662, publicly read the service from the new Prayer Book, which had been undergoing revision by Convocation in the sense most objectionable to the Presbyterians, and had declared his 'unfeigned assent and consent' to everything contained therein. To express in the strongest manner the exclusiveness of the Church, and to stamp her with that national and political character which she has ever since held, all connection with the Protestant churches of the Continent was broken off, by the clause which forbade anyone whose orders had been obtained abroad, to continue in his benefice or to administer the sacraments without re-ordination by the bishop. The Act further provided that all incumbents, holders of university offices, schoolmasters, and private tutors, should, in addition to taking the oaths prescribed by the Corporation Act, renounce the Covenant, promise to conform to the Liturgy and to 'endeavour no change or

Distrust of
the King ; his
declaration
of allegiance
to the
Church.

Act of
Uniformity,
May 19,
1662.

alteration of government either in Church or State.' The same tests, omitting only the renunciation of the Covenant, were imposed upon all the military forces of the kingdom, and upon the lord-lieutenants and deputy-lieutenants.

In the case of the clergy no circumstance of aggravation was omitted. The day named for submission had been chosen with rare malice. The great
 Special hardships of the Act. tithes, their chief support, would, since they were not due till Michaelmas, pass to the new incumbents ; and, no provision being made for the maintenance of the deprived ministers, as had been made in the case of the Anglican clergy ejected under the Commonwealth, they would be thrown on the world destitute of support. A still more flippant disregard for justice was shown in the fact that, as the revised Prayer Book was not published until St. Bartholomew's Eve, the Presbyterians were called upon to express their 'unfeigned assent and consent' to everything contained in a book they had not yet seen.

From their fellow Dissenters the Presbyterians received no encouragement. The Catholics and members
 The other Dissenters. of the Protestant sects, except in the case of a few Independents, held no benefices, and were therefore untouched by the Act. Nor had they any cause to love the Presbyterians, whose hand had formerly been heavy upon them. Moreover they were anxious about their own fate, and they might well hope that, if the lot of the Presbyterians were made the same as their own, their large numbers must before long lead to a general measure of toleration.

They found hope in an unexpected quarter. Both Charles and Clarendon were opposed to the rapid growth of the persecuting spirit, the former because of the obstacles it placed in the way of favouring the Catholics,

Clarendon from fear of disturbance and revolt. On March 17 the Chancellor endeavoured in vain to introduce a clause enabling the King to dispense with the provisions of the Act, declaring that it was recommended by Charles himself. The Act being passed, and Parliament being prorogued, Charles, in compliance with the petition of the Presbyterians, which was supported by Monk and Manchester, declared his intention of suspending its execution for three months. Now however he was deserted by Clarendon, who, while glad to see a Parliamentary recognition of the dispensing power, would not as a constitutional lawyer favour a claim to an autocratic use of it by the Crown ; and he only gave way when Charles told him that his own honour was pledged to this course. The vehement opposition of the bishops, especially of Sheldon, the representative of the irreconcilable section of the Church, speedily convinced Charles of the impossibility of success, and the design was put aside. The spectacle was presented of the Presbyterians, who usually placed the law above the prerogative, calling upon the King to suspend the law by an unconstitutional use of power, and of the bishops, generally the staunch upholders of the prerogative, resolutely opposing its exercise.

The Presbyterians were determined to refuse the terms of Uniformity. They adhered to their determination in spite of liberal offers from the king of bishoprics and deaneries. On Sunday, August 17, from the farewell sermons : all the Presbyterian pulpits in the city, the St. Bartholomew's Day. clergy who refused to conform preached their farewell sermons to crowded and sympathetic congregations ; and on the next Sunday no fewer than 2,000 clergymen, the best of the great Presbyterian body, retired into voluntary poverty and professional exile. Henceforth Presbyterianism was the creed, not of a large part of the

English Church, but of a Dissenting sect ; the Church of England had taken its final shape, the shape which it holds to this day.

We get a glimpse of the difficulty of carrying out this Act of Uniformity, and of its results, in one part at least of the country, from the reports of Seth Ward, then Bishop of Exeter, to Sheldon. In December 1663 he tells the archbishop that at least fourteen of the justices of the peace for Devonshire alone 'are accounted
Effects of the Act. arrant Presbyters, and some of them esteemed as dangerous as any men within the diocese ; those therefore in Exeter who have obeyed the laws have been checked and discouraged for their labour.' Some of the most populous places had stood void, he says, ever since the passing of the Act, and complaints were almost universal, 'either that they have no minister, or a pitiful ignorant one, or the minister hath complained of want of sufficient maintenance.' One minister whom he had put in prison had told him that 'after his removal he staid some months to see whether any other would supply his place ; but at length, finding that no man was put in his stead, and that the people went off, some to atheism and debauchery, others to sectarianism (for he is a Presbyterian), he resolved to adventure to gather his flock again. And he had gathered a flock of 1,500 or 2,000 on Sunday last when he was taken from the pulpit and brought away.'

2. FIRST CONNECTION WITH FRANCE. ROYAL MARRIAGES. SALE OF DUNKIRK.

The restoration of monarchy in England had been accomplished without the intervention of a single foreign power. But scarcely was the crisis over before Charles and the various continental Governments sought to take mutual advantage of the change.

Charles's object was a simple one ; it was to get money. The revenue settled upon him by Parliament was quite inadequate to the various calls of Charles's objects. government, the payment of debts incurred abroad, the satisfaction of royalist demands, and the expenses of his more disreputable pleasures. Still less was it sufficient to enable him to gratify the desire which he fitfully entertained throughout his reign of ruling as Louis XIV. ruled, of establishing an intelligent despotism, independent of Parliament, founded upon armed force and the sympathy of Dissent, which might enable him to carry out his promised toleration of Catholicism. He determined therefore to secure his freedom from control by other means, and this determination, however unsteadily maintained, is the keynote of his foreign policy throughout the reign.

His first application was to the Dutch ; and from them, as the price of an alliance, he demanded two millions. The renewal, however, of the Navigation Act of 1651 (see p. 113), by which their carrying trade had in a great measure been destroyed, formed an insuperable obstacle to union. Charles had plenty of alternatives, for Spain, France, He applies to the Dutch. and Portugal were approaching him with rival offers. In September 1660 he let the Spaniards understand that his alliance was merely a question of price. They offered him whatever money he might want, but they demanded that Jamaica and Dunkirk should be restored to them. The proposal was at once refused, and the plan for Charles's marriage with the second daughter of Philip IV. being rejected by that monarch, the negotiations were broken off. And to Spain.

With far greater satisfaction Charles turned to France. He was the son of a French princess, and he had received great kindness from his cousin Louis. An alli-

ance between the two crowns was from the dynastic and personal point of view obviously a natural one.

On Louis's side considerations of state-craft pointed in the same direction. At the Peace of the Pyrenees the French King had bound himself to give no aid to Portugal, then in rebellion against Spain, and he had acceded to the condition that that country should not be included in the treaty. Openly the promise was kept; secretly it was systematically broken. But Louis now saw the means of supplying indirectly from England more effective help.

For many years the course of events had in general led to friendliness between Portugal and England, and a formal renewal of the alliance had been long under consideration. In September 1660 a marriage was proposed between Charles and the Infanta Catherine. Portugal offered as dowry the cession of Tangier and Bombay, freedom of commerce in Brazil and the East Indies, perfect religious liberty for English subjects in all Portuguese territories, and a sum of 500,000*l.* Charles was in return to assist Portugal with 3,000 men and 1,000 horses, and to put eight frigates at her disposal.

To hinder this marriage Spain had recourse to every device of intrigue and menace. Louis in turn spared no pains to accomplish a match by which, without formally violating his engagements, his old enemy could be so weakened. The result was a signal victory of French influence. The English Privy Council unanimously approved the marriage, and the contract was signed on June 23, 1661. In a speech couched in terms of studied insult to Spain Charles communicated his intention to the newly elected Parliament, and there too it was received with acclamation. To enable him to carry out the terms of the contract Louis sent Charles a sum of 80,000*l.* Ten

English men-of-war, with 3,000 men from the Scotch garrisons, sailed to the Portuguese coast. Even as early as January 1662 it was noticed that English Protestant congregations had been established in Lisbon.

Two other marriages of importance took place in the royal family. That between James and Clarendon's daughter, Anne Hyde, had been secretly celebrated before the Restoration; it was now publicly acknowledged. The personal connection with France was still more firmly cemented by the union of Charles's favourite sister, Henrietta, renowned for beauty, wit, and ability in intrigue, and possessing great influence over Charles himself, with Louis's younger brother, the Duke of Anjou, who afterwards became the Duke of Orleans.

By the Portuguese marriage Louis had made the first step in securing a hold on Charles, and thereby on English affairs. But on the other hand it was, by the vast commercial advantages it secured to England, and from the aggressive alliance which it carried with it against the chief papal power of the world, entirely consonant with the Cromwellian policy of making us, in Dryden's magnificent phrase, 'freemen of the Continent.' Very different was a step which emphatically marked the policy of isolation henceforth pursued, and which formed another aid to the realisation of French ambition.

As late as the summer of 1661 Clarendon had urged upon the Commons the necessity of maintaining Dunkirk, and the danger of its ever again being in hostile hands; and Parliament had proposed its perpetual annexation to the Crown. The expense incurred for the defence of Portugal, however, the king's desire to be independent of Parliament, the absence of any wish for continental influence, and the connection with France, all contributed to suggest the advisability of

Marriages
of Charles's
brother and
sister.

Sale of
Dunkirk.

raising money by the sale of the town to that power. Strong arguments were easily forthcoming. It cost 120,000*l.* a year, it brought no trade, it had a dangerous harbour, and its defence from the land side was extremely difficult. On the other hand, if it fell into an enemy's power, it could easily be blockaded by England from the sea. The cost of the maintenance of Tangier, Jamaica, and Bombay, and the probability of war with either France or Spain if it were retained, were dwelt upon. Clarendon at length gave way ; after some haggling the price was fixed at 200,000*l.*, less than the cost of two years' maintenance ; and in November 1662, to the great scandal of the Protestant powers, but with scarcely a dissentient in the Privy Council, and without a murmur in Parliament, Dunkirk was handed over to the French. It was understood that the money was to be used, not for the ordinary occasions of the Crown, but only for pressing accidents, such as the quelling of an insurrection. Charles looked to it to provide himself with an army.

CHAPTER IX.

LOUIS AND SPAIN. THE DUTCH REPUBLIC. 1660-1662.

THE death of Mazarin in March 1661 found Europe in a state of almost absolute repose. The Peace of Westphalia had reformed the constitution of the German Empire ; the Treaty of the Pyrenees had confirmed a truce in the long warfare of France and Spain ; while the relative positions of Sweden, Denmark, and Poland had been settled by the Treaties of Copenhagen and Oliva in 1661. The independence of the Dutch Republic had been recognised. The monarchy was permanently re-established in England.

1. PERSONALITY OF LOUIS XIV.

Already however the agencies which were to put an end to this short breathing space were at work. Of these none was more potent than the ambition and the power of Louis XIV. That monarch was the central figure of Europe, the despotic sovereign of a united country and the master of a superb army. Mazarin and the Fronde had schooled him well. To repress his passions, to keep down the princes of the blood, to be distant with his courtiers, to be secret in his business, to cultivate his natural talents for dissimulation, to work hard—these were to be the principles which should make him a great king. Above all, the Cardinal had urged him, with his dying breath, to have no prime minister. He was to succeed to a double power and prestige, those of the monarchy and those of the prime ministership. He took possession of both parts of his inheritance at once. On the day after Mazarin's death he announced to the council his intention of taking the government solely upon himself. His ministers—his *gens d'affaires*, he called them—were henceforward to look to him for instructions.

His mother and the courtiers laughed at what they imagined was but a passing whim. But the whim lasted more than fifty years. During all that time no man in his kingdom worked harder than he. No despatch was signed, no agreement sealed, no money paid without his knowledge. His energy and diligence were no more remarkable than his ability. Devoid of political morality, he looked upon the state of Europe with an eye piercing and cynical, while the despatches written by himself to his ambassadors in all the European courts are models of clearness of expression and correctness of insight.

2. LOUIS CLAIMS (1) THE WHOLE SPANISH SUCCESSION,
(2) THE IMMEDIATE POSSESSION OF THE SPANISH
NETHERLANDS.

It was in his efforts to establish his claim upon the succession to the Spanish monarchy that these qualities were first exercised. Should Philip IV. and his only son die, as seemed probable, without the birth of any other male heir in the meantime, Louis was determined to uphold the right of his wife. That right, as has been seen, was rejected by the Spaniards on the ground that both she and Louis had signed a renunciation. Louis replied in the first place that the Spaniards had themselves rendered that renunciation invalid by the non-payment of the dowry, and, secondly, that no renunciation could be upheld which was contrary to a fundamental law of the Spanish monarchy.

In June 1661 the hereditary prince was on his death-bed. Another child was about to be born to Philip IV. and his second wife. Should this be a son the question of renunciation would of course not be raised, and the French ambassador was ordered in that case merely to press for the payment of the dowry. On November 1 the prince died ; but a week later another boy, the future Charles II., was born, and Louis's path to the succession to the whole Spanish monarchy was thus completely barred for the time.

His claim, too, had been contested from another side. The second daughter of Philip III., unlike Louis's mother, the elder daughter, had signed no renunciation of her rights. She had married the late Emperor Ferdinand, and was the mother of the present Emperor Leopold, who therefore claimed in her right. To this Louis again had a double

The
Emperor's
claim.

answer : first, the old one of the inherent invalidity of all these renunciations ; secondly, that in any case it would be neither his mother nor the Emperor's, but the present unmarried Infanta who, if she married, would transmit her right to her husband and descendants ; and, therefore, unless she married the Emperor, neither he nor his children could claim in any case. This contention of the Emperor, like that of Louis himself, fell of course into abeyance at the birth of the new prince.

But though the prospect of grasping the whole Spanish monarchy had thus for the time faded away, the ingenuity of Louis's advisers had suggested another plan by which he might compass that portion of it most immediately important to him. By a local custom of Brabant, referring solely to private property, and in force in some only of the provinces of the Low Countries, it was established that if a man married twice, the succession went to the children of the first marriage, to the exclusion of those of the second. This local custom—the *jus devolutionis*, as it was called—Louis audaciously determined to invoke in order to form a claim, at Philip IV.'s death, to the whole of the Low Countries. That king had married twice, and Louis had married the only daughter of the first marriage. The death of the hereditary prince, her brother, left her, therefore, if the local and private custom was to hold with regard to the succession—a contention ridiculed by the Spaniards—the heiress to the Low Countries, to the entire exclusion of the children of Philip's second marriage, the present infanta and the boy just born.

Louis had meanwhile been endeavouring to compass his object by diplomacy. Hopeless of conquering Portugal by force, Spain, aware of the help which Louis was unavowedly sending to it, though ignorant of his con-

nection with Charles II. of England, now, by promises of eventual consent to the nullity of the renunciation, and by urging the argument that England would, if not checked, grow too powerful at sea, endeavoured to draw the French monarch into a coalition against that country. Louis's answer was short and decisive. Ridiculing the idea of England growing too powerful, he declared that to justify him in the eyes of Europe for such a step he must have striking advantages offered him. His terms were, (1) a secret revocation of the renunciation ; (2) the immediate possession of Franche Comté, Luxemburg, Hainault, and Cambrai ; and, failing the revocation, the towns of Aire and St. Omer as well. On these conditions alone would he consent to break with the King of England.

But Spain was not yet brought low enough to listen to such humiliating terms, and though Louis changed his tone to one of menace, he found himself unable to move the court of Madrid from its attitude of passive resistance to all his claims. In October 1662 the negotiations were finally broken off. Louis had meanwhile been looking elsewhere for means of accomplishing his ends.

3. THE DUTCH REPUBLIC.

In striking contrast to the success of the monarchical principle in France and England was the development of the power of the Dutch Republic. By the side of the absolute monarchy and the caste feeling of France, and the threefold system of King, Established Church, and Parliament in England, was reigning a form of government in which there was neither arbitrary power, aristocratic privilege, nor eccle-

siastical supremacy. It consisted of a league of seven provinces, each province preserving perfect independence as regarded its internal affairs, but contributing its share to mutual defence. The province in its turn was a federation of towns, each of which bore to its province the same relation as that of the province to the whole federated body. The town was thus the unit of national life, the basis of the constitution. Its government was in the hands of a town council of varying number, a merchant oligarchy, for the most part self-elected, who delegated their executive power and financial administration to a 'regent'; and it possessed complete autonomy in its own concerns. It sent deputies to the Provincial Estates, which regulated the entire internal affairs of that province, administrative, financial, military, and judicial. Similarly each province sent deputies to the States General, who, assisted by a Council of State composed of twelve members selected from the different provinces, voted upon the imperial questions of the Republic—peace, war, and measures for defence—fixed the contingent of each province to the army and fleet, and had the right of concluding alliances and of nominating the commanders-in-chief both by land and sea. Each province however was bound to obey the States General only if its own deputies agreed in the decision; and similarly each town was bound to obey the decision of the Provincial Council only if its deputies had concurred.

Admirably adapted for the encouragement of local ambition, and for the training of a large proportion of the citizens in the public service, such a constitution was evidently unsuitable for crises when a common danger demanded immediate action on the part of the Republic as a whole. The need of a central authority overriding the individual interests or prejudices of each province or town was then keenly felt. The

Its defect.

history of the Republic therefore shows a tendency to fall back in times of national peril upon the principle of a limited monarchy, and, when that danger is over, to revert to the original constitution. The struggle by which its independence was secured had been carried out under the House of Orange. To this family it had for a time given the supreme military and civil authority, in the person of the first 'Stadtholder,' William of Orange; and this authority, legally elective, had gradually become hereditary. Four members of the Orange house successively ruled over the Seven Provinces, and it was not until 1651 that the attempt of William II., the husband of Mary, daughter of Charles I., to acquire absolute sovereignty by a *coup d'état*, led to the abolition of the stadtholdership. The autonomy of each town and province was then re-established, and, to render impossible the recurrence of an attempt at absolutism, the military command was so divided that for purposes of foreign war the army was well-nigh useless.

The Republic had shaken off the domination of a person; it now fell under the domination of a single province. Holland was overwhelmingly pre-ponderant in the federation. She possessed the richest, most populous, and most powerful towns. She contributed more than one-half of the whole federal taxation. She had the right of naming the ambassadors at Paris, Stockholm, and Vienna. The fact that the States General met on her territory—at the Hague—necessarily gave her additional influence and prestige. It was through her energy that the attempt of William II. had proved abortive. She now stepped into the vacant place. With the Stadtholder's power that of the States General also, as representing the idea of centralisation, had largely disappeared. The Provincial Estates of Holland, therefore, under the title of 'Their High

Mightinesses,' became the principal power—to such an extent, indeed, that the term 'Holland' had by the time of the Restoration become synonymous among foreign powers with the whole Republic. Their chief minister was called 'The Grand Pensionary,' and the office had been since 1653 filled by one of the most remarkable men of the time, John de Witt.

John de
Witt and
the House
of Orange.

John de Witt therefore represented, roughly speaking, the power of the merchant aristocracy of Holland, as opposed to the claims of the House of Orange, which were supported by the *noblesse*, the army, the Calvinistic clergy, and the people below the governing class. Abroad the Orange family had the sympathy of monarchical Governments. Louis XIV. despised the Government of 'Messieurs les Marchands,' while Charles II., at once the uncle and the guardian of the young Prince of the house of Orange, the future William III. of England, and mindful of the scant courtesy which, to satisfy Cromwell, the Dutch had shown him in exile, was ever their bitter and unscrupulous foe.

The empire of the Dutch Republic was purely commercial and colonial, and she held in this respect the same position relatively to the rest of Europe that England holds at the present day. To this supremacy many causes had contributed. Her geographical position, between northern and southern Europe, the rivers from central Europe reaching the sea on her shores, her extended coast-line, made her a convenient centre for the reception and distribution of the wealth of all the lands of the earth. The natural barrenness of the land, and the incessant struggle to keep a footing against the inroads of the ocean, had formed a thrifty, hardy, and patient race, while the abundant fishery on her coasts had made of a large part of her population the most skilful and daring

Naval and
commercial
power.

sailors of the world. Speedily her fleets went farther afield. As early as 1523 no fewer than 2,000 vessels, making three voyages a year, were reaping rich harvests in English and Scotch fishing grounds; in 1547 eight ships of war attended to defend them from attack, and in 1635, such importance did the Dutch attach to this source of their wealth that they paid a sum of 30,000*l.* for permission to fish that summer in the English waters. But meantime, and chiefly from a cause of a different nature, the trade of the world had been gradually drifting into their hands. While central Europe was being desolated by the Thirty Years' War the United Provinces formed a haven of rest for industry; and while every other nation was driving out, by war or religious persecution, the best of her working population, the exiles found a ready welcome in a land in which religious toleration was a fundamental law. Under this constant influx of skill and enterprise, aided by a wise commercial policy, the wealth of the country increased with vast rapidity, while through her navies, developed out of the fishing fleet, and formed of vessels which, though far roomier than those of other countries, were manned with fewer hands, she was year by year acquiring a colonial empire in every continent, and absorbing the carrying trade of the world. In 1604, Raleigh, in a remarkable memoir to James I., complained that English enterprise was confined to fetching coals from Newcastle to London; and at the same date the fleets of the Republic were to be found in the East Indies, the Moluccas, Java, Guinea, Ceylon, the Malaccas, Sumatra, the Cape of Good Hope, Brazil, the Coromandel Coast, Malabar, and had captured the chief Portuguese possessions in Asia and Africa. By 1669 John de Witt was able with truth to say that 'the Hollanders had well-nigh beaten all nations by traffic out of the seas, and become the only carriers of goods

throughout the world.' And in 1670 their position is thus described in the 'Lex Mercatoria':—'The commerce of Holland, which may be termed universal, reassembles in the United Provinces this infinite number of merchandizes which it afterwards diffuses in all the rest of Europe. It produces hardly anything, and yet has wherewith to furnish other people all they can have need of. It is without forests and almost without wood, and there is not seen anywhere else so many carpenters, which work in naval construction. Its lands are not fit for the culture of vines, and it is the staple or mart of wines, which are gathered in all parts of the world, and of brandies drawn from them. It has no mines nor metals, and yet there is found almost as much gold and silver as in New Spain or Peru, as much iron as in France, as much tin as in England, and as much copper as in Sweden. The wheat and grains that are there sowed hardly suffice for nourishment of a part of its inhabitants, and it is notwithstanding from hence that the greatest part of its neighbours receive them, either for their subsistence or trade; in fine, it seems as if the spices grew there, that the oils were gathered there, that it nourished the precious insects which spin the silk, and that all sorts of drugs for medicine or dyeing were in the number of its products and of its growth; its warehouses are so full, and its merchants seem to carry so much to strangers, that there is not a day that ships do not come in or go out, and frequently entire fleets.'

This is the more remarkable as in 1651 a rude blow had been struck at the commercial supremacy of the Dutch. In that year the famous Act of Navigation had been passed in England, by which it was provided that no merchandise, the produce of Asia, Africa, or America, should be imported into England in any but English-built ships, commanded by an English

master, and navigated by a crew three-fourths of whom should be Englishmen ; nor any European goods except in English ships or in ships belonging to the countries from which these articles originally came. No fish might be exported from or imported into England or Ireland except of English taking. By this law the carrying trade with England was utterly destroyed. It led to a repetition of the great duel between the two countries. In 1652 Tromp, to signify his power to sweep the seas, sailed down the Channel with a broom at his masthead. Naval battles, the like of which had never been seen, filled the next two years. But in 1654, when the masterfulness of Cromwell and the genius of Blake had finally triumphed,

Treaty with
England,
1654.

the Republic was forced to make peace on terms which showed that the command of the sea was passing to her enemy. Not only was she compelled to assent to the Navigation Act, as well as to other conditions no less humiliating, but she even agreed that 'Dutch ships, as well of war as others, meeting any of the ships of war of the English Commonwealth in the British seas shall strike their flag and lower their topsails.' It was not to be expected that with her traditions and resources she would contentedly bear this badge of inferiority. Her feeling at the time of the Restoration was a burning desire to recover her old position.

CHAPTER X.

LOUIS AND THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS.

I. NEGOTIATIONS WITH DE WITT.

IT was obviously of importance to Louis to secure at least the benevolent neutrality of the Republic should he decide to carry out his enterprise on the Spanish Netherlands.

De Witt, in like manner, was looking round for support in case the personal antipathy of Charles II. and the rivalry between the Dutch and English should lead to a renewal of war ; while, foreseeing a moment when he might have upon his frontier no longer the nerveless power of Spain but the victorious armies of France, he was anxious to avoid the chance of this force being turned against the Republic.

Under these feelings a treaty was easily concluded in April 1662, whereby France and the Republic guaranteed each other's European possessions, with their commercial and maritime interests, and arranged for mutual defence if attacked. Liberty of fishing was reciprocally granted, and France agreed to levy no more import duties upon Dutch shipping.

De Witt's immediate object however was by all means to keep the Spanish Low Countries as a barrier between the United Provinces and the oncoming power of France. But he could take no overt step until Louis had acknowledged the designs which he had already guessed. To secure this acknowledgment became therefore the object of his diplomacy.

Three plans had been put forward for the treatment of the Spanish Low Countries. Richelieu had favoured the plan of 'cantonment,' by which they were to be formed into an independent catholic republic ; Mazarin was bent upon their becoming part of the French dominions ; the Dutch had more than once suggested equal partition with France. But as the power of France grew more threatening, the Dutch in their anxiety to have her '*amicum sed non vicinum*,' leaned more and more to the plan of cantonment, and even affected to listen to a fourth proposal by Spain, that the

ten Spanish provinces should form a defensive league with the Republic.

Louis was as anxious to avoid a premature disclosure of his design as De Witt was to extract it. The astuteness of the Grand Pensionary however secured the first diplomatic success. He formally pressed upon Louis various solutions of the difficulty, especially that of 'partial cantonment,' by which France and the Republic should each take the strategic towns on their respective frontiers, while the rest of the country became an independent republic; he represented that the great Dutch towns, tempted by the Spanish promises of wide commercial privileges, were so eager for the defensive league just mentioned that he should not be able much longer to withstand the clamour; and he declared that however friendly he might personally be to French interests, he could not actively assist them until Louis's intentions were distinctly expressed. After many months of diplomatic fencing he was rewarded. For once off his guard, Louis permitted D'Estrades, the French ambassador, to place the devolution claim formally before De Witt.

Louis discloses the Devolution design.

De Witt, having unmasked Louis, at once changed his tone. He replied that the claim, founded upon a purely local custom of Brabant, could not be entertained for a moment; and in spite of Louis's haughty anger, he exposed his reasons for so treating it in a most able historical memoir. Then, coming boldly to the point, he declared that a pursuance of the design would drive him to accept the Spanish league. Moreover, he said, the Emperor, now contracted to the Infanta, possessed a claim of at least equal right in the eyes of Europe, and he should be ready therefore to entertain proposals from Vienna.

De Witt rejects it.

Firm however as was De Witt's tone, he was sur-

rounded by difficulties. The activity of the partisans of the House of Orange was daily increasing; and he knew that the acceptance of the Spanish league would excite their most vehement opposition and imperil his own power. He was however released from the need of fully declaring himself by the action of the principal towns, which refused to concur in the plan of partial cantonment, on the special ground that the continuance of the closure of the Scheldt (see p. 8), by which measure the trade of their great commercial rival Antwerp had been effectually crippled, was not provided for. Freed from the necessity of further entertaining the French scheme, De Witt now succeeded in convincing the towns of the inadvisability of accepting the Spanish proposal. He thus secured a full knowledge of the ultimate objects of Louis without being bound to any definite course.

Difficulties
of De Witt.

End of the
negotiation,
1664.

Louis, too, was well satisfied. The Spanish league had been the one thing he feared, and that danger was past. The Republic was for the time driven to inaction. He himself was sure of his own power to strike when the proper moment should come; and though the devolution claim had been unhesitatingly rejected by De Witt, the great advantage had been gained of making it familiar to men's minds. He now pursued his design in another quarter.

2. DEATH OF PHILIP IV. REJECTION OF THE FRENCH CLAIMS. LOUIS AND SPAIN.

Day by day Spain was falling into greater decrepitude. Her treasury was exhausted, her armies unequipped and inefficient, her navy had practically ceased to exist, her diplomacy was despised. The failure to reconquer Portugal became ever more apparent,

Decline of
Spain.

and she was even compelled to stand idle while the Moors insulted her coasts with impunity.

Philip IV. looked forward with acute pain to the disruption which threatened his kingdom. It was more than doubtful whether his infant son would survive himself. The unhappy boy appeared indeed in his physical infirmities to be no inappropriate symbol of the condition of the monarchy to which he was heir. At four years of age he was still at his nurse's breast ; his head was not properly formed ; neither his hair nor teeth were grown ; he was unable to walk without assistance, and he was incessantly subject to fevers, eruptions, and bleedings.

Philip had determined to secure what support he could for the tottering monarchy by marrying the young Infanta, Margaret Elizabeth, to the Emperor Leopold, naming her at the same time heir to the monarchy should the male line become extinct, to the exclusion of all other claims ; and the contract was signed on December 18, 1663. The news of the intended marriage had been announced to Louis in May ; he coldly replied that he trusted it would entail no conditions prejudicial to his interests.

Affairs in the Portuguese war had meanwhile been going from bad to worse. On January 18, 1663, the Spaniards had been severely beaten, in great measure through the generalship of the Frenchman Schomberg, and the valour of the English contingent. The campaign of 1664, though not marked by any decisive battle, was little less disastrous. In 1665 a final effort was determined upon, and Caracena, esteemed the best Spanish general of the day, was called from his governorship of the Low Countries to take the command. Nothing however could stay the ever hastening descent. On June 17 was fought the great and decisive battle of Villa Viciosa, resulting in the utter defeat of the Spanish

army. The blow killed Philip IV. He let the despatch which brought the tidings drop from his hand, Death of Philip IV. exclaiming, 'It is God's will !' and daily and visibly fell to his grave. He died on September 17, 1665.

Spain however still possessed men who refused to accept all as lost. Upon the removal of Caracena, the Low Countries had been placed under the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo. Skilful, enterprising, and devoted to his country, he determined, so far as the want of money or decent government at Madrid would allow, to place his province in a condition to meet an attack from France. To create a chain of forts which should replace those which the Peace of the Pyrenees had put into French hands, and in every way to expel French influence, were his great objects. His first general order forbade the inhabitants to wear the French dress or to follow the French fashion of the hair. Not until he applied to the Emperor for leave to raise troops in Germany did he give Louis an excuse for interference. The use of the conditions inserted in the Treaty of Westphalia and of Louis's bond with the German princes was at once apparent. He wrote to those whose territories blocked the road into the Low Countries, urging them to refuse a passage to the troops, and at the same time made such vehement complaints at Madrid that orders were sent to Castel Rodrigo to drop this part of his design. The Governor then proceeded to carry out a long-contemplated scheme. By the Peace of the Pyrenees Louis had acquired a free passage across the Lys at St. Venant. To render this acquisition useless, Castel Rodrigo determined to turn the course of the river by a canal starting above the town, which would have left it high and dry, and placed a new water defence between him and France. Once more however Louis complained at Madrid, and once more the harassed and enfeebled court gave way.

The terms of Philip IV.'s will were looked to with the utmost anxiety by Louis. They were found to justify that anxiety to the full. The succession was left first to the young Prince Charles and his descendants, then to the Infanta and her children. Not a word was said as to the French claims, but the dowry provided by the Treaty of the Pyrenees was to be paid in full.

Had Louis's hands been free, he would doubtless now have pressed his devolution claim to the Low Countries, which the Spanish council had unanimously rejected.

But he was for the moment embarrassed. He was at war with England, in compliance with his treaty of April 1662 with the Dutch ; he was, too, engaged in a diplomatic dispute with Sweden and in a quarrel with the Pope, and complications had arisen in Savoy. He again saw himself compelled to wait.

CHAPTER XI.

ENGLAND. PERSECUTION OF DISSENT. THE DUTCH WAR.

I. THE KING'S ATTEMPT TO FAVOUR POPEY.

THE English Parliament had separated in May 1662, gratified by their triumph over the Presbyterians in the Corporation and Uniformity Acts. They met again in February 1663, to find themselves confronted by an enemy whom they feared and detested with a still keener hate and terror. The dominant factor in the feverish politics of this reign is to be found in the feeling of the ordinary English mind regarding Popery. The Churchman might despise and persecute the Presbyterian ; the Presbyterian, like the

Scots, might regard the other sects as the advocates of the devil himself ; but in all of them hatred of Popery was the master impulse. Foxe's Book of Martyrs was favourite reading, and the fires of Smithfield were in the English imagination still alight. Another Armada seemed to hang like a dark cloud upon our shores, and a fresh Gunpowder Plot might at any moment burst forth. There was no atrocity which was not natural to the Papists ; the very debauchery of the court was laid to their charge ; and the cry which greeted the early Christians in Rome, ' Christianos ad leones ! ' never rang in their ears more pitilessly than the execrations which, when the panic rose to its height, were hurled at the ' Bloody Papists.'

To the Englishman, then, it was the first duty of his King to hate and combat 'this last and insolentest attempt on the credulity of mankind.' But Charles desires to help the Catholics. first to his astonishment, and then to his indignant fury, he found, or thought he found, that Charles was of altogether another mind. Charles indeed had abundant reasons for wishing to alleviate the lot of the Catholics. He was himself a Catholic, had been befriended while in exile by Catholic princes, and had made promises of favour which he earnestly wished to fulfil. Among his father's most faithful adherents had been many of the proscribed creed, and more than others they had been the mark for fine, imprisonment, and confiscation. He was at this very time in formal communication with Innocent XI. for a reconstitution of the English Church, whereby, while retaining its national and independent character, it should nominally acknowledge the Holy See as its head.

These considerations had led to his former attempt to put off the execution of the Act of Uniformity for three months.

He now repeated the attempt. On December 26, 1662, during the recess, he issued a declaration expressing his intention of doing his best to induce Parliament to mitigate the rigour of that measure, and to concur with him 'in making some Act for that purpose, as may enable him to exercise, with a more universal satisfaction, *that power of dispensing which he conceived to be inherent in him.*' This declaration drew from Sheldon a letter in which the iniquity of the proposal, 'as tending to set up that most damnable and heretical doctrine of the Church of Rome, whore of Babylon,' was set before him in the plainest language. Undeterred, the King met Parliament on February 18, 1663, with a speech in which he declared himself 'in nature an enemy to all severity for religion and conscience,' and, while asserting that he had no intention of favouring the Papists, though he owed them gratitude and admitted their claims to indulgence, and desiring that laws might be made to hinder the spread of their doctrine, he asked for such a power of indulgence, 'to use upon occasions,' as might not needlessly force them out of the kingdom, or give them cause to conspire against its peace.

Before the words were well out of the King's mouth all men saw before them in tangible shape the enemy they dreaded most. They had kept out the fox, said William Coventry, were they now to let the wolf into the fold? They did not know that Charles was himself a Catholic. But there was much going on to cause suspicion, and in every place where he wrote 'Dissent' the English mind read 'Pope of Rome.'

He was not long left in ignorance of the feelings he had roused. Within a week the Commons answered his appeal in a remonstrance of the boldest character. Such an indulgence, they said, 'will establish schism

by a law. . . . It will no way become the gravity or the wisdom of a Parliament to pass a law at one session for uniformity, and at the next session (the reason for uniformity continuing just the same) to pass another law to frustrate or weaken the execution of it. It will expose your Majesty to the restless importunity of every sect or opinion. It will be a cause of increasing sects and sectaries, whose numbers will weaken the Protestant profession so far that it will become difficult for it to defend itself against them . . . and in time some prevalent sect will, at last, contend for an establishment, which, for aught can be foreseen, may end in Popery.'

Charles now knew the conditions on which he might expect to continue to rule. At all hazards Popery was to be kept out of the kingdom, by the maintenance of a dominant State Church. A bill introduced in the House of Lords enabling him to dispense with the Act of Uniformity was to his great disgust opposed by Clarendon and Southampton, and had ultimately to be dropped.

Charles compelled to banish the Catholic priests. He was made to understand that supply would depend upon the immediate issue of a proclamation banishing all Catholic priests, and he yielded. Then, taking him at his word as to hindering the growth of Popery, the Parliament 'heartily laboured therein.' He now however put an end to the session. His object was to keep the matter as far as possible in his own hands, and to secure the sympathy of the Dissenters; but he saw how keen was the anger caused by the over-confident tone of the Catholics, who had thought themselves secure in his favour, and before the Houses separated he promised that he would in the next session himself suggest bills for realising the purpose which the Parliament had at heart.

On other questions the reaction against the principles

of the Long Parliament was still in full force. The Triennial Act had secured Parliamentary government by declaring that if the king did not summon a fresh Parliament within three years from a dissolution, the Peers were to undertake the duty ; if they failed, the sheriffs of each county, and in the last resort the electors themselves. An impression had got about that this meant that no Parliament might sit for more than three years. Skilfully availing himself of this to raise jealousy in a body whose continuance was thus threatened, and using to the utmost the influence of bribes and of the 'King's friends,' as those members who were attached to the court were called, Charles so prepared the ground that on the reassembling of the Houses in March 1664 he ventured to tell them that, much as he was 'in love with Parliaments,' he 'never would suffer a Parliament to come together by the means prescribed by that bill.' Anxious no doubt to narrow the scope of their differences with the King, the Commons, while re-asserting the principle of the Triennial Bill, removed from it all the precautions which had given it efficacy. The result of this abandonment of a strong position was not shown until the end of the reign, when for the last four years the King ruled absolutely and without a Parliament.

2. PERSECUTION OF PROTESTANT DISSENT

The Commons then resumed their favourite work. The Act of Uniformity had of course led to the establishment of unauthorised religious meetings or 'conventicles,' against which the Anglican clergy and the Commons inveighed as hotbeds of schism and sedition. Charles, ever unwilling to maintain resistance where attack was persistent, and anxious for a supply, gave his assent to the First Con-

The incomplete Triennial Bill.
First Conventicle Act, May 17, 1664.

venticle Act. This iniquitous measure, which was to be in force for three years, first renewed the Act of Uniformity of Elizabeth. It then absolutely forbade meetings of more than four persons besides the household for religious services other than those allowed by the Church. Three months' imprisonment or a fine of 5*l.* for the first offence, a double penalty for the second, banishment for seven years to the American plantations or a fine of 100*l.* for the third, and death for return or escape, were the penalties of the Act. Sheriffs, justices of the peace, or any persons commissioned by them, were authorised to break up conventicles and imprison at will any who were present at or who permitted the meetings. Even married women were liable to a year's imprisonment unless their husbands paid a fine of forty shillings. Many devices were resorted to for evading these provisions. Sometimes, where houses were joined, a hole was cut in the wall so that two or three congregations, each within the limits of the Act, might listen to a sermon. In the records of the Baptist congregation at Broadmead, near Bristol, we read of a conventicle being held in an upper room, the stairs being purposely packed so closely with women that the sheriff and his officers were unable to force their way up until time had been given for the minister and his congregation to escape by another way. Nevertheless the sufferings were very great. Upon the Quakers, who from the novelty and peculiarity of their doctrines were more suspected and obtained less popular sympathy than any others, the blow fell with special weight. Pepys, on August 7, 1664, relates how he saw several being dragged through the streets, and his only comment is : 'They go like lambs, without any resistance. I would to God they would conform, or be more wise and not be caught.'

Before a year was over an Act still more cruel and drastic was carried in the Commons without a division,

though again opposed in the Lords. During the desolation of the Plague many of the clergy had fled. Without authorisation the deposed Presbyterian ministers stepped into their pulpits and once more gathered eager congregations. But the vigilance of the Anglican Church was not asleep. The old cry was raised of 'schism and rebellion.' At the October session at Oxford in 1665 it was determined 'to prepare a shibboleth, a test to distinguish amongst those who will be peaceable and give hopes of future conformity, and who of malice and evil disposition remain obdurate.' Once more the pressing need of supplies compelled Charles to give way. For consenting to the Five Mile Act he obtained a grant of a million and a quarter. No Nonconformist minister was permitted henceforth to teach in schools, or to come within five miles of any city, corporate town, or Parliamentary borough, unless he had previously subscribed an oath denying the lawfulness of taking arms under any circumstances against the King or those commissioned by him, and declaring that he would not 'at any time endeavour any alteration of government in Church or State.' The penalty was six months' imprisonment or a fine of 40*l*. The infamous trade of informer, which had been created by the Conventicle Act, and which was so odious a feature of the reign, was encouraged by the promise of one-third of the fine exacted. It was too actually proposed, and the motion was only defeated by six votes, that this oath should be imposed upon the whole nation.

The machinery of persecution was now complete. The Corporation and Uniformity Acts had settled for ever the limits of the Church. The Conventicle and Five Mile Acts were the answer of the Church to the claim of Dissent, not to legal recognition, but to the right to exist.

3. CAUSES OF THE DUTCH WAR.

While the Anglican Church was exacting to the utmost the vengeance she deemed her right for the injuries of twenty years, and was asserting the supremacy which was to exist in the same tyrannous form for nearly two centuries, the country was reeling under the stress of a great naval war. England and the Dutch Republic were now engaged in the second part of that tremendous contest for the commercial supremacy of the world, of which the first had been fought out between Tromp and Blake. The peace of 1654 had not only left the causes of enmity untouched, but, in the confessions of inferiority exacted from a high-spirited people, had established the certainty of a renewal of the conflict. The mutual advantages which the Protector and De Witt received from their alliance had indeed secured the continuance of

Treaty of
September
1662.

peace during the Commonwealth ; and in September 1662, in spite of the Navigation Act, a fresh treaty had been concluded between the two nations. This treaty in itself however only served to advance the date of a rupture. It gave a mutual liberty of fishing to both countries ; but otherwise it was almost solely to the advantage of England. The invidious demand for the salute by Dutch ships to the English flag in English waters was repeated and allowed ; Poleroon, the richest of the Molucca Islands, was nominally restored to England ; and it was agreed that neither country should afford protection to the rebels of the other.

But while the forms of amity were thus preserved between the two Governments, the nations themselves were

Informal
war in the
colonies.

actually in fierce and incessant strife in every quarter of the globe. The Committee of Trade reported to the Commons that the English were almost driven out of the East and West Indies,

Turkey, and Africa, with a loss during the last few years of seven millions sterling. Wherever the Dutch had influence they compelled the natives to close their ports against their rivals. Poleroon had not been handed over according to the treaty, and the English had been deprived of the lucrative slave trade from the Guinea coast

to the Barbadoes. On April 2, 1664, the House of Commons presented a petition to the King for the speedy redress of these wrongs, and unanimously expressed their willingness to assist him with their lives and fortunes.

The Dutch were in a state of equal irritation. The acquisition of Bombay by England, in accordance with the treaty with Portugal, had especially roused their jealousy. In the spring of 1664 Robert Holmes sailed on a filibustering expedition along the African coast ; he captured eleven merchant vessels, and ousted the Dutch from Goree, Cape de Verde, Cape Corso, and many

other places. In America the Dutch West India Company had for forty years possessed Long Island and the opposite coast from the Connecticut River to Delaware Bay. A force under Colonel Nicholas drove them out, and Charles, after changing the name of New Amsterdam to New York, handed the country over to his brother James. Tobago and other good harbours in the Antilles were similarly wrested from the Zealand settlers.

The Dutch were not idle under these aggressions. De Ruyter was sent to the African coast with orders to 'make war on the English and to do them all the harm he could.' In October he captured the English vessels at Goree, and took all their posts on the Guinea coast except Cape Corso. The English retaliated by cutting off the Dutch Bordeaux fleet, and after a severe action part of that from

Smyrna also. All Dutch ships lying in British harbours were seized as prizes.

Thus the nations necessarily drifted into formal war. 'Must we,' said the Dutch envoy to Monk, 'sacrifice our commerce to yours?' 'Whatever happens,' replied Monk, 'we must have our part, or the peace will not last.' Even had the rulers been anxious for peace it could not have been maintained. But every private and family

feeling in Charles's mind was enlisted against the Dutch. He disliked them personally, and he declared that his honour required him to be their enemy since Cromwell had been their ally. His brother James, an eager advocate of England's commercial interests, who hated the Dutch as a Calvinistic people, and who was ambitious of naval glory, sedulously cultivated these feelings. Charles, moreover, saw in the outbreak of war a chance of a liberal supply, and trusted that the binding influence of a great national crisis might bring to his side the classes disaffected to the Government. De Witt similarly hoped to find in the contest a means of frustrating the intrigues of the Orange faction.

Feeling of
Charles and
De Witt.

4. PREPARATIONS OF ENGLAND AND THE REPUBLIC.

The declaration of war by England in March, 1665, found the Crown, the people, and the Parliament for once in complete harmony. A supply of 2,500,000*l.*, the largest money grant hitherto given by an English Parliament, was unanimously voted; and Charles's terms to the Dutch rose in proportion. He demanded compensation for injuries to British commerce, the possession of various ports as pledges for payment, the right of search of all foreign ships in the Channel, and the renunciation by the Dutch of their fishing rights in British

English pre-
parations.

waters. Men talked of 'giving the law to the whole trade of Christendom,' and of making all ships which passed through the 'narrow seas' pay toll to England. The number of vessels, with their armaments, which the Dutch were to be allowed to keep was mentioned. The din of preparation resounded in every dockyard in the kingdom. Commissioners were appointed in the principal ports for the sale of prizes; and it was declared that all ships, no matter from what country they sailed, were liable to capture if there were three Dutch sailors on board. Privateers were let loose in swarms; the war, it was said, must support itself.

No less high was the spirit of the Dutch. Heavy taxes were cheerfully voted; the navy was brought to its utmost efficiency, especially in the quality of the guns, and the army, as far as possible, was reorganised. Entrenched batteries were erected at all the exposed points of the coast; the peasants were armed to resist a possible landing. The sailors were to receive increased rations, and liberal pensions were voted for the families of all who should fall. Large rewards were offered for the capture of prizes, and 2,000*l.* for that of the admiral's flag-ship. For any captain who should strike to the enemy or retire without orders there was to be but one penalty—death.

De Witt now claimed from Louis the fulfilment of the treaty of April 1662 (see p. 115). Louis however was much embarrassed. He was afraid that the war might spread, and that he might be thereby hampered in his design on the Spanish Low Countries. Moreover, by declaring for the Dutch he would lose England; and from England he had the widest hopes, for Charles had given him to understand that, as far as he was concerned, France might have a free hand in the Netherlands. On the con-

Dutch pre-
parations.

Embarrass-
ment of
Louis.

trary, if he allowed the Dutch to succumb, De Witt would be overthrown, the House of Orange would be triumphant, and the Republic would fall politically into dependence upon England. The first great action had taken place before he had made a move to redeem his promises.

5. THE WAR, 1665.

In spite of the disorder which reigned at the Admiralty, so vividly described by Pepys, an English fleet, such as had never been gathered together before, was ready for sea in the spring of 1665. No fewer than 109 large vessels, with thirty of smaller size, manned by 21,000 men, many of them old Commonwealth sailors, and armed with 4,192 guns, sailed under the command of James. The Dutch fleet, under the veteran Opdam, was of the same size, but manned with more numerous crews and armed with heavier guns. This superiority was, however, corrected by the greater knowledge of the art of sea warfare which the English had learnt under Blake. 'Nothing,' says an eye-witness, 'can equal the good order of the English; their line is perfect, and thus an enemy who comes near them has to undergo their whole fire; . . . they fight like a line of cavalry in perfect discipline; whilst with the Dutch the various squadrons leave their ranks and come separately to the charge.'

The fleets met off Lowestoft at 4 A.M. on June 3. The explosion of Opdam's vessel was the turning-point of the battle, and the Dutch withdrew in confusion, Tromp with his squadron alone keeping up the fight. But for the negligence of the English in ceasing the pursuit during the night, the hostile fleet would have been annihilated. As it was, the Dutch had lost, besides the admiral, three vice-admirals,

*Battle off
Lowestoft,
June 3, 1665.*

nineteen first-rates, and 7,000 men. The English loss was four ships and 1,500 men; that in officers, as in all the battles of this war, being proportionately great. The medal struck in London to celebrate the victory bore the proud motto, 'Et pontus serviet.'

For a time deep discouragement weighed upon the Dutch; but the spirit of De Witt rose with disaster. The Measures of De Witt. penalties due for flight were sternly meted out. Three captains were shot, six more were degraded and had their swords broken above their heads. A superb mausoleum was raised at the Hague in honour of the dead. Light vessels put out to warn the different merchant fleets at sea. Ruyter arrived opportunely with his Guinea squadron, while the East Indian and Mediterranean fleets also reached Holland with but small loss.

Meanwhile the Dutch had been attacked from another side. Bernard Van Galen, Bishop of Munster, was the last representative of those warrior prelates who had been conspicuous in the Middle Ages. His youth had been passed in the army, and his vast wealth enabled him to indulge the military tastes which he had retained. His position on the Dutch frontier gave him at this time special importance, and Charles II., who knew that he had standing causes of jealousy with his neighbours, had skilfully secured his assistance. In June 1665 an alliance had been concluded by which, in return for a heavy subsidy, the Bishop engaged to maintain an army of 30,000 men, and to attack the Dutch within two months. The Republic was almost incapable of resistance, the fortifications were out of repair, the best troops were on board the fleet, and she could oppose this attack with but 7,000 untrained men. The Bishop entered Dutch territory in October, took Zutphen, and overran the province of Overijssel.

Alliance of
Charles II.
with the
Bishop of
Munster,
June 1665.

Upon the sea however the Dutch had once more asserted their supremacy. A fresh fleet, raised by the efforts of De Witt, had sailed, in the midst of the stormy season, to challenge their foes wherever they might be found. The challenge was in vain. London was panic-stricken by the Plague, the crews of the English fleet were themselves infected, and the sixty ships at the mouth of the Thames lay sullenly inactive. The Dutch were compelled at length to return to their own shores without firing a gun. None the less the expedition had served to raise the courage of their country, and to show the English how far they still were from the victory to which they had so confidently looked forward.

The Dutch
again
masters of
the sea,
November
1665.

6. DUTCH ALLIANCES.

De Witt now again pressed Louis to fulfil his treaty engagements. Otherwise he threatened that he would make peace and enter into close alliance with the English. For Louis this meant a serious obstacle to the carrying out of his great project. He was moreover nettled at the coolness with which Charles II. had, in the flush of a first success, treated his offers of mediation. He therefore declared his intention of sending a fleet to join the Dutch in the North Sea, and at the same time maintaining a squadron in the Mediterranean. He promised to employ his diplomacy in their favour wherever he had influence in Europe and to assist their intrigues with all Charles's discontented subjects. As soon as he was informed of Charles's treaty with the Bishop of Munster he sent a corps to join the Dutch troops who were resisting that Prelate. The conduct of the French showed however how little their sympathies lay with their nominal allies.

Louis fulfils
his treaty
with the
Dutch.

They behaved as if they were in an hostile country. They pillaged the people and insulted their religion, they openly cursed the Dutch cause, and they drank publicly in the market-place of Maestricht to the healths of the King of England and the Bishop of Munster. The French commander successfully avoided every favourable opportunity for attacking the Bishop's troops, and indeed acted in such a way as to raise to the utmost the ill-will already existing between the two nations.

Nevertheless the fact that France was in alliance with the Dutch, and had actually declared war against England (January 1666), had given far greater weight to the diplomacy of the States-General. They baffled Charles's ambassador in Sweden, and succeeded in restraining that country from joining England; they formed with Denmark an alliance (February 11, 1666), by which she bound herself to place forty ships at their disposal; the Elector of Brandenburg (February 16, 1666) promised to force the Bishop to make peace, and the heads of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg in consequence offered their goodwill. Heavy subsidies were paid by the Dutch in each case. The result was that the warlike Bishop was compelled (April 1666) to renounce the English alliance, and to sign an ignominious peace. When the rival fleets again put to sea, in the early summer of 1666, England was without an ally. From Bergen to Bayonne there was not a friendly port open to her ships.

Six months later (October 27, 1666), after the campaign which has now to be described, these different treaties were completed and confirmed by a closer defensive alliance for ten years between the Republic, Denmark, Brandenburg, and Brunswick-Lüneburg, by which each power agreed to assist the others with all its forces in case of new

Diplomatic
successes of
the Dutch,
1666, spring.

Bishop of
Munster
makes peace,
April, 1666.

Quadruple
Alliance of
the Hague,
October
1666.

aggression. It thus relieved the Republic from her dangerous dependence on Louis. And it was the first sign of that tendency to coalition against France, which henceforward is so marked a feature of the politics of Europe.

7. THE WAR, 1666.

Meantime great events had been passing on the sea. On June 1, 1666, the fleets had met off the Dunes, and during four days had waged the most terrible sea-fight in history. Ruyter and Tromp, with 100 vessels, were confronted by an English fleet under Monk, rendered greatly inferior in numbers by the necessity of despatching Rupert with twenty vessels to meet the French fleet, which Louis, however, who only desired to see the two great naval powers destroying one another, carefully kept back. The battle raged from midday until dusk. Some idea of the slaughter may be gathered from the fact that in an English vessel which went into action with 300 men but forty were left alive. At six next morning the contest was renewed. The day's fighting went against the smaller fleet, and Monk fell back sullenly and in perfect order towards the English coast. The next day however Rupert rejoined him, and, thus strengthened, the English prepared for a third struggle. Ruyter summoned all his captains to his own vessel, and told them that upon the issue of that day depended not only their own fate but that of the Republic. Fighting began at nine in the morning and lasted with desperation for six hours, without advantage to either side. Then Ruyter hoisted the red flag, the signal for a general and final effort. With such desperate valour was he obeyed that he twice pierced his enemy's line. Still it was only after incessant fighting, lasting till dusk, that the English

gave way ; and so shattered was his own fleet that he did not attempt to pursue his advantage. He had lost three vice-admirals, 2,000 men, and four ships. On the English side 5,000 men had been killed and 3,000 taken prisoners ; eight ships of the line had been sunk or burnt, and nine more had remained in the hands of the Dutch.

Almost without the loss of a day each side prepared to renew the struggle. The Dutch sailed from the Texel on July 4. Before the end of the month an English armament, the finest and best equipped that had left her shores, sallied from the Thames. On August 4 Monk and Ruyter met off the Norfolk coast to try conclusions once more. After another long day of carnage the Dutch, this time decisively beaten, sought safety in confusion in the shallows of Zeeland.

Battle of
August 4,
1666.

The English signalised their mastery by a daring and successful act. In the harbour of Flie, at the entrance to the Zuyder Zee, 160 merchant ships were riding in apparent safety. A single English frigate, followed by five fire-ships, managed to penetrate the narrow passages ; the fire-ships were let loose, and the whole fleet, with the exception of nine vessels, was destroyed. The loss was estimated at a million sterling.

Destruction
of Dutch
merchant
fleet.

Internal troubles were at the same time pressing upon De Witt. As misfortunes collected round the Republic, men's thoughts turned more strongly to the family under whom the early greatness of their country had been achieved. Five provinces, with Zeeland, the second in influence, at their head, now declared for peace, and for the restoration of the House of Orange. Even in Holland, De Witt's own province, the cause made way. Haarlem and Leyden were unanimous for the Prince. It was demanded that he should be named captain-general of the cavalry, and should have a place in the Council of State. Other towns urged that the Re-

Difficulties
of De Witt.
The Orange
faction.

public should adopt him as the child of the State, and undertake his education lest he should grow up in English principles.

Unable otherwise to nullify the intrigues of the adherents of the Prince of Orange, De Witt determined to follow this last suggestion. He himself undertook, as Mazarin had formerly done with Louis, to instruct the Prince in the art of government. Already the intelligence, power of dissimulation, and persistence of William's character were such as to strike an intelligent observer.

In other respects De Witt was in good hope. Not only had his indomitable energy enabled him once more to send forth a fleet which in vain challenged Rupert at the mouth of the Thames, and thus restored the honour of the flag, but he found that England was herself anxious for peace. London was in ruins from the Fire. The navy, despite its late successes, was in a desperate condition. The state of the treasury compelled Charles to retrench his expenses ; this he did, not by any diminution in the shameless extravagance of his pleasures, but by starving the navy to such an extent that, although Parliament had made another grant of 1,800,000*l.*, England was obliged to act strictly on the defensive, the sole office of her warships, as in the days of James I. (see p. 112), being to convoy the colliers from Newcastle to London.

From the Scotch came bitter outcries at the strangling of their trade, which, owing to the rigorous protection laws of England, was almost exclusively with the Dutch. Ireland was equally distressed ; while, as for England herself, her feelings were shown by the address of the Speaker on January 18, 1667, who, alluding to the terrible exhaustion of the kingdom, prayed Charles in the name of the people to put an end to this desolating war. ‘Evi-

dently,' says Clarendon, 'the Dutch could endure being beaten longer than England could endure to beat them.'

Charles seized the opportunity of returning to his natural personal connection with France. In February

Secret 1667 Lord St. Albans was secretly sent to Paris
engagement to conclude an engagement on the basis that
between Louis XIV. England should enter into no connection during
and Charles II., 1667 with the house of Austria, while Louis
March 1667. was to support all Charles's interests 'in or out of the kingdom.' The final form which this intrigue took—an intrigue kept entirely secret from the English ministers, and contained only in autograph letters from both monarchs to the Queen Mother, in whose house the negotiations had taken place—was (1) each pledged himself not to enter during a year into any alliance contrary to the interests of the other; (2) Louis agreed to hold back the fleet with which he had promised to help the Dutch; (3) Charles was to allow him a free hand in the Spanish Low Countries.

8. THE DUTCH IN THE THAMES. TREATY OF BRED A.

Sweden having offered her mediation, a conference met in May 1667 at the neutral town of Breda. For a long while it was found impossible to come to terms. Exhausted as both nations were, neither had reduced the other sufficiently to gain the commercial advantages on which they were bent. It was now that De Witt, looking anxiously across the frontier to the Spanish Low Countries, into which Louis had already marched, determined upon a decisive stroke. Suddenly, on June 7, when Charles was at a drunken revel at the Duchess of Monmouth's, 'all mad in hunting of a poor moth,' the sound of guns was heard in the Thames. It was the Dutch fleet of sixty-one men-of-war, which,

under Ruyter and John De Witt's brother Cornelius, had come to revenge upon England the insult of Flie. Mounting the Thames as far as Gravesend, and driving the English vessels before them, they took the Dutch fleet in the Sheerness, sailed as far as Upnor, and along the Thames, June 7, 1667. the Medway to Rochester, burnt three English men-of-war, and succeeded in capturing the 'Royal Charles,' which was taken in triumph to Holland. Then Ruyter sailed proudly along our coasts, vainly challenging a contest at Harwich, Portsmouth, Torbay, Dartmouth, and Plymouth.

The immediate effect of this daring blow was to extort peace. On July 31, 1667, the Treaty of Breda was signed, and a month later ratified. Its terms were the terms of a drawn battle. Each nation was to retain all conquests made, both before and during the war, up to May 10, 1667, either in territory or ships; and the treaty of 1662 was annulled. The effect of this was that England kept New York, and the Dutch Surinam and Poleroon. The Act of Navigation was so far relaxed that Dutch vessels were allowed to bring Dutch, German, and Flemish goods into English ports. The salute to English men-of-war in British waters was again allowed, but only as a matter of courtesy. The treaty of 1662, as far as it regarded commerce, was renewed. Each country was to protect the other against all enemies whatsoever. At the same time treaties were made by England with France and Denmark. France restored St. Christopher, and gave up Antigua and Montsérat. England restored Acadia, or Nova Scotia. Denmark was admitted to commercial equality.

The great struggle for the command of the sea and the commerce of the world was over for the time, only because the combatants, exhausted and bleeding, needed repose.

It had decided nothing, and had left behind it hatred and mistrust. But hatred and mistrust yield to the pressure of a common danger. Even before peace was concluded, all eyes had been turned from Breda to the victorious march of Louis's armies. The era of French aggression in Europe had begun.

CHAPTER XII.

DIPLOMACY AND PREPARATIONS OF LOUIS. INVASION OF SPANISH NETHERLANDS.

I. FRENCH TREATIES WITH PORTUGAL AND THE RHINE PRINCES.

THE years of the Dutch war had been on Louis's part a time of incessant diplomatic activity in preparation for the great design. Himself distinguished by Diplomatists of France. all the qualities which mark a master of statecraft, he was served with implicit obedience by a corps of the most accomplished *diplomats* that Europe had yet seen. Lionne in Paris, Ruvigny and Colbert in London, De Gremonville in Vienna, the Archbishop of Embrun in Madrid, Pomponne and d'Estrades in Sweden and the United Provinces—these and many like them had, except in De Witt, Lisola, and, perhaps, Arlington, no rivals. Well might a baffled English envoy at Madrid exclaim, 'France has the gift of persuading what she pleases here as in the rest of Christendom.'

By his nominal alliance with the Dutch (p. 115) Louis had prevented them from taking measures against an aggression which would bring him to their frontier; and, by restraining his own fleet, had prevented them from crushing their rival. When England seemed to be preponderating, he had on the other hand been instrumental

in gaining for the Republic, in 1666, the alliances which had helped to give her heart for another effort. He had secured from Charles, while peace was still pending, a secret and personal engagement which assured the neutrality of England for a time sufficient for his immediate purpose. But previously to this he had scored against her a brilliant diplomatic success in the Peninsula, by counteracting her endeavours to bring about peace between Portugal and Spain, and by forcing from the former an offensive alliance with himself. By this treaty

Treaty between Portugal and France, March 1667. (March 31, 1667) it was agreed that for a heavy subsidy, armed help against Spain, Louis's guarantee of any treaty she might make with Spain after Spain herself had made peace with France, and his promise to compel Spain to grant the title of King to her ruler, Portugal should actively carry on the war, should grant considerable commercial advantages to France, and should listen to no proposals from Spain until France herself made peace. He thus secured a potent source of distraction to Spain whenever he might choose to strike his blow.

Secure of England, the Republic, and Portugal, there now remained for Louis only one possible opposition of importance to neutralise. From Leopold, chief of the Austrian House, on account of his near relationship to Spain, the former connection of the countries, and the proximity of the Spanish Low Countries to his own dominions, the liveliest resentment might be expected. The means to counteract this difficulty, at any rate for a time, had already been provided by Mazarin, in 1658, by the formation of the Rhine League (see p. 76), which renewed its constitution every three years, and was still in existence in August 1667. Louis had too in 1664 formed separate alliances with the King of Sweden, the Grand Elector of Brandenburg, and the

Treaties with the Rhine Princes.

Electors of Saxony, and Mayence, cemented by large subsidies. He had thus made himself in a great measure the arbiter of German affairs, and took frequent occasion to assert his position.

Naturally, however, as, thus fettered, the Emperor grew less and less formidable to the Princes of the Empire, these bonds had become relaxed. Jealousy of France was taking the place of jealousy of the Emperor, and in 1667 it seemed doubtful whether another prolongation of three years of the Rhine League would be secured. Louis, therefore, at once (Oct. 28, 1667) made secretly at a heavy cost fresh alliances with the Princes along the Rhine, the Electors of Mayence and Cologne, the Duke of Neuburg, and the Bishop of Munster, by which they engaged to refuse a passage to Austrian troops. At the same time he stirred up disaffection among the Emperor's discontented subjects in Hungary, hoping thus to distract his attention, as in the case of Spain he had done by the help of Portugal.

2. INVASION OF THE LOW COUNTRIES.

Never did a fairer prospect present itself to an ambitious monarch. France was at this moment beyond comparison the best administered country in Europe. The wounds of the Fronde had been healed, and all classes seemed in contentment. The energy and determination of Louis himself were ably seconded by the devotion of the great administrators who had learned their trade from Mazarin. Colbert and finance. had removed abuses and reorganised finance with such success that Louis found himself in 1667 not merely free from debt, but with an easily collected revenue of more than thirty-one millions of livres beyond what had been with difficulty wrung from the people at the death of Mazarin. Lionne had

restored the navy, which Mazarin had permitted to rot away. In 1661 the royal dockyards had contained eighteen weatherworn vessels, scantily armed and manned. In 1667 France possessed a fleet of 110 well-built and amply-equipped ships, carrying 3,730 guns, and manned by 21,915 men, exclusive of officers.

The army was superb. No fewer than 150,000 men, officered by the veterans of the Fronde, were in constant drill, field practice, and garrison duty. The utmost attention had been given by the war minister, Louvois, to raising the infantry, hitherto the weakest arm, Louvois and the army. to the standard of the unequalled cavalry, and every inducement had been offered the *noblesse* to join its ranks. In the provinces near the Spanish Low Countries Louis had massed 50,000 of his best troops, while the whole country was covered with camps and arsenals. 'The best means,' he says himself, 'I thought, of doing something of importance was to surprise my enemies by my diligence, and by entering their country in arms before they should be ready to resist me. I therefore got everything ready much sooner than was customary. I collected everywhere corn, meal, fodder, powder, bullets, guns, and everything the lack of which might have delayed the march of my army. But particularly I kept carefully exercising the troops immediately about my person, in order that from my example the other leaders might learn to take the same care of those of whom they had the command.'

A strong contrast to this energy was afforded by his enemies. In spite of urgent warnings from the governors of the Spanish Low Countries and Franche Comté, the Unreadiness of Spain. court of Madrid, sunk in lethargy, made no preparations. At the moment when the troops selected to accompany Louis on his march were passing before him in review, the Spanish ministers were congra-

tulating themselves on his deceptive assurances of peace. A few days later their eyes were opened by receiving from him, in a lengthy volume entitled the 'Livres des Droits,' a statement of his immediate claim on the Spanish Low Countries, and the suggestion of the future claim to the whole monarchy. Its arguments, which were answered by Lisola, Austrian ambassador at London and the Hague, in 'Le Bouclier d'État et de Justice,' were thus summed up: 'France claims the Spanish Low Countries by the right of marriage; Spain owns them in right of blood; the provinces themselves owe allegiance in virtue of their customs. The Queen of France is wife of the first, sister of the second, and sovereign of the third.' A few days later Louis forwarded this statement to the various courts of Europe. He presented his enterprise not as a war—war indeed was not declared—but as a mere entering into possession of his wife's inheritance. He was going, he said, to *travel* in the Spanish Low Countries.

There was no further delay. On May 24, 1667, Louis and Turenne crossed the frontier. Castel Rodrigo, with a total force of 20,000 men scattered in garri-
 Louis over-
 runs the
 south of the
 Spanish Low
 Countries.
 sons in towns whose fortifications were out of repair, could make no resistance. Binch was taken on the 31st, Charleroi on June 2. By the 18th Ath, Tournai, Douai, Courtrai, Oudenarde were in French hands. In less than two months the whole south of the Spanish Low Countries was at Louis's feet.

3. TREATY OF EVENTUAL PARTITION OF THE SPANISH MONARCHY WITH LEOPOLD.

Spain could not dream of effective resistance to Louis. Her only hope was from outside. She speedily found that from England nothing was to be expected, though

she was still ignorant of Charles's secret engagement with Louis. Taking advantage however of the revolution in Portugal of November 1667, which had overthrown Don Pedro and placed his brother Alphonso on the throne, and which had thus rendered the alliance with Louis of no effect, she made a peace with that country, recognising her at length as an independent kingdom. She then turned to Leopold. The Spanish Low Countries, forming part of the 'circle' of Burgundy, one of the ten 'circles' into which, for certain administrative and financial purposes the Empire was divided, was, as such, nominally under the protection of the Empire, and Spain claimed a fulfilment of this duty. But at the Peace of Westphalia the Empire had agreed to give no assistance to Spain during her war with France, and in 1658 Leopold had renewed the engagement on his own account. Louis now took every step in his power to secure the continued fulfilment of these promises.

His ambassador at Vienna, De Gremonville, perhaps the ablest of his diplomatists, had the charge of managing the Emperor. He so completely succeeded in his task that even when Turenne had captured Lille (August 27, 1667), hitherto deemed impregnable, and had routed the Spanish force sent against him; and when Leopold, in consternation, had yielded to the pressure from Madrid and ordered large levies of troops, by taking the high hand he actually compelled the Emperor to countermand his own orders. Not a man was enlisted, and Louis, thus freed from anxiety, was able at the end of September to put his army into winter quarters, and return from his victorious progress to his capital.

With the Diet of Ratisbon Louis was equally successful. Publicly he assured the Princes that he would

hold his conquests in the Spanish Low Countries on the same terms relatively to them and to the Emperor as those upon which Spain had held them. Privately he appealed to individual members by profuse bribery ; and he fomented the divisions which already existed among them. In October 1667 the Diet resolved to confine its action to mediation, and to let the claim to protection of the 'circle' lapse. In one respect only Louis failed. He was unable to secure another term of three years' continuance of the Rhine League.

With the two great Protestant powers of the north, Brandenburg and Sweden, he dealt separately. Firm allies of France as their jealousy of the Emperor had made them, they began now to be alarmed rather at the prospect of an indefinite extension of French influence ; and their anxiety was increased by the endeavours of Louis to secure the Polish succession, likely soon to become vacant by the abdication of John Casimir, for a Prince of the French blood. Louis, to whom Poland was merely one of the counters with which he played the game, at once changed his tone. To secure the co-operation of Brandenburg he not only withdrew his own claim, but promised to support the election of the Grand Elector's relative, the Duke of Neuburg. Won by this promise, by a generous subsidy, and by the engagement of Louis to be moderate in his claims in the Spanish Low Countries, and persuaded by their ministers, who, down to the secretaries who wrote the draft, had their pockets filled with French gold, both the Grand Elector and the Duke agreed to preserve a strict neutrality and to refuse a passage to the Emperor's troops. Sweden was treated with less ceremony. By the force of plain threats she also was induced to remain neutral. The arrogant spirit of the French is shown by Lionne's boast

The Diet of
Ratisbon
refuses to
oppose Louis,
October 1667.

Branden-
burg and
Sweden
promise
neutrality.

that in case France had any trouble from her she should be speedily 'sent back into her forests.'

Louis had thus taken all indirect precautions against Leopold intervening in the struggle. He now made use of arguments still more convincing. Without feint or reticence he laid before the Emperor a project which, by its straightforward appeal to his selfishness, might induce him to break through those family and dynastic interests which at present prevented his cordial alliance with an enemy of Spain. This was no less than a scheme of the partition of the whole Spanish monarchy between Louis and himself should Charles II. of Spain die childless. Already, in the beginning of 1667, the idea had been mentioned tentatively; and the negotiations were resumed with the utmost secrecy in October. So well was that secrecy maintained that not until a few years ago was the existence of this intrigue and of the treaty which resulted from it known to the world.

Between the first and second attempts Louis had ascertained the conditions upon which the Dutch would support him in coming to terms with Spain. They agreed that Louis should hold Franche Comté, Cambrai and the Cambrésis, Douai, (with the fort of Scarpe), Aire, St. Omer, Furnes, and Bergues, with their *dépendances* or districts; and that Charleroi should be dismantled; or, as an alternative, that he should retain what he had already conquered. Louis now placed these conditions before Leopold, along with the enticing project of partition. By flattery of the Emperor and his ministers, by first proposing exorbitant terms, and then, as great concessions, withdrawing those which had no importance for France; by every device, indeed, known to diplomacy, even to downright lying, De Gremonville at length brought

Suggestion of eventual partition of the Spanish monarchy, October 1667.

Agreement of Louis and the Dutch. The 'alternatives.'

Treaty of eventual partition, January 19, 1668.

about an agreement. If Spain should refuse to make peace with France on the suggested conditions, the Emperor would not help her, provided Louis did not push his conquests further. In no case would France or Austria attack each other in their own dominions. The eventual division of the Spanish monarchy was then regulated. The Emperor was to have Spain itself, except Navarre and Rosas ; the West Indies ; Milan and the right of investiture to the duchy of Sicna ; and all the Spanish ports on the Sea of Tuscany up to the frontiers of Naples ; while Louis was to take the Low Countries and Franche Comté ; the Eastern Philippines ; Navarre and Rosas ; all Spanish possessions in Africa ; with Naples and Sicily, except as before arranged. Each power was to help the other to overcome resistance on the part of its new subjects ; local rights were to be disregarded ; the agreement was not to lapse until any child that might be born to Charles was six months old ; and the treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees were meanwhile to remain in full force.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE FALL OF CLARENDON.

WHILE Louis XIV., absolute ruler of a great kingdom, was thus giving the law to Europe, Charles II. of England was every day realising more clearly how narrow were the limits of his own freedom. His Parliament had been showing itself imbued with precisely the same views as the Long Parliament of his father, except that, whereas that had been Puritan, this was Anglican. Its enemies

Temper of
the Parlia-
ment.

were the same—Popery, military force, and an uncontrolled use of the purse by the Crown.

Upon all three points the action of Charles had excited bitter suspicion and discontent. It was

through that suspicion and discontent, aided by many collateral causes, and most of all by the base desertion of the King, a desertion less notorious than his father's desertion of Strafford only because the circumstances were less tragic and the personages less grandiose, that Clarendon was now struck down.

The leading causes of his fall are easily discernible, though, from the many purely personal questions which were involved, it is impossible to give to each its just value. In 1662 he had risked the King's favour by opposing the Declaration of Indulgence. In 1663 his personal enemy, the Catholic Earl of Bristol, made an ill-advised attempt to secure his impeachment for high treason. But the charges were utterly frivolous; Charles gave no countenance to the proceeding; Bristol, as the King prophesied, only 'burnt his wings,' and Clarendon remained the stronger for the attack. He was however surrounded by enemies. Lady Castlemaine, the most vulgar and abandoned of the women who governed Charles, hated him with the hatred of disappointed vanity and avarice. Not only had

Clarendon's enemies. Clarendon steadfastly declined to court her favour—he would not even permit his wife to visit her—but he had frequently refused to pass grants for her from the King. It was at her house that those nightly meetings were held at which a knot of young political adventurers, to whose rise the all-absorbing power of the Chancellor was an obstacle, met to plan his overthrow. Ashley, Lauderdale, William Coventry, and Henry Bennet, better known as the Earl of Arlington, whom Clarendon had himself introduced to public life, and who was now Secretary of State in the place of Nicholas, had each his reasons for wishing his fall. The disappointed cavaliers owed him a deep grudge for the Indemnity Bill and the Bill of Sales; the Catholics saw in him the representative of Anglicanism; the Presbyterians and

other dissenting sects laid their persecution at his door. He was disliked by the courtiers for the reproach which the decency of his private life cast upon their excesses. His daughter's marriage with the presumptive heir to the throne roused the jealousy of the nobility; while the arrogance of his demeanour and his display of wealth alienated the citizens of London. It was not least to his disadvantage that the gravity of his deportment lent itself to Buckingham's ready wit and mimicry. The Bishops alone were his steadfast friends.

It was not until 1666 that grave political events placed him in direct antagonism to the Parliament. The incessant drain of money for the expenses at once of the Dutch war and of the King's pleasures was gradually exasperating the Commons. They had with enthusiasm voted an enormous supply in 1664, and had followed this, in 1665, with another of half the amount. Even then Charles had been compelled to accept a proviso, suggested by suspicion of waste, that the money should be applied strictly to the war. As in the Parliament of Charles I. the doctrine had been established that taxation could not be raised without the consent of Parliament, so now was established the equally important doctrine that neither could it be spent without that consent. Clarendon's view of the constitution, despite the lessons of the last twenty years, was precisely the same as it had been when he served Charles I.: 'The King was to work in combination with his Parliament; but he was not to allow the House of Commons to force its will upon the House of Lords; still less was he to allow both Houses combined to compel him to give the royal assent to bills of which his conscience disapproved.' He now incurred the displeasure of both the King and the Commons by vehemently inveighing against this proviso as derogatory to the Crown.

He opposes
appropriation of
supplies.

When however in September 1666 Charles demanded yet another supply, the country gentlemen, upon whom the weight of taxation chiefly rested, and who were scandalised at the excesses of the court in which they did not participate, determined, while offering a sum of 1,800,000*l.*, to frame further safeguards. Avoiding a direct attack upon the King, they declared their belief that he had been cheated by the officials, and demanded a public inspection of accounts. They appointed a committee to examine all persons who could give information on the subject, and they introduced a bill to nominate Parliamentary commissioners to investigate expenditure and punish defaulters. Charles, anxious only for the money, did not oppose the action of the Commons. Clarendon however again stood between them and their desires. He declared that they had exceeded their proper functions, that this was 'a new encroachment as had no bottom,' an unconstitutional expansion of their privileges, and that 'the scars were yet too fresh and green of those wounds which had been inflicted upon the kingdom from such usurpations.' He openly expressed his determination to oppose the bill to the utmost of his power when it came before the Lords, and he urged Charles to refuse his sanction even if the Lords permitted it to pass. The further progress of the measure was stayed by a prorogation, and before the next session Clarendon had fallen. The bill of the Commons was then passed. Commissioners were appointed who were members of neither House, and by their investigation shameful disorganisation and peculation on a gigantic scale were brought to light.

But Clarendon had taken a step which brought him still more directly into conflict with Parliament. He saw that the Government and the Commons were in constant antagonism. He therefore pressed

the King to have recourse to a dissolution, the constitutional method of getting rid of such a difficulty. His advice was not followed, for Charles felt that the present House contained a far larger number of his personal adherents and of the court officials than were ever likely to find seats again, and the bishops represented the danger of the possible election of many Presbyterians. The mere proposal however further increased the excitement against Clarendon.

Greater still was the jealousy caused in all classes by another suggestion, perhaps the only one for which Clarendon can be justly blamed. How far Charles was at the time endeavouring to realise his long-cherished desire of creating a standing army is doubtful. It is however certain that, on pretence of guarding the coasts after the Chatham disaster, troops were now raised without any reference to Parliament. They were collected and equipped by some of the great nobility at their own cost, but their maintenance had to be provided for, and the exchequer was empty. Though Parliament stood prorogued, Charles determined to summon it at once. This resolve was opposed by Clarendon on the formal ground that it was unconstitutional to summon a prorogued Parliament before the day named for its meeting; and to get over the difficulty he suggested that without waiting for Parliamentary sanction royal letters should be sent to the Lord-lieutenants and deputy-lieutenants of the counties in which the troops were raised, authorising them to call in provisions, while the other counties should pay a proportionate subscription. That he honestly believed this to be within the lines of the constitution is clear, and nothing could more strongly prove how ignorant he was of the effect upon the English mind of Cromwell's government by standing armies. The effect was imme-

Suggests
supporting
troops by
forced con-
tributions.

diate. At the meeting of Parliament in July, 1667, the Commons unanimously voted an address praying the King to disband the newly raised troops. His reply was to rally them on their suspicion that he should dream of wishing for a standing army, and once more, for reasons which are very obscure, to prorogue them. This prorogation, too, was laid to Clarendon's advice.

It became certain that whenever Parliament should reassemble Clarendon would be impeached. Among the bishops alone could he look for support. Charles himself, while treating him with personal kindness, displayed the cool ingratitude of his race to the man to whom he largely owed his peaceful and triumphant restoration. He had indeed many causes of irritation against Clarendon. The Chancellor had opposed his wish for toleration, had not spared the most outspoken remonstrances upon the idle debauchery of his life, and had thwarted him in at least one disgraceful intrigue. He was tired of hearing on every side that so long as his minister was in power he was but half a King. Finally—and this was with Charles throughout life the most potent argument—it was easier, in the presence of popular clamour, to abandon than to support him. Just as in later years, when consenting to the judicial murder of Archbishop Plunket, Charles was not ashamed to exclaim, 'I cannot save him because I dare not,' so now he was heard to say, 'My own condition is such that I cannot dispute with them.' On August 30, 1667 after a vain endeavour to induce Clarendon to resign, he sent him, ill as he was at the time, and mourning the death of his wife, orders to deliver up the Great Seal. He was rewarded by receiving the assurance of May, Lady Castlemaine's secretary, that 'he was now King, which he had never been before.'

Personal dislike, unscrupulous attack, the virtues far

more than the weaknesses of his private character, the disasters of the nation—the odium for which fell, as always, upon the most prominent figure in the kingdom—and the ingratitude of Charles, had all much to do with Clarendon's disgrace. But the main cause is to be sought in the inherent weakness of his political theory. He

did not instinctively feel, and therefore could not guide, as Pym had guided, and Shaftesbury was to some extent to guide, the desires of

Clarendon's
weakness as
a politician.

his generation. He was purely a constitutional lawyer, with views of the constitution which he thought beyond argument or improvement. His sole guide was the law, as he understood it. He had opposed Laud and the Star Chamber because they were above the law, and he had opposed Parliaments when they acted against the law. He endeavoured to secure a clause in an Act of Parliament to grant the King a dispensing power; but he objected to the King's use of that power without Parliamentary sanction as an illegal extension of the prerogative; just as he objected to the claim for appropriation of supplies and the inspection of accounts as an illegal extension of Parliamentary privilege. These essentially negative views had not stood in the way, had rather been advantageous, at the Restoration itself. They had indeed then taken a positive aspect; for Clarendon's business was to restore the old Parliamentary monarchy in strict connection with the old Anglican Church, to come back to the broad lines of a constitution which he loved. For such a task his firmness, integrity, knowledge of constitutional law, and love of business, fitted him beyond any man of his time. But, that task once finished, the weakness of a position based upon negations showed itself. He had neither the keenness to discern a coming change nor the elasticity of mind to adapt himself to it when it came. Had he been able to place

himself at the head of the current of popular opinion he might have died prime minister of England, for his usefulness was incontestable. As it was he stood in its way, and was swept aside to make room for more supple men.

It is possible that Charles had hoped that by his action he might save his old servant from further attack. But he had misunderstood the temper of Parliament. Everything that had gone wrong during Clarendon's administration was laid to his initiative—the sale of Dunkirk, the entering upon the Dutch war, the disaster at Chatham, the waste of public money. When the

Proposed
impeach-
ment, and
flight, Nov.
29, 1667.

Commons met on October 10, 1667, they at once voted an impeachment. It was as extravagant as might have been expected. Of all the articles, one only—that in which he was accused of promoting a standing army, the dissolution of Parliament, and the supporting troops upon forced contributions—had even plausibility. Conscious of the weakness of their case, they applied, but in vain, to the Lords to commit Clarendon on a general charge of treason. Clarendon hesitated long what course to pursue. Hearing however that Charles had 'wondered why he did not withdraw himself,' he determined to take the hint, which indeed soon became a positive command; and on November 29 he fled to France, leaving Parliament to the barren vengeance of passing an Act banishing him for ever, to which Charles was forced to consent.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND PEACE OF AIX-LA-
CHAPELLE.

I. VARIOUS PROJECTS OF CHARLES.

UNDERLYING the other causes of the Parliamentary attack upon Clarendon had been the conviction that he was directing English policy in the French interest. It was this jealousy of the French power, the jealousy of the nation as distinct from the King, which now led to the formation of a great European coalition against Louis.

The project of a close alliance between England and the Republic had been discussed even before the close of the late war. It first took shape in the mind of Sir William Temple, an intimate friend of De Witt, and the most cultured of English diplomatists. He had fretted under the success of Louis in fostering a war whereby the two great naval and Protestant powers destroyed one another's strength, and he longed to repay him in kind. De Witt had listened to his proposals readily. The sole object of the Grand Pensionary was to stay the approach of France towards the Dutch frontier, and he had tried in vain to induce Louis to pledge himself to hold his hand. He had, too, reason to hope that Sweden, sore at Lionne's arrogance, would throw in her lot with that of the two other Protestant powers. His agent in London was therefore directed to work upon the fears of Charles by declaring that if England did not join the Republic the Dutch would be driven to a close alliance with Louis,

English
jealousy of
France.

Project of a
Dutch
alliance.
Sir W.
Temple.
Sept. 1667.

and upon his pride by putting before him the headship of a great Protestant coalition. At the same time he tried to bring Louis to terms by letting him know that on the one hand he was treating directly with Castel Rodrigo, and on the other had good hopes of a league with Austria, Sweden, and England. The implied threat drew from Louis nothing but a curt and angry reply.

The focus of diplomatic intrigue was now transferred to London. Ruvigny, the French ambassador, a personal friend of Clarendon, was despatched to England in the utmost haste, well furnished with funds to enforce his arguments, and with instructions to renew to Charles himself the promise of French help against his own subjects. Before however he reached London, Clarendon had fallen, and he had to deal with Buckingham and Arlington, between whom the power which the Chancellor had left behind was now divided.

He was received with perfect frankness. Charles expressed the warmest personal regard for Louis, but declared that Parliament would never consent to an alliance with France ; and among all whom Ruvigny approached he found the conviction that England would not stand idle while France was taking the whole of the Spanish Low Countries. Louis, on receiving Ruvigny's report, showed the liveliest anxiety. To soothe the Parliamentary opposition, rendered keener by the news that Clarendon had landed in France, he forbade the fallen minister to come to Paris. He instructed Ruvigny to press upon Charles the shame of being a slave to his Parliament, and the prospect of avenging the insult at Chatham. Concealing the fact that he was at the moment in active negotiation with De Witt, Charles replied by hinting at generous offers from Spain. A large supply of ready money, a part of the French conquests in the Spanish Low Countries,

Contest of
French,
Dutch, and
Spaniards
for the
English
alliance.

and important commercial advantages might, however, move him. Louis at once (October) instructed Ruvigny to promise the money demanded, increased facilities for trade with France and the Spanish Low Countries and French aid in ships and money to conquer the Spanish possessions in the West Indies. The question of places in the Spanish Low Countries was, however, waived.

The diplomatic contest between France and the Republic was accentuated by the personal rivalry of Buckingham and Arlington. The former, a vain man, devoid alike of principle and political insight, was wholly in the French interest ; he hoped to receive the command of an English contingent in the service of Louis. Arlington, equally vain and unscrupulous, had succeeded to the principal direction of foreign affairs by his evident capacity for business and coolness of judgment. He may indeed be regarded almost as a statesman of the first rank. It was greatly in his favour that he was the only one of Charles's ministers with a knowledge of European languages sufficient to enable him to converse easily with foreign ambassadors. He perfectly understood the temper of the English people ; and, having married a lady from Holland, was inclined to the Dutch rather than the French connection. The opportunity now offered him of thwarting Buckingham tended in the same direction. While therefore engaged, in apparent concert with the latter, in preliminaries with Ruvigny which he had no intention of seriously pursuing, he at the same moment busied himself, with Charles's sanction, but without Buckingham's knowledge, in direct and serious negotiations with De Witt.

In pursuance of this policy, terms were placed before Louis in December of a nature likely to insure their rejection. Louis in return sent the draft of a treaty

equally distasteful to the English Government. Charles hereupon asserted that England was so exhausted by the late war that repose was absolutely necessary, and that he was therefore determined upon a course of strict neutrality. Louis was compelled to hide his irritation at this, the first serious check to his diplomatic success, by proclaiming that such neutrality was really more to his interest than war, inasmuch as the Dutch, no longer fearing the union of England and France, would lay aside much of their jealousy with respect to his movements. Privately, however, he expressed profound disappointment.

It is a lively illustration of the political morality of the time, that simultaneously with these negotiations Charles was offering to Spain too his active alliance. His terms were, as always, ready money and commercial expansion. He demanded a heavy subsidy, permission to send a fixed number of ships for unrestricted trade to Buenos Ayres and the Philippines; privileges in Antwerp, which was again to become the rival of Amsterdam; and, through the exercise of Spanish influence, free trade with the Hanse towns. Both the poverty and the pride of Spain stood in the way of the acceptance of such terms.

2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

Nothing therefore now remained, if England was to take action at all, but the acceptance of the union with the Republic proposed by De Witt, to compel Louis to bind himself to one or other of his 'alternatives' (see p. 147); and to this, under Arlington's influence, Charles now found decisive reasons for turning. Most of all, the hope that such an alliance might put to rest the increasing clamour of Parliament was an argument which influenced a King who

Rejection of
French
alliance.

Proposals to
Spain
rejected.

Charles de-
termines on
Dutch
alliance.

habitually acted along the line of least resistance. Early in January 1668 Temple was sent off in haste to the Hague.

Two difficulties threatened to retard the conclusion of the alliance. De Witt had dealt a severe blow to the Orange faction, and had offended Charles, by obtaining the perpetual separation of the stadtholdership from the command of the land and sea forces. To this he wished for Charles's acquiescence, and he now secured this acquiescence by affecting to hang back from the treaty, on which the King was for the moment bent. The other difficulty was that, while haste and secrecy were of the last necessity, the peculiar constitution of the Dutch government, which required the sanction of all treaties by the Provincial Estates, rendered haste and secrecy impossible. It happened however that during the late war the Provincial Estates had for urgency delegated their power to a commission of eight members, which was still undissolved. To this body the business was referred, and upon their agreement the treaty was at once ratified by the States General. Temple thus completely outwitted d'Estrades, the French ambassador at the Hague, who reported to Lionne that some arrangement was in the wind, but that it would be easy to secure its defeat when brought, as the constitution demanded, before the Provincial Estates.

On January 13, 1668, Temple succeeded in concluding three separate treaties. By the first each power was bound to assist the other, if attacked in Europe, with forty ships of the line, 6,000 infantry, and 400 cavalry. By the second they were to endeavour to restore peace between France and Spain on the basis of the 'alternatives,' to obtain from Louis a cessation of arms until the end of May, to guarantee the cession by Spain of the places to which he

The alliance
of England
and the
Republic,
January 13,
1668.

would become entitled, and finally to induce him, under this guarantee, to renounce further conquests in the Spanish Low Countries, even if force should be found necessary to compel Spain to observe the agreement.

In these two treaties all sign of menace to Louis had been sedulously avoided. The third, which was strictly secret, was of a different character. It provided that *whichever* of the parties refused to consent to the 'alternatives,' force should be used to compel her to accept peace. If France were recalcitrant, the war upon her should not cease until she had been reduced to the limits imposed by the Peace of the Pyrenees. No protest was made against the future claim of Louis to the Spanish monarchy, and it was doubtless hoped that since the conditions of peace were those proposed by Louis himself, the secret article would never be called into play.

The secret treaty.

Conditional accession of Sweden.

To this treaty Sweden gave her adhesion in April, conditionally upon obtaining from Spain the payments to which she laid claim. Such however was the poverty of Spain that she was unable to find the money, and the difficulty was got over only by England and the Republic guaranteeing the payment at a future time. The signature of Sweden was affixed on May 15. The treaty has thus become known as the Triple Alliance.

Important as the Triple Alliance was, both in its immediate effects, and as the first formal expression of European resistance to the aggressions of Louis, it was, so far as Charles was concerned, a piece of gross political knavery. His hopes were in reality steadily fixed on France, and on the day after the treaty was signed he wrote both to his sister Henrietta, who was in the confidence of Louis, and to Louis himself, to explain his action as forced

Charles's view of the treaty.

upon him by his subjects. He had too the special meanness to declare that it was the Dutch and not he who had proposed and pressed the matter forward. By the secret treaty he had cleverly and fatally compromised the Dutch in the eyes of Louis, and had thus secured their isolation if ever he should himself desire to attack them again.

3. PEACE OF AIX-IA-CHAPELLE

In the face of this coalition Louis might well pause in his career. The peace which Portugal had made with Spain naturally tended in the same direction, since it set free to fight in the Spanish Netherlands whatever forces Spain still possessed. The three events—the Partition Treaty, the Triple Alliance, and the peace of Portugal with Spain—now brought about a short period of repose for Europe.

But Louis had meanwhile had time to strike another blow. On the mediation of the Pope he had, in September 1667, granted a truce of three months. At its conclusion, in January 1668, the Diet asked for a further period of three months during which terms might be arranged ; but Louis, while consenting to keep open the negotiations, refused a suspension of arms. The confidence of Castel Rodrigo, who declared that Nature herself would enforce a suspension, incited him to an unexpected enterprise. Winter campaigns had been till then almost unknown in European warfare. But Louis broke through the general practice. He determined to overrun Franche Comté, which lay temptingly open to attack.

His preparations were rapidly made. A corps of 15,000 men was placed under the command of Condé. On the 2nd, after sending notice of his intention to all the European powers, he left St. Germain. In a

fortnight all was over. The Spaniards could oppose only 12,000 disorganised troops to Condé's *corps d'élite*; and by the 19th, before Europe had recovered from her surprise, the only places capable of offering resistance were in Louis's hands. He now received from the English and Dutch envoys the formal announcement of the Triple Alliance. Their communication was couched in terms of studied compliment, the whole stress being laid upon the intended compulsion of Spain. In accordance with the treaty they asked for a suspension of arms until the end of May.

Conquest of
Franche
Comté.

To this Louis replied that Spain, by making peace with Portugal, showed her intention of continuing the war, and that to grant the suspension demanded would merely give her three months in which to strengthen herself, while he, with 100,000 men ready to march, had to stand by with folded arms. To show his anxiety to satisfy Europe however, he would hold his hand until May 16, upon an undertaking that the ratifications of the treaty with Spain on the basis of the 'alternatives' were exchanged by that date, and would even give back to Spain all he might have taken since March 31, the date he had originally offered for the conclusion of an arrangement.

Louis
accepts the
terms of the
Triple
Alliance
condition-
ally.

This decision was arrived at only after long consideration. In the unprepared condition of the other powers, no less than in his own readiness for attack, in the advice of Condé and Turenne, and in the feeling of Paris, where the warlike spirit was so strong that it was 'a mortal sin even to mention peace,' Louis had every temptation to immediate war. Moreover he had, through the treachery of Charles, learned with excessive indignation of the secret provisions of the Triple Alliance. Other considerations however pre-

His reasons.

ailed. The necessity of garrisoning any towns he might capture would enfeeble his army ; while a general European coalition would probably at once follow any further attack. War would but consolidate the Triple Alliance, which was sure before long, if he were moderate, to fall asunder by its own weight. Franche Comté could be rendered powerless before he gave it up ; and the towns which he already possessed in the Spanish Low Countries would place the rest at his mercy when a more favourable moment should arrive.

He therefore, on April 15, 1668, agreed to the following terms. Up to May 31 he would accept whichever of the 'alternatives' Spain might choose. During the next two months he should raise his terms.

Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. To the first 'alternative' (see p. 147) he should add the possession of Luxemburg, or Lille and Tournai ; to the second, that of Franche Comté, Cambrai, and the Cambrésis. Should nothing have been settled by the end of July, the whole question would be open to revision. England and the Republic bound themselves meanwhile to attack Spain after May 31 should she refuse to concur, reserving for their action the north-eastern, while he dealt with the south-western portion of the still unoccupied part of the Spanish Low Countries.

Without resources or prospect of efficient help, Castel Rodrigo at length gave way ; though the pride, dilatoriness, and formality of the court of Madrid so effectually seconded his reluctance that it was not until May 29 that the treaty was finally concluded. Looking more to a future war with France than to the present peace, he decided to accept the second 'alternative,' since the first, which included the French possession of Franche Comté, would have closed all communication between the Spanish Low Countries, the Empire, and Lorraine. The Dutch too, he felt, would by this choice be alarmed at the proximity



of France, and would be more interested in the continued defence of the rest of the Spanish Low Countries.

The advantages gained by Louis were immense. Victory had, as it were, been given him by compulsion, and he appeared before Europe as the apostle of moderation. Confronted by a formidable alliance, he had himself laid down the conditions of peace ; and those conditions contained not one word to hamper his action in that which especially caused the fears of Europe—the prosecution of his claim to the Spanish monarchy. The fortresses of Charleroi, Binch, Ath, Douai (with Scarpe), Tournai, Oudenarde, Lille, Armentières, Courtrai, Bergues, and Furnes, with their districts, which were now secured to him by treaty, constituted a veritable *frontière de fer*, the impregnable north-eastern frontier of France for which Henri IV., Richelieu, and Mazarin had all striven. Paris was now the real centre of the country, and the way for the next leap to European supremacy was open and easy.

Advantages
gained by
Louis.

CHAPTER XV.

COMPLETE FAILURE OF CHARLES'S ATTEMPTS AT TOLERATION AFTER THE FALL OF CLARENDON.

1667–1671.

I. TOLERATION DURING THE RECESS OF PARLIAMENT.

THE fall of Clarendon constituted a definite point of departure in the history of the reign of Charles II. ; for it removed one obstacle to the fulfilment of his purpose of resting his power upon the good-will and gratitude of Dissent. Buckingham and Arlington were naturally ready to espouse a policy opposed to that of Clarendon. But their private inclinations

Buckingham
and Arlington.
ton.

also led them towards toleration ; Buckingham, as the husband of Fairfax's daughter, and the patron of Protestant discontent ; Arlington, as a sympathiser with the Catholics, even if he were not one himself.

As long as the recess lasted they had their way. The penal statutes were ignored, the prisons set open, and the meeting-houses again thronged. The
 Renewed attempt at toleration. Presbyterians received ostentatious favour, while many old Commonwealth men again appeared in public. A conference was held in which Orlando Bridgeman (who as Lord Keeper of the Seals had succeeded Clarendon), Lord Chief Justice Hale, and some of the purest characters of both the Church and the dissenting bodies took part, and a bill was drafted whereby, upon some alterations of ceremonies and the form of ordination, the Presbyterians were to re-enter the Church, while the other sects whose principles forbade association with a State establishment were to have three years' full indulgence. It was confidently hoped that Parliament, rendered tractable by the Triple Alliance, would give their consent to this proposal.

This hope soon proved groundless. The Commons had indeed overthrown Clarendon, because he had resisted their encroachments on the prerogative, and was thought to favour France, not because he had opposed toleration. Upon this question they had always been more Clarendonian than Clarendon himself, and it was now found that their views were but strengthened by their late successes.

2. PERSECUTION DURING THE SESSION.

The intentions of the King had already leaked out, and the Commons met (February 10, 1668) in a state of excessive irritation to consider the speech from the

throne. The usual demand for money occupied the first place. Then followed a request that they would 'seriously think of some course to beget a better union and composure in the minds of my Protestant subjects in matters of religion.' All mention of Catholics was carefully avoided.

The reply of the Commons struck the prevailing note of distrust. A subsidy of 300,000*l.* was indeed voted, but with a demand for definite application. A searching inquiry was instituted into the mismanagement of the Dutch war, and especially into the Chatham disgrace. They next sought to restore the abandoned safeguards to the Triennial Bill (see p. 124) by entrusting the Chancellor with the duty of issuing writs should the King fail to do so within three years of a dissolution. But the dislike to stultify themselves so soon, the indecency of pushing the King so hard, and the fact that in Sweden, the only other country then under parliamentary government, writs were issued by officials only during a minority, furnished arguments to the court party; and a technical irregularity in the introduction of the bill was made an excuse for waiving the question. Language of unusual boldness was however heard in the debate, and phrases such as 'compelling the king by law' were significant of the rising anger and distrust.

On the main issue there was among the vast majority no hesitation. Charles was at once petitioned to proclaim the suppression of all unlawful assemblies, whether Papist or Protestant. He well knew that upon his answer depended a continuance of the supplies which his extravagance rendered necessary. The short-lived hopes of the Dissenters came to an end. The desires of the King, the influence of Buckingham and Arlington, and the wishes of the best

Anger of the Commons.

Attempt to restore the Triennial Bill.

Failure of Charles's attempt at toleration.

men of both parties were alike powerless before the angry determination of the Commons.

On March 11 they settled down to the consideration of the last part of the King's speech. The minority spoke with boldness and force. They urged that 'if a man finds not his account in the government he lives under he will never labour to support it,' and they represented vividly the evils which the persecuting Acts were causing to trade. The dread of a standing army was

Debates on the King's proposals, March 1668. appealed to on both sides; it was alternately declared that toleration with its consequent anarchy, and repression with its consequent discontent, would alike demand the maintenance of a military force. The violent Churchmen used the old language. The Presbyterians had, it was true, brought about the Restoration, and were supporters of monarchy; and yet their tenets were destructive of proper government: 'The king but "minister honorum"' — 'greater than any one man, but less than the people' — 'salus populi suprema lex.' They must not be allowed a footing, lest they destroy the whole. The charge that, though by profession men of mercy, Churchmen carried things with excessive severity, was met by the question, 'Must a father yield authority to his son?' Leave was at length given to introduce a bill to continue the Conventicle Acts.

On April 8 the proposal that the King should be asked to hold a conference of divines was fully debated. It was argued that severity did but make Dissent respectable; that the justices refused to convict, because the wife and children of the offender became chargeable on the parish; and that it was dangerous to make laws too big to be executed. Waller likened the Church to an elder brother among the Turks who strangles his brethren lest they should threaten the succession; and he bade

the House take notice that Empson and Dudley were hanged not for extortion but for pressing the penal laws. The Tolerationists had the speaking to themselves; but the majority had the votes, and the proposal was rejected by 176 to 70.

Three weeks later, on the bill for continuing the Conventicle Acts, the advocates of severity had their way.

Bill for continuing Con-
venticle Acts, May
1668. In vain they were urged 'to make the fire in the chimney and not in the middle of the room,' and warned against making it so hot that it would burn both the victims and their

executioners. The prevailing sentiment was probably interpreted by a speaker who declared that if the Catholics did not come under this bill he should ask leave to bring in one to tolerate Popery. The bill was carried by 144 to 73.

For a while the attention of the House was distracted by a famous controversy with the Lords, embittered by the jealousy aroused by their frequent power since the Restoration. A merchant named Skinner, who complained that the East India Company had seized his ship and cargo, and assaulted himself, laid his cause before the Privy Council instead of first appealing to the law courts; the Privy Council referred the matter to the Lords, and the Lords awarded him heavy damages. The company thereupon appealed to the Commons, who at once denied the legality of an original appeal to the Lords in a case with which the ordinary courts were competent to deal, declared the action of the Lords to be a breach of privilege, and ordered Skinner into custody. They passed, too, a vote that anybody who assisted in carrying out the order of the Lords should be deemed a betrayer of the liberties of the Commons of England and an infringer of the privileges of the House. The Lords thereupon committed

to prison Sir Samuel Barnardiston, chairman of the company and a member of the Commons, and fined him 500*l*. So violent was the quarrel, and so complete the deadlock, that the opportunity was a good one for seeing whether, if time were given for passions to cool, the Commons might not at the same time be induced to waive their opposition to toleration. Charles therefore, on May 8, 1668, ordered the House to adjourn itself, and afterwards by successive adjournments put off its meeting until October 19, 1669.

During this long interval the question of a dissolution was again earnestly discussed. Not only were both Buckingham and Arlington anxious to avoid parliamentary attack, but they were confident of the full support of the Dissenters for a new election, since their condition had again been ameliorated as soon as Parliament had been adjourned. The more pronounced sectarians had been secured by Buckingham, and had offered a large contribution towards the King's expenses in return for the indulgence he promised. Charles had himself received a Presbyterian deputation, and declared he still hoped to see their body before long within the national Church.

It is probable that a dissolution would have secured his objects. But the old fears again prevailed. Monk, who still possessed great influence, urged that a Parliament composed largely of the oppressed would seek for vengeance on their oppressors, and exclaimed that rather than wait for that day he would leave England. Charles determined once more to face his old Parliament, the meeting of which could not indeed be longer delayed. During the recess a spasmodic attempt had been made to bring the expenditure within the revenue secured to the King for life. But 'economy was an exotic at court,'

Discussion of
advisability
of a dissolu-
tion.

Fresh tolera-
tion during
recess.

and money was again absolutely necessary. The Houses met on October 19, 1669.

Had Charles been careful to maintain at least a moderate execution of the penal laws, it is possible that the Commons might at their coming together have accepted some indulgence for Protestant Dissent. As it was, they assembled possessed more than ever with the doctrines that Catholicism was their arch-enemy, and that an overwhelming and exclusive Anglican ascendancy was the only means whereby to fight this enemy. Sheldon had collected *ex parte* information as to the character of the conventicles, and even before the meeting of Parliament had carried it to Charles and forced him to issue a fresh proclamation to enforce the laws.

The session began with a strict examination into the public accounts. The King was then thanked for his recent proclamation. The Commons next appointed a committee to inquire into the holding of conventicles in London, which had aroused a blind dread of the return to a Commonwealth *régime*. The committee reported that such meetings were an affront to government, and an imminent danger to Parliament and the general peace. Monk was deputed to suppress them; and it is noteworthy that this suppression had now become a matter of pure police; the meetings were to be put down as politically dangerous; religion was not named. The House then returned to the Skinner dispute, justified the unrestricted right of petitioning the Commons, which the Lords had called in question, and again declared the action of the Upper House in claiming original jurisdiction subversive of the rights both of themselves and of the subject. They asserted further that should the Lords at any time give a decision contrary to law the subject had a right to appeal to the Commons. The

Renewal of
persecution
by the
Commons.

The Lords'
claim to
original
jurisdiction,

dispute was never settled, but the claim of the Lords to original jurisdiction was allowed to lapse, and has never been reasserted.

Somewhat later the Commons practically defeated the Lords upon another question of great constitutional importance, their claim to make alterations in money bills. Such a claim had been made, and either allowed or contested, many times, without a final decision being arrived at. At length, in April 1671, the Lords reduced the amount of an imposition on sugar, and this led to a resolution of the Lower House to the effect that 'in all aids given to the King by the Commons the rate of tax ought not to be altered by the Lords.' The exclusive title of the Commons to the giving aids, 'the only poor thing the Commons can value themselves upon to their Prince,' or, in other words, the only real hold they have upon the Crown, was, in the words of the Attorney-General at the conference between the Houses, 'so fundamental that I cannot give a reason for it, for that would be a weakening of the Commons' right and privilege, which we can never depart from, being affirmatively possessed of it in all ages, and negatively as to the Lords.' The Lords, strong in the absence of proof to this effect, brought forward many precedents to the contrary, the relevancy and import of which was however challenged with great subtlety by the managers for the Commons. The question came to an end with the session, and, like that of the judicature, has never been formally settled. But, as with the latter, the Lords have tacitly given up the point ; for, though they have not acknowledged the privilege of the Commons further than as regards the originating of money bills, they have, on the other hand, never seriously questioned their right to the absolute adjustment of all questions of taxation and supply.

Hopeless of gaining his objects, Charles, on Decem-

ber 11, 1669, once more prorogued Parliament, and thus ended a session which, lasting since February 10, 1668, had not passed a single Act. The supply which had been voted him was insufficient for the wide-reaching purposes which it will be seen he had in view, and he refused to accept it. He was already deep in secret negotiation with Louis, presently to be related, and he had hoped for assistance from Parliament large enough to enable him to treat with that monarch on independent terms. The jealous parsimony of the Commons, who refused so much as to take his debts into consideration, changed his views. He determined to look to France for the money.

When Parliament met for a new session on February 14, 1670, an unusual scene was witnessed. For the first time in English history the sovereign in opening the proceedings was attended with military pomp. It can hardly be doubted that his design was thus to accustom the people to the idea of a standing army. He met the Houses with confidence begotten by his dealings with Louis, and addressed them ‘*stylo minaci et imperatorio.*’ But he had another reason for confidence. He had no intention of hampering himself by a continuance of the quarrel. On the contrary, he was resolved to extract from Parliament an unstinted supply, which he would use for the objects most distasteful to it. He knew the one condition necessary, and he cynically determined to offer it himself. His speech did not for once contain a word about toleration. The Commons understood that they might have their swing of persecution. They showed their instant recognition of the fact by voting a supply of 300,000*l.* a year for eight years. The Skinner dispute having been got out of the way by his sensible proposal that all the records connected with it should be erased, Charles left them without demur to settle down to their favourite work. So successful was

Charles
opens
Parliament
with military
display.

this complete surrender of the policy which he had pursued since his restoration that, in the words of Andrew Marvell, 'the King was never since his coming in, nay, all things considered, no King since the Conquest, so absolutely powerful at home.'

On March 2 the bill for suppressing conventicles passed its second reading on the old ground that 'seditious sectaries, under pretence of tender consciences, do contrive insurrections at their meetings.' It consisted of the former Act of 1664 with somewhat slighter penalties for the listeners, but with the addition of clauses which rendered it far more severe and thorough in application. Preachers and teachers were liable to a fine of 20*l.* for the first and 40*l.* for the second offence. Constables withholding information were to be fined 5*l.*, and justices of the peace who refused to convict were to pay 100*l.* for every such refusal. Informers were further encouraged by the promise of half the fine. To protect the arbitrary execution of the law, it was decided that if anyone appealed against a prosecution and was nonsuited he should be mulcted in treble costs; while the climax of injustice was reached by the enactment that 'all clauses shall be construed most largely and beneficially for the suppressing conventicles and for the justification and encouragement of all persons to be employed in the execution thereof. No warrant shall be made void for any default in form; and if a person fly from one county or corporation to another, his goods and chattels shall be seizable wherever they are found.'

This inhuman Act did not pass without protest. It was argued that 'men have a kindness for persecuted people ever since Henry VIII. and Mary;' **Arguments against it.** the Dissenters, it was said, 'are like children's tops; whip them and they stand upright, let them alone and they fall.' 'A man that has no preaching near him,'

said Colonel Birch, an old Commonwealth man, 'will get it where he can. Is it reasonable to punish men when they must go four or five miles for a sermon? To whip them, and not to be able to tell them why you do so, is unreasonable, they having no churches in many places to go to.' When Waller demanded that the conventiclers should have no severer penalties than the Papists, he laid himself open to the obvious retort that that was just none at all; and a reference to Louis XIV., who had solved the religious difficulty in France by allowing the Huguenots set and limited places of worship, was not likely to have much weight with an assembly to whom the name of France had become hateful.

The Lords eagerly seconded the Commons in passing the bill. They attached to it however two provisos: the The Lords' provisos. first to insist upon their own immunity from search, except by a warrant from the King under his sign manual, or in presence of the lord-lieutenant. The second ran thus: 'Provided always that neither this Act nor anything therein contained shall extend to invalidate or avoid his Majesty's supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs, *or to destroy any of his Majesty's rights, powers, or prerogatives, belonging to the imperial crown of this realm, or at any time exercised or enjoyed by himself or any of his Majesty's royal predecessors*; but that his Majesty, his heirs and successors, may from time to time, and at all times hereafter, exercise and enjoy all such powers and authorities aforesaid, as fully and as amply as himself or any of his predecessors have or might have done the same; anything in this Act *or any other law, statute, or usage to the contrary* notwithstanding.' It was not probable that the Commons would pass an amendment under cover of which the dispensing power might have been legally exercised. The words in italics were rejected by 122 to 68; and the Lords wisely

refrained from insisting upon their view. On April 11, 1670, Charles gave his assent to the bill. Sheldon hounded on the Bishops, and so severely was the Act executed that a trustworthy witness declared soon afterwards that there was scarcely a conventicle to be heard of all over England.

Amid all this senseless cruelty one advance in constitutional liberty deserves to be recorded. The Quakers were especially obnoxious to the law. Finding the usual place of meeting in Gracechurch Street closed by soldiers, the celebrated William Penn, the most eminent of their body, addressed the people in the open street. The Conventicle Act not technically touching this meeting, Penn and another Quaker, William Mead, were indicted at the Old Bailey on September 1, 1670, for preaching to 'an unlawful, seditious, and riotous assembly, which had met together with force and arms.' The trial which followed is notable in the history of English liberty, for the jury for the first time asserted the right of juries to decide in opposition to the ruling of the court. They brought in a verdict declaring Penn and Mead 'guilty of speaking in Gracechurch Street,' but refused to add 'to an unlawful assembly.' Then, as the pressure from the bench increased, and as they were sent back time after time without food, light, fire, or tobacco, they first acquitted Mead, while returning their original verdict upon Penn, and then, when that verdict was not admitted, gave in their final answer, 'not guilty,' for both. The Recorder of London fined the jury-men forty marks each for contumacy, and in default of payment imprisoned them; whereupon they vindicated and established for ever the right they had claimed of finding verdicts against the ruling of the bench, in an action before the court of Common Pleas, when the Lord Chief Justice Vaughan declared their imprisonment illegal.

Case of
William
Penn : rights
of juries,
Sept. 1670.

Protestant Nonconformity being now out of the way, the Commons were at liberty to attack the other wing of the forces hostile to Anglican supremacy. On March 10, 1671, a remarkable petition was forwarded to the King, in which were set forth at length the causes of the increase of Popery and the remedies held to be necessary. All Popish priests and Jesuits were to be banished, with the exception of those attached by treaty to the Queen's household and to the foreign embassies. The existing laws against Popish recusants were to be rigidly enforced. Attendance at the chapels which by the exceptions mentioned were left unmolested was to be forbidden to the King's subjects. No civil or military office was for the future to be held by a Papist, or one 'justly suspected' to be so. All Catholic schools were to be closed, and the teachers punished. Plunket, Catholic primate of Ireland, and Peter Talbot, titular archbishop of Dublin, were to be arrested and sent to England for trial. To the demands for the banishment of priests and Jesuits, and for the enforcement of the penal laws against Popish recusants, Charles yielded at once. Opinion had not however yet travelled so far as to force him to grant the rest. Being now secure of a further supply, the payment for this new surrender, Charles immediately prorogued the Parliament, which did not meet again for business until February 4, 1672. Before that time the great crisis of the reign had been reached.

Persecution
of Catholi-
cism, March
1671.

CHAPTER XVI.

PREPARATIONS OF LOUIS FOR THE INVASION OF THE UNITED PROVINCES.

I. THE TREATY OF DOVER, JUNE 1, 1670.

THE Triple Alliance had been entered into by Charles against his personal inclinations. No one in his confidence regarded it as more than a temporary expedient, for the disruptive forces were as permanent as those which secured it were fleeting. The King's antipathy to the Dutch was reinforced by desire of avenging the Chatham disgrace; the same informal war of merchants wherever the two countries met in competition for trade, as had precluded the late struggle, was being waged; and the old dispute of the flag had been revived. On the very day when London was blazing with bonfires to celebrate the conclusion of peace, Clifford was heard to declare that for all the rejoicing there must soon be another war.

That Louis should contentedly accept his rebuff at the hands of the Dutch was still less to be expected. As republicans, as traders, and as Protestants, they were the objects of his haughty contempt. As promoters of the Triple Alliance with its secret articles they were the objects of his bitter anger. The arrogance of speech in which they were unwisely indulging, their '*fanfaronnades de pêcheurs*'—an arrogance exhibited especially in a medal in which France was represented as the sun (which Louis had adopted as the symbol of his grandeur) stayed in his course by the Republic—so rankled in his mind that he

never, he says, entered his council without thinking how to make them pay dearly for the great rôle they had assumed. But before attacking them he set to work to remove from them all possible sources of support, to destroy the coalition limb by limb ; and he began with England.

Louis deter-
mines to gain
Charles II.

It is a mistake to regard Charles in what followed as making a surrender of himself to Louis. He was for the time master of his own game, and he exacted his own terms. The game was not an easy one to play. He was to break off an alliance upon which Parliament was most earnestly bent ; he was to enter into fellowship with the representative of European aggression and Catholic despotism, and these were precisely what Parliament most dreaded. He had, too, to deal with the divisions in his own council. The frothy egotism of Buckingham was enlisted on the side of France ; while Arlington openly expressed the opinion that Louis was pretending to universal monarchy, and that his wings must be clipped.

The first approaches of Louis (April and May 1668) were frustrated by Arlington's action. When Ruvigny asked what offers he might place before his master, he insisted that the first proposals should come from France, and in the teeth of Buckingham's influence induced the King to send Temple as ambassador to the Hague-- a step

Arlington
opposed to
a French
alliance.

which, from Temple's well-known sympathies, could only mean a determination to maintain the existing alliance. But Louis was not discouraged, for he had received the private assurances of Charles that he would willingly treat 'as between gentlemen,' and that he preferred his word to all the parchment in the world. He now replaced Ruvigny, whose Protestantism unfitted him for the work in hand, by Colbert de Croissy, brother of his great finance minister, with instructions at all cost to secure Arlington. The strictest

secrecy was to be observed, but, since Charles had broken a previous informal agreement, any fresh understanding must be precise, and signed by the commissioners of the two Kings.

At the outset he again met with disappointment. Charles frankly told Colbert (August 1668) that he was almost the only man in his dominions in Louis's interest. Arlington declared that trade was the English idol, and any alliance would be judged by that test. Colbert decided that it would be waste of money to offer him the lavish bribe which Louis had suggested.

At one point however Arlington as well as Buckingham could be reached. The return of Clarendon, then an exile in France, would have meant to them political downfall. Harping skilfully upon this fear, Louis so far succeeded, that in February, 1669, Arlington himself made advances to Colbert.

This change of tone was however probably due far more to another event. The Duke of York had lately declared his conversion to Catholicism, and with all a convert's ardour was urging his brother to the same course. Arlington was warmly attached to Catholic views. He had now a good excuse for deserting the Dutch, and ranging himself on the side to which he knew his master inclined. From this moment he became the eager promoter of the treaty.

Charles had hitherto sought favour for the Catholics under cover of toleration for Protestant Dissent. For Protestant Dissent, as such, he had no sympathy, and he threw aside without reluctance that part of his scheme. The other part however was always actively present to his mind. The political view of the matter was as strong as the religious; only under a Catholic constitution, he said, might a King of England hope to become absolute.

But an influence of a more personal kind was acting

upon the King. If there was one being for whom he felt a genuine affection it was his sister Henrietta, the wife of Louis's younger brother, the Duke of Orleans (see p. 103).

Declaration of conversion by Charles. A devoted Catholic, she longed before all things that her brothers might likewise find the true road to salvation. She had succeeded with James. She now succeeded with Charles. On January 25, 1669, the King in strict secrecy announced his conversion to Arlington, Clifford, and Arundel.

He now placed the entire conduct of the proposed alliance in the hands of Arlington and Colbert. Buckingham, as a Protestant and a babbler, was excluded from all participation in the 'grand secret.' Personal negotiations were at once opened with Louis. It was understood that if Charles would join the French monarch against the Dutch he should be assisted in every way to establish an uncontrolled authority in England, and to declare his conversion. The frequent journeys of messengers between London and Paris soon aroused public notice and jealousy. It was openly declared in the streets that a compact was already concluded, and the price was named for which English honour had been bought and sold.

Charles's preparations. Charles was already, he wrote to his sister in June 1669, making formidable preparations. He was rapidly fortifying the principal ports of the kingdom, and placing them in sure hands. The number of his troops was being cautiously increased, and he could fully rely upon their devotion. Lauderdale, his viceroy in Scotland, had created an army of 22,000 men, bound by Act of Parliament to march when and whither he pleased within his dominions. Ireland too, under Berkeley, was in good hands. He was resolved to proclaim his conversion the moment he felt safe.

But it is easy to reckon Charles's words at too high a

rate. A fixed resolve was utterly foreign to his nature, and day by day, as his character deteriorated under continual debauchery, he grew less capable of sustained effort. Time after time we see him forming great designs, and proceeding with them just so long as they do not meet with formidable resistance. Careless as he always appeared of public opinion, he never deceived himself for long as to the facts of his position. He never forgot his father's fate, and, as he humorously said, he had no intention of again 'going on his travels.'

Temple meanwhile was doing his best to sustain the alliance which his master had determined to betray. At his instigation the States General formally complained to Louis, on behalf of Spain, of infractions of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Louis replied in the language of insult. To the Dutch, he said, he refused any explanation; but he would willingly listen to any communication from the King of England. Charles, though to satisfy Louis he repudiated Temple's action, was much disquieted. To obtain the supplies he needed from Parliament he felt that he must be able to assure them with verbal accuracy that the Triple Alliance was firm, and that there was no danger of further attack upon the Spanish Low Countries. It was arranged therefore that Louis should request Charles to act as mediator between him and Spain in the disputes which had arisen, and that by including Sweden in the arbitration the opportunity should be taken to separate her interest from that of the Dutch. Sweden meanwhile, angry at the delay in the payment by Spain of the promised subsidies, was threatening to withdraw her guarantee of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. De Witt therefore urged Charles to maintain the coalition by offering his security to Sweden that her claims should be satisfied (see p. 161); and

His
difficulties;
necessity of
deceiving
Parliament.

Charles, to avoid increasing De Witt's growing suspicions, and for the reason already mentioned, thought it prudent to give way.

Meanwhile some amusing fencing had taken place between Charles and Colbert, upon the question whether the King's declaration of war against the Republic should precede or follow the announcement of his conversion. The object of Louis was to attack the Dutch at the earliest moment ; Charles was in no haste to bind himself to the cost and risks of a great war. Upon the religious question, he said, he could reckon upon the neutrality of the Dissenters, for they hated the Church more than they hated Catholicism ; with his troops and fortresses he should be strong enough to carry the matter through. Colbert laid stress upon the fact that in such a case the Dutch would stand before Europe as the champions of the Protestant cause, while the difficulties which would necessarily arise at home would prevent the King from using his strength for the war. But if, sustained by the commercial jealousy of his own people, he first declared war, he would have good ground for demanding supplies ; with the troops and ships thus provided he would find it easy, at the close of a successful conflict, to secure a quiet acquiescence in his conversion. To Charles's next suggestion, that Louis should first begin hostilities, and that he himself should then carry out both parts of his scheme simultaneously, Louis replied with an absolute refusal to begin the war without the explicit concurrence of England.

Louis had been well served by the conduct of the English Parliament, which met on October 19, 1669. Charles, in asking for a supply, had prided himself upon being the happy instrument which had secured the Triple Alliance and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. He had used language which, though not verbally menda-

cious—since there was no intention of breaking the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle—was intended to lead to the belief that the Triple Alliance was equally firm. The fraud was a vain one. Disregarding his appeals for supply and for the payment of his debts, the Commons voted the inadequate sum of 400,000*l*. Charles at once decided to go on with the negotiations with Louis (see p. 173).

On December 18, 1669, Arlington submitted to Louis demands which did credit to Charles's audacity. The declaration of Catholicism was to precede the war, at a date settled by Charles himself; for this Louis was to give him 200,000*l*. and armed help, should it prove necessary, against his own subjects. For the war, in which he was to join only when England had been pacified, he was to receive 800,000*l*. a year; at its conclusion Minorca, Ostend, Walcheren, Sluys, and Cadsand, with Spanish America at a future time, were to pass into his hands; the interests of the Prince of Orange were to be preserved, and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle maintained. On his side Charles was to support Louis by land and sea in the Dutch war, and, when the time came, in making good his claim on the Spanish monarchy; he was for the present to maintain 6,000 infantry in the French service. Louis replied that rather than agree to such preposterous terms he would wait until he could do the work himself.

Charles was however only playing a game of brag. On January 24, 1670, he made further proposals, which for the first time convinced Louis that he was in earnest. They contained one provision however which showed how well Charles knew the temper of his people. He told Louis bluntly that no English captain would take orders from a French admiral; if therefore the fleets were united, they must sail under English command.

The reconciliation which he secured with Parliament in the session of February 10, 1670, with its practical result in the vote of 300,000*l.* a year for seven years (see p. 173), greatly strengthened Charles's position in these negotiations. He now began to hang back from the alliance and to raise his terms ; and on every point—commercial advantages, the command and numbers of the fleet, the payment of subsidies in hard cash and not in letters of exchange, even his demand that in the powers given to the commissioners he should be styled ' King of France '—Louis found himself compelled to yield.

His compliance was hastened by the action of De Witt, who had at length become convinced that treason to the Alarm of De Triple Alliance was being hatched in London Witt.

The Grand Pensionary determined to send his leading diplomatist, Van Beuninghen, to ascertain the truth, and frustrate, if he could, any such design. Louis, who knew Van Beuninghen's reputation for persuasiveness, resolved to anticipate the visit. No one, he felt, was so likely to overcome Charles's reluctance and the few remaining difficulties as his sister Henrietta ; her influence over her brother was immense, and her hatred of the States-General, on account of the dependent position in which they kept her nephew, was keener than that of Charles himself. She more than fulfilled her mission. On

The Treaty of Dover, 1670, June 1. May 5 she arrived at Dover, where she was met by Charles ; and on June 1, 1670, Colbert for France, and Arlington, Clifford, Arundel, and Sir Richard Belings for England, signed the celebrated Treaty of Dover, the ' *Traité de Madame*,' as it was often called, though the terms had practically been agreed upon between Arlington and Colbert in March. A fortnight later the ratifications were exchanged. When Van Beuninghen arrived all was over, and nothing remained but to carry out the farce by keeping him in play

with feigned negotiations, in which Charles's own ministers, Bridgeman, Trevor, and Ashley, were equally his dupes.

By this famous compact Louis, at no great cost, secured his immediate object. The Triple Alliance was broken up. England was to join in war upon Its conditions. the Republic, and Louis was to choose the moment of declaration ; an English land force was to serve under French command and in French pay ; and when there should arise a failure in the Spanish male line Charles was to help Louis by sea and land to make good his claims upon that monarchy. But Charles was, except for honour, no loser by the bargain, nor, he might claim, was England. He was indeed to declare his conversion ; but, while he was at once to receive 150,000*l.* to aid him in any difficulties which might arise, the date was left entirely to himself. So long as the war lasted he was to receive 225,000*l.* a year ; and at its conclusion, Walcheren, Sluys, and Cadsand, giving him the command of the coasts of Zealand, were to be his share of the spoil. The treaty of commerce was to be immediately concluded, and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle maintained. The supremacy of England at sea was marked by the condition that France was to raise only thirty vessels, to be regarded as auxiliaries to the fleet equipped by England, and that the whole should be under the command of an English admiral.

A new difficulty, giving occasion for one of the most curious pieces of by-play in history, now arose. It was impossible to show the treaty as it stood to The sham treaty, January 1671. those servants of the king who were Protestants—to Buckingham, Lauderdale, Bridgeman, Trevor, Ashley, Ormond, or Rupert ; it was equally impossible to keep the secret long. With Buckingham's inordinate vanity however to play upon, the matter was

very simple. He was allowed to negotiate—in the belief that the suggestion was his own—a fresh treaty. Led on by the flattery of Louis, and still more by the feigned hesitations of Arlington and Colbert, while Charles looked on with infinite amusement, he laboured zealously in preparing a draft (January 1671) differing from the original one in only two important respects. All mention of the conversion was omitted, the subsidy offered for that purpose being now added to that to be given for the war. The opportunity was then taken to secure still further advantages for England. Goree and Worne were added to the places to be given her; and the commander of the English land contingent was to take precedence of all the lieutenant-generals of France. Louis had his way on only one point. The nearer that Charles approached the question of Catholicism the less agreeable grew the prospect. He had indeed spoken confidently of his forces in Scotland and Ireland, but they were composed of Protestants, and, on this question, would fail him at the pinch. He had regarded this second treaty as a way out of the difficulty; but Louis insisted on a secret article, unknown to Buckingham, that in this respect the first agreement should stand. The ostensible treaty was then signed by Buckingham, Lauderdale, and Ashley. Thus, among all the immediate advisers of the Crown, there was not one who held his hand from this shameless abandonment of an alliance which England had herself sought.

The second treaty had fixed the spring of 1672 for the declaration of war. Strangely enough, this was the doing, not of Louis, but of Charles. He had now two reasons for desiring prompt action. The advisability of settling both the war and the religious question before the next meeting of Parliament was urged upon him by James; and he happened, through the success of his duplicity,

and through his abandonment of toleration, to be in possession of ample funds. On October 24, 1670, he had opened Parliament with a speech in which he had carried deception to the furthest point short of absolute falsehood. The reputation he had acquired by the Triple Alliance and the commercial treaties with Spain, France, Denmark, and Savoy, was magnified. 'In a word,' so ran the speech, 'almost all the princes of Europe do seek his Majesty's friendship, as acknowledging they cannot secure, much less improve, their present condition without it.' The necessity of raising the navy to proportions which might challenge the daily increasing armaments of France and the Dutch was dwelt upon. Not a hint was dropped that the bonds of the Triple Alliance were likely to be relaxed; the first of Temple's treaties indeed, which bound England and the Republic to mutual assistance in case of attack, was specially mentioned. Thoroughly deceived, the Commons answered the King's demand for still a further supply by a vote for no less than 800,000*l*.

The importance of the Treaty of Dover can scarcely be overrated. In spite of the advantages Charles had extorted, Louis was the real gainer. Charles had entered upon a course which, becoming more and more one of subservience to France, placed it henceforth in the power of Louis to neutralise the influence of English opinion, and even to enlist the material support of England in the interests of despotism and Catholicism. This political profligacy was responsible for the miseries to which for more than a generation Europe was subjected. Without England, Louis would not have dared to attack the Dutch, for the fleets of the Republic would have swept his commerce from the seas; while the cordial union of the two great naval powers

Parliament
deceived by
Charles;
large sup-
plies.

Effects of
Treaty of
Dover.

would have stood like a wall against his schemes of aggression. Had England at this moment possessed a King of lofty temper, proud to lead and apt to control the current of national feeling, the chapter of bloodshed and desolation which began at Dover and ended at Utrecht would probably have remained unwritten.

2. TREATY WITH SWEDEN AND THE PRINCES OF THE EMPIRE.

Louis had now lopped the principal limb from the Triple Alliance ; he determined to detach the Swedes also. For a long while his success seemed doubtful. They would be glad, they said, to see the naval power of the Republic crippled, but they had no wish to see her ruined. To overcome their scruples, Charles, at Louis's request, sent Henry Coventry in October 1671 to support the French ambassador, Courtin. Between Courtin and Coventry on the one hand, and the ambassadors of Spain, Austria, Brandenburg, and the Republic on the other, a daily diplomatic duel was waged for several months. Sweden was poor, and the more she was courted the higher she raised her terms. This gave a decisive advantage to the longer purse and clearer purpose of Louis. On May 6, 1672, he secured a treaty for three years, by which Sweden agreed to oppose any Princes of the Empire who might attack him ; to send 16,000 men into Pomerania, in order to defend his line of march ; and to regard any breach of neutrality on the part of Dutch garrisons in places belonging to the Empire as a declaration of war. For this she was to receive 100,000*l.* at once, and 150,000*l.* a year during the war. Her jealousy of Denmark—so great, said Lionne, that their dogs would not hunt in company—was expressed by the demand that Louis should guarantee the

Treaty between Louis and Sweden, May 1672,

present peace between them, but that Denmark should not enter the alliance, except by the mutual consent of France and Sweden.

Almost as important to Louis were the treaties which in July 1671 he succeeded in forming at Hanover, Cologne, Munster, and Osnabruck. By lavish subsidies and the promise of a share in the spoil, he secured a free passage for his troops and the right of purchasing stores, while similar advantages were to be refused to any forces which might be sent by Leopold to the aid of the Dutch. The Elector of Brandenburg however, who was an ardent Protestant, and the other Princes of his family, rejected the proposals of Louis.

And with
other Ger-
man princes,
July 1671.

3. TREATY OF NEUTRALITY WITH LEOPOLD.

In all these cases the diplomacy of Louis had been assisted by at least an apparent community of interest. It was far different with the negotiations which he had begun early in 1668 with the Emperor Leopold, first to restrain him from joining the Triple Alliance, and later to secure his neutrality when France attacked the Dutch. De Gremontville, the negotiator of the Partition Treaty, was entrusted with this affair also. He was alternately assisted and hindered by the character of Leopold and the state of his councils. The Emperor, originally destined for the Church, had the tastes and bearing of a recluse. So irresolute was he, that his own ministers declared him to be only a statue which people could carry about and put up at their pleasure. From week to week he wavered in his plans as the arguments of De Gremontville, the pressure of Spain and the Dutch, personal pique, the force of old connections, the influence of his mother, his position as head of the Empire, and the in-

The Em-
peror.

ternal dissensions of his heterogeneous kingdom, acted upon his mind.

From the date of the Triple Alliance De Gremonville carried on single-handed, and with inexhaustible skill and temper, a daily contest against all the influences adverse to France. His plan was to give Leopold no rest, but, by placing before him proposals which followed one another as fast as each was rejected, to keep him in a constant state of nervous anxiety. Incessantly craving audiences which Leopold could not refuse, or conferring with his ministers, whose rivalry he knew well how to foster and utilise, he positively bewildered them with the innumerable arguments furnished to him by Louis and Lionne, and by his own astuteness. Unruffled by any insult and undeterred by any temporary check, with absolute confidence both in his master and in himself, he was the one stable element in the sea of warring interests by which he was surrounded. Not until February, 1670, however could he claim any important success beyond that of restraining Leopold from taking decisive action. Even then the Emperor's promise that he would not enter the Triple Alliance was but a spoken one. He had however expressed himself willing to leave the Dutch to their fate, provided Louis would promise not to attack Spain; and Louis had hastened to cut the ground from under his feet by writing publicly to the Pope, engaging not to do so for at least a year.

Further progress was now delayed by the masterful action of Louis himself. Charles IV., the errant Duke of Lorraine, restored to his estates by the Peace of the Pyrenees, had in 1662 formally handed them over to Louis, on condition that the Princes of Lorraine should be recognised as members of the royal family of France. He received them again in 1663, upon giving up Marsal, the

Invasion of
Lorraine by
Louis,
August 1670.
Effect at
Vienna.

key of the country, and admitting the sovereignty of Louis to the great road from Metz to Alsace, with a league's breadth of country the whole of its length. In August, 1670, however Louis heard that the Duke was intriguing against him with the Dutch and the Electors of Trèves and Mayence. Not sorry for the excuse, Louis declared the treaty dissolved by this act, poured troops into Lorraine, and in a few days had overrun the country. This new aggression roused the utmost resentment at Vienna. Not only was Lorraine a dependency of the Empire, but Charles IV. was the brother-in-law of Leopold. The refusal of Louis to attend to all remonstrances, the reproaches of the German Princes, and the threats of Spain that, as he had abandoned his family interests, they would abandon him, once more turned the Emperor's fickle resolution against France.

Louis now directed De Gremonville to employ his utmost efforts to secure a written promise of neutrality when the attack on the Dutch took place. But Louis threatens the Emperor. Treaty, December 18, 1671. this, in his present mood, the Emperor refused to give. Hercupon Louis, for the first time, indulged in threats. Since Leopold reserved to himself the liberty of helping the enemies of France, he should claim a similar freedom for himself. The effect was immediate, for the Emperor knew that it would be easy at any moment for Louis to stir up war in Hungary. He therefore promised his neutrality, so long as neither the Empire nor Spain were attacked. Even then it required the further threat of an immediate abandonment of the negotiations to overcome the dilatoriness of the imperial court. It was not until November, 1671, that, thoroughly wearied out, Leopold signed a treaty promising that in case of the expected war he would not interfere provided that the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle were preserved.

And thus was completed the circle of negotiations by which Louis had during nearly four years been engaged in securing that, when he attacked the Republic, she should look around her in vain for support. The ability and firmness with which his purpose had been maintained were as remarkable as that purpose was unscrupulous and base.

CHAPTER XVII.

CHARLES II. AND THE CABAL.

1671-2.

1. THE CABAL.

THE prorogation of April 22, 1671, left Charles once more free from parliamentary control. The manner in which, aided by the peculiar character of the executive government, he used his liberty, led to the great crisis of his reign.

The Privy Council, which in theory was always consulted, had been found to be an inconveniently large body. It had become the custom therefore to form within it a small committee, or 'cabal' (a term at least as old as the reign of James I.), of the members most in the King's confidence, to which were referred not only foreign affairs, for which it was primarily intended, but all matters of importance and secrecy. This 'cabal' has been regarded as the origin of the present 'Cabinet.' But the 'Cabinet' is representative of the people, at any rate of the House of Commons, possibly in antagonism to the personal wishes of the Crown; whereas the 'Cabal' was the representative of the Crown, often in spite of both Commons and people; neither existing nor ceasing to exist with any direct reference to their opinion.

Each member held his place purely, at the King's will ; he gave his advice, but his duty then was to support whatever decision the King might choose to adopt.

The Cabal, at the time of the Treaty of Dover, practically consisted of Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley, and Lauderdale, though Bridgeman, Trevor, Ormond, Rupert, and others were at times included. It was soon noticed that the initial letters of these first five names made up the word 'cabal,' and it is therefore to this particular Cabal that the title has been specially attached. Among the five there was, besides the guilty knowledge of one or other of the Treaties of Dover, but one bond of union. All of them, though from the most various motives, were in favour of toleration.

Sir Thomas Clifford was perhaps the most picturesque figure of the Cabal. 'A valiant, incorrupt gentleman, ambitious, not covetous, passionate, a most constant, sincere friend.' An ardent Catholic in sympathies, if not by actual conversion, he was as ardent an advocate of an uncontrolled monarchy. 'Only in the combination of religious freedom and royal despotism did he see salvation for the State.' His temper was vehement, his eloquence striking, his personal courage conspicuous. The story is well known how, during the former war, when on a visit to Arlington at Euston in Suffolk, he and Ormond's son, Ossory, hearing the guns off Harwich, leaped on their horses, galloped to the coast, and put off in an open boat to join the fleet and serve as volunteers through one of the bloodiest days in English naval warfare. Though a poor man, his hands were clean of bribes, and his life was remarkably pure. His horoscope foretold him fame and fortune, but an early death. He answered that he cared not for an early death if before he died he might witness the triumph of the Catholic Church.

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Lord Ashley, ancestor of the present Earl of Shaftesbury, had been in the forefront of political life since boyhood. In the days of the Commonwealth he had striven against Cromwell in support of parliamentary government, and after the Protector's death had taken a great share in breaking down the despotism of the army; in spite of his present complicity in Charles's counsels he was still a keen upholder of parliamentary rule. He was violently anti-Catholic, not from any religious convictions, but because, as he expressed it, 'Popery and slavery go ever, like two sisters, hand in hand;' but he had been a supporter of every attempt at toleration of Protestant dissent, as being necessary for trade; and in the constitution which at his request John Locke drew up for the new colony of Carolina toleration was a leading feature. He had established a reputation for business power, tact, and finesse; and though he never affected to censure the prevailing private and public immorality, he shunned debauchery in his own person, and, like Clifford, is free from any well established charge of bribery. Small and slight in stature and of delicate health, he had a soul as ambitious and fiery as that of Clifford himself; and it was not until the end of his career that his keen political foresight gave way under the excitement of faction and the harassments of ill-health. But though he possessed an intuitive perception of those causes which had a great future before them, his conduct was always liable to be modified by the determination to ride on the crest of the political wave; and while from his ready and incisive eloquence, his unceasing activity, and his skill in party warfare which, in its modern form, he may be said to have originated, he was always formidable, he is far more often spoken of with distrust than with admiration or respect.

John Maitland, Duke of Lauderdale, was only in the

second place an English politician. He was Charles's irresponsible and almost absolute viceroy of Scotland, at a time when Scotland was completely separated in sympathies from England. He was, too, the Lauderdale. King's devoted personal adherent, eager to carry out his slightest wishes, which he affirmed were more to him than all human laws, and the pander to his most shameless vices. Utterly dissolute as he was in morals and religion, his early career as a Presbyterian caused him to be regarded as a Protestant, and, as such, he was excluded from knowledge of the Catholic plot.

There is one other person whose influence was more powerful and lasting than that of the professional politicians. This was a young Breton girl of noble family, who came over in the train of Henrietta, and who, by the beauty of her 'baby face,' and a winning charm of manner and conversation which formed a piquant contrast to the vulgar humours of Lady Castlemaine and Nell Gwyn, completely captivated Charles. It is more than probable that Louis had determined that some permanent representative of French influence should have a place in that scene of female caprice which surrounded Charles's most intimate life, and that it was this which Louise de Kéroualle was to supply. She soon became the chief intermediary between the monarchs, sharing in all their schemes of statecraft, and displaying an independence of judgment and a capacity for intrigue worthy of a practised politician. Her influence was recognised by the hatred with which she was popularly regarded as the agent of France.

Upon Louise de Kéroualle, better known as the Duchess of Portsmouth, as upon the other women of Charles's harem, the treasure of the country was poured out in reckless profusion. It was not without good reason that a caricature published in Holland represented the

King between two women, with his pockets turned inside out. The supplies voted by Parliament, the subsidies of Louis, ran like water through the hands of these female favourites. Pensions, patents, monopolies, crown lands, reversions of lucrative posts, were showered upon them and their children. Louise de Kéroualle alone had before long an annual income of 40,000*l.*; and in 1681 the enormous sum of 136,000*l.* passed through her hands. It is no wonder that, this being but one form of expenditure on his pleasures, the sums received by Charles were all too small, and that in August, 1671, his debts were reckoned at more than three millions.

2. STOP OF THE EXCHEQUER. DECLARATION OF INDULGENCE. DUTCH WAR.

A state of things so desperate, with an expensive war in prospect, suggested desperate remedies. All evidence points to Clifford as the author of the confession of national bankruptcy known as the 'Stop of the Exchequer,' though it is possible that a similar step by Mazarin (see p. 26) may have suggested it to Charles. It was customary for the bankers to advance money to the Crown, on the faith of taxes voted by Parliament but not yet collected, at an interest of twelve per cent. It was now determined in the Privy Council, though against the advice of Ashley, to apply the whole proceeds of the taxes for 1672 to the war, the bankers being left unpaid, while for the future the interest on the money thus confiscated should be reduced to six per cent. The sum upon which by this outrageous breach of faith Charles laid violent hands, 1,400,000*l.*, was secured at the cost of the permanent ruin of the royal credit and general commercial distress. Hundreds of private persons were left destitute, for the bankers were compelled to suspend payment, and

merchants who had placed money in their hands were unable to carry on their ordinary business. And after all, says a shrewd observer, 'as it did not supply the expenses of the meditated war, so it melted away, I know not how.'

For carrying through this scheme, the flagrant dishonesty of which was evidently obscured by his view of the proper privileges of royalty (see p. 194), Clifford was rewarded with a peerage and the Lord Treasurer's staff. The second important measure which signalised the spring of 1672 must be laid to the credit of Ashley.

Declaration
of Indul-
gence, 1672,
March 15.

Trusting, no doubt, that at the close of the war he would be in a position to dictate his own terms to Parliament, Charles made another attempt to secure the dispensing power. On March 15, 1672, he published the famous Declaration of Indulgence. It was evidently drawn up by Ashley, whose often expressed views were thus set forth in the preamble: 'We do now issue this our Declaration, as well for the quieting of our good subjects as for inviting strangers in this conjuncture to come and live under us, and for a better encouragement of all to a cheerful following of their trades and callings.' Charles then boldly claimed the dispensing

Charles
claims the
dispensing
power.

power. Looking to the 'unhappy differences in matters of religion,' he declared himself 'obliged to make use of that supreme power in ecclesiastical matters which is not only inherent in Us, but hath been declared and recognised to be so by several statutes and Acts of Parliament.' In the vain hope of conciliating the Church, the declaration stipulated that the 'doctrine, discipline, privileges, and government of the Church as now established' should be scrupulously observed. The suspension of 'all manner of penal laws in matters ecclesiastical against whatsoever sort of Nonconformists or recusants' was announced; while, in pursuance of a plan adopted by Louis with marked

success, but which had been on a former occasion rejected by the Commons, certain places were to be licensed for the worship of nonconforming Protestants. Catholics however were to be allowed only their former liberty to hold service in their private houses.

The issue of the Declaration had been hindered by the conduct of Orlando Bridgeman, Keeper of the Seals. That honest minister had already made difficulties in the matter of the Stop of the Exchequer ; he now absolutely refused to put the Great Seal to the Declaration. The opportunity was taken to reward its author. Bridgeman was removed, and Ashley, under the title of Earl of Shaftesbury, was made Lord Chancellor. Two days after the issue of the Declaration, the last great step for which the members of the Cabal were jointly responsible was taken. On March 17 war was declared against the Dutch.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE DUTCH REPUBLIC BEFORE THE WAR.

THE Republic had risen with remarkable elasticity from the exhaustion of the late war. A national debt of twelve and a half millions sterling was borne with ease. Her population was rapidly increasing ; her commerce was expanding in every quarter of the globe, and her traders were displaying their former exclusiveness. But this absorption in the search for wealth, and their apparent immunity from foreign invasion, forbade in her people that spirit of watchfulness and that readiness to sink individual interests in the national welfare which result from the constant imminence of danger. 'The character of the Dutch,' said De Witt, 'is such that they will take no steps for defence until the danger stares them in the face.'

With all this apparent prosperity there existed, in the claims of the Prince of Orange, an abiding source of political instability. De Witt had indeed secured the charge of his education as a ward of the State, and was sedulously training him, as Mazarin trained Louis, to be fit to govern. The 'Perpetual Edict' of January 1668, and the 'Act of Harmony' which followed, had secured the separation of the civil and military commands; for the Stadtholderate was abolished in Holland, while in the other provinces it was rendered incompatible with the offices of Captain or Admiral General of the Republic—offices which the Prince was to occupy only when he reached the age of twenty-two. With the sympathy however of both Louis and Charles, he soon began to act for himself. Escaping in September, 1668, from De Witt's surveillance, he hastened to Zealand, where his party was strong, and was received with enthusiasm. In 1670 De Witt was compelled to assent to his taking his seat on the Council of State, and to his visiting England. As war grew imminent his claims became more acceptable; the past was forgotten, except that under the leadership of his house independence had been won. The army and navy were enthusiastic in his favour. In the spring of 1672, after taking an oath to maintain the 'Perpetual Edict,' and with many limitations, he was made Captain-General for one campaign, the office to be continued for life should it seem fitting when he had completed his twenty-second year. The Admiralty, so long as Ruyter was there to lead the fleet, was held in reserve.

De Witt offered a signal example of the truth of his own saying. He could not bring himself to believe that his work was so soon to perish, though mysterious warnings had reached him as early as February, 1668. When however his offers to assist Louis in his eventual designs upon

Spain and to settle the Spanish Low Countries favourably to French interests were slightly passed by, and a complimentary address from the States-General to Louis in Flanders, in the spring of 1671, was received with studied coldness; when Louis refused to include the Republic in the arbitration concerning his alleged infractions of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle; when the French

ambassador was removed from the Hague, and no successor sent; when heavy duties were imposed upon Dutch goods entering France, and all attempts at retaliation treated with contempt, the truth came upon him with terrible clearness. In January, 1672, he made a final appeal to Louis, offering to disarm completely if he would do the same, and would remove the hostile tariffs. Louis replied that he should complete his preparations and should use his forces as best befitted his dignity.

The awakening to the treachery of Charles had been still slower and more painful. Here too he had tried every means of conciliation. Hearing of the King's irritation at the pamphlets, medals, and triumphal pictures which glorified the Chatham achievement, and especially that the captured 'Royal Charles' was made a common show, he had the moulds of the medals broken, the pamphlets as far as possible suppressed, the royal arms removed from the vessel and her name altered—concessions which were viewed merely as signs of weakness. The recall of Temple in July 1671 was made the occasion for a wanton insult to the Dutch. The captain of the yacht sent to bring back Lady Temple was ordered by Charles to sail through their fleet in the Channel, to insist upon their lowering their flags, and in case of refusal to take such action as would compel them to fire upon him, and so appear the aggressors—a scheme frustrated only by the self-restraint of the Dutch admiral,

De Witt
convinced of
treachery of
Louis and
Charles.

Van Ghent. In December, Downing, a well-known enemy of the Republic, was sent to succeed Temple as ambassador to the Hague, with instructions to bring about a rupture. In the most offensive terms he demanded reparation for the insults of which Charles complained, and specifically insisted upon the acknowledgment of the maritime supremacy of England over all seas, going so far as to require that whole fleets should lower their flags to a single English warship. Even to this outrageous demand De Witt was willing to give way, provided the King would engage to assist the Republic against France. As late as March 3, 1672, he endeavoured to conjure away the danger by the offer of a heavy personal bribe to Charles.

Charles had wished to appear as the attacked party. When he found the attempt useless, he began hostilities by an act which Louis himself contemptuously characterised as sheer piracy. The Dutch merchant fleet from Smyrna was lying at anchor off the Isle of Wight. Admiral Holmes was ordered to attack without warning, and to capture the convoy. But the Dutch were prepared, and after a severe engagement (March 13) the fleet escaped with the loss of only two vessels. War was declared by England four days later.

As danger approached, the Dutch had done their best to secure allies. But their proverbial thriftiness stood much in their way. They might undoubtedly have anticipated France in securing Sweden had they been as open-handed as Louis. Only in two quarters did they gain any important success. The Grand Elector of Brandenburg, the most powerful of the German Princes, had been induced through his vehement Protestantism and his jealousy of the proximity of French troops to sign a treaty in February, 1671, which became effectual in April,

Insults to
Dutch ;
attack on
Smyrna
fleet.

Alliance of
Republic
with Elector
of Branden-
burg, April
1672.

1672, when he promised to aid the Republic with 22,000 men; and his adhesion brought with it that of the Elector of Mayence. Spain too, convinced that if the United Provinces fell into the hands of Louis nothing could save her Low Countries, concluded with the Dutch a treaty of mutual defence.

But even so the case of the Republic seemed desperate against the forces which Louis was prepared to

launch upon her. The retrenchment of expenses after the peace had been unwisely made upon the army. No less than 41,000 men had then been disbanded. Obligatory service had become a dead letter. Among

the troops that remained there was little discipline. The best among the officers had resigned their commissions in consequence of their sympathies with the cause of William. The commissariat was disorganised, the fortifications were in decay, and the country was almost denuded of military stores. When war was declared, there were, in spite of De Witt's utmost efforts, but 52,000 men with the standards. These were placed under William as Captain-General, with Frederick of Nassau, his natural uncle, and John Maurice, the Rhinegrave, then a man of sixty-five years of age, in charge of the infantry and cavalry respectively.

With these miserable forces the Republic prepared to confront as best it might an army of 176,000 men, led by

Louis's army. Condé, Turenne, Luxemburg, and the great engineer Vauban, and admirably equipped in every arm. This was the 'escort' which, as Louis said, permitted him 'to travel safely in the United Provinces.' To face Ruyter's fleet of 135 ships he trusted chiefly to England; but he had himself collected 120 vessels, mounted with 5,000 guns. As a retort to the medal which had so aroused his anger, he caused another to be

struck, in which the sun was portrayed dispersing the fogs from a marsh, and bearing as its motto, in allusion to the fact that it was through French assistance that the Republic had been created, the words, 'Evexi, sed discutiam'—'I raised them up, and I will disperse them.'

CHAPTER XIX.

INVASION OF THE UNITED PROVINCES.

I. FRENCH OCCUPATION.

LOUIS had spoken of 'travelling safely' in the United Provinces. But none really regarded the enterprise as a light one. Condé, who was not wont to count danger highly, confessed the anxiety he felt; he even prophesied disaster. Temple compared Louis to a strong swimmer, who plunges full of confidence into the water; 'but a strong current, the wasting of his strength, or an accident will surely sweep him away.' Every provision was made for a difficult and dangerous expedition. The magnificent force collected at Charleroi was complete throughout its equipment. Vast stores were laid up at Neuss, a little below Cologne; and the labour of transport was thus saved over half the route.

Had De Witt been seconded with ability, this advantage would have been wanting to Louis. He had sent a detachment of cavalry to surprise Neuss; but the lack of discipline among the men, who betrayed their approach by a continuous fusillade upon the fowls and geese along the route, frustrated the design. His project for anticipating the declaration of war by entering Brest, Rochelle, and other open French ports, and destroying the ships which were being fitted

Futile projects of De Witt.

out there, was rendered futile by the want of a strong central authority. The jealousy of Zealand caused the failure of a still bolder design. This was no less than to repeat the Chatham exploit; to sail up the Thames before the English fleet could issue out, and there, in the heart of his kingdom, challenge the power of Charles. Before the Zealand squadron had joined the fleet the bulk of the English vessels were out of the river; and though Van Ghent, with a number of light ships, reached Sheerness, he could not force a further passage.

Two routes were before Louis—by the Meuse or by the Rhine. Blocking the former stood Maestricht, a strong fortress garrisoned by Dutch troops. Supposing this obstacle overcome, and the line of the Meuse followed, the army would be confronted before it entered Dutch territory by the Waal, a deep and wide river, defended at the crossing point by Nimwegen. If the Rhine route were chosen, it would be necessary to capture four fortresses—Orsoy, Rhynberg, Wesel, and Bürick—then in Dutch hands. Following the right bank, the army would finally have to cross the Yssel, which leaves the Rhine just above Arnheim. It was determined to adopt the latter of these two plans. On May 5 Louis joined the army at Charleroi. Marching swiftly along the Sambre, he led his forces near Liège, on the Meuse. On the 15th Maseyck, a little north, and Tongres, a little south, of Maestricht, were taken and garrisoned, that place being thus completely masked. Passing the Meuse at Visé, Louis reached his magazines at Neuss on the 31st. Here the army was divided, Condé crossing the Rhine at Kaiserwerth. On June 2 the fortresses were simultaneously attacked. By the 6th Turenne had taken Orsoy, Bürick, and Rhynberg on the left bank, while Wesel on the right surrendered to Condé. Crossing at Wesel, Turenne rejoined Condé, and on the

The Rhine
route chosen
by Louis.

With the whole force was before the Yssel, faced by William with all the troops he could muster. Condé now offered to wager that he would force a passage with a loss of less than four hundred men.

A plan even less dangerous was adopted. By crossing at Tollhuys, between the outflows of the Waal and the Yssel, the whole army might easily be placed in the region between the Waal and the Rhine known as the 'Betuwe.' Robbed of the volume of the Waal, the river is here easily fordable by cavalry. William had, moreover, neglected to defend it in force. The celebrated 'passage of the Rhine' therefore, which, graced by the young monarch's presence, aroused such enthusiasm in France, has been described by Napoleon as an 'operation of the fourth order.' It was made with only one serious mishap. Condé, as he led the dash into the river, was wounded in the wrist, and could take no further part in the advance. The next day a bridge was thrown over and the whole army crossed into the Betuwe.

The line of the Yssel being thus turned, William fell back towards Amsterdam, with the regiments of Holland, Guelders, and Utrecht, numbering some 12,000 men. The rest refused to take part in the defence of any province but their own, and were left uselessly cooped up in Arnheim, Nimwegen, and the Yssel fortresses. Had Louis followed Condé's advice, to send his cavalry straight upon Amsterdam, the campaign would probably have been ended at a blow. Yielding however to the presumption of Louvois, he ordered Turenne to complete the conquest of the Betuwe, while himself, after investing Nimwegen, crossed the Rhine once more below Arnheim, took that town, and proceeded leisurely to reduce the Yssel forts. The mistake was well-nigh redeemed by the enterprise of the Count of Rochefort, who with 1,800 horsemen made a

Crossing of
the Rhine at
Tollhuys,
1672,
June 12.

Mistakes of
Louvois.
Rochefort's
cavalry dash
to Muiden.

dash for Muyden, within sight of Amsterdam, in order to secure the sluices, passing William, and capturing as he sped on, Rheuss, Amersfort, and Naarden. A few of his men reached Muyden only to find that at the critical moment John Maurice had thrown in a garrison. Returning on his track, Rochefort on June 23 entered Utrecht, which William had abandoned when the inhabitants refused to sacrifice their gardens and villas for its defence.

Louis however, in spite of the check at Muyden, felt sure of his prey. Advancing from the Yssel, he took up his quarters at Utrecht, published a proclamation calling upon the towns which still held out to surrender, under the severest penalties of war, and waited for the submission of Amsterdam.

But that submission never came. As early as April the supreme necessity had been foreseen by De Witt.

Opening of
the sluices ;
defence of
Amsterdam,
1672,
June 18.

All had been in readiness to open the sluices and cut the dykes. On June 15 the memorable resolution was come to. By the 18th the sacrifice was consummated. The sea poured in, placing a waste of water between Louis and Amsterdam, and the province of Holland at least was saved. The citizens worked with the intensest energy to provide for their defence. The archives and State treasures were transferred thither from the Hague, and the States General held their sittings there. The mills were set to grind powder instead of corn ; the regiments which had followed William were taken into the pay of Holland ; every fourth man among the peasantry was enlisted ; marines and gunners were drawn from the fleet. A strong force was sent to guard the shores of the Zuyder Zee, while a swarm of light vessels rendered any attempt of the French ships to make use of the inundation hopeless. The resolution of the men of Holland rose day by day,

now that they were fighting for their own province. The Republic had been well-nigh lost through the want of imperial spirit; it was now saved by the vigour of local patriotism.

A gleam of light came from Zeeland. Louis had left behind him a strong force near Ath to watch the Spanish Low Countries. Their commander, hearing that Aardenburg, which guarded the entry into Zeeland, was weakly garrisoned, marched through Spanish territory with 5,000 men and suddenly appeared before the town. Attacking with his advanced guard, he was driven back with loss. A second assault with his whole force was even more disastrous, while to complete his discomfiture the captain of a Zeeland vessel landed his crew of 200 men, and by a vigorous flank attack so well seconded a sortie of the garrison that the French were compelled to retreat with great loss in killed and prisoners. By this spirited feat of arms Zeeland was placed in safety, and French troops were shown to be not invincible.

Thus saved on land by a desperate appeal to nature the Republic had been saved at sea by the valour of her sailors. On June 7 Ruyter encountered the united fleets of France and England in Southwold Bay. At seven in the morning they joined battle. Ruyter, with whom was Cornelius de Witt, led the centre. He ordered the pilot to lay his vessel, 'The Seven Provinces,' alongside James's flag-ship, 'The Prince,' while Banckers and Van Ghent attacked the French squadron under Estrées and the English left wing under the Earl of Sandwich respectively. Within two hours 'The Prince' was so shattered that James, among whose faults a lack of personal bravery can never be numbered, was compelled to row off under the fire of the enemy and hoist his flag

Success
of the
Zealanders
at
Aardenburg.

Naval
campaign
of 1672 :
Battle of
Southwold
Bay,
June 7.

upon the 'St. Michael.' Before the day ended the 'St. Michael' too sank under him, and he barely escaped to the 'London.' On the English right *Estrées* fell back, pursued by Banckers; while on the left a terrible fight raged throughout the long summer's day. Van Ghent was killed early in the action. Sandwich, after a desperate resistance to overwhelming attacks, perished with his son by the sinking of the boat in which they were rowing to another ship. Ruyter, who had been seriously endangered by the absence of Banckers, recovered ascendancy late in the evening; and, when night fell, the English were falling back with a loss of five ships of the line, 2,500 men, and no fewer than eighteen captains. A dense fog prevented Ruyter from pushing his victory next day. But he had done his work; he had at the critical moment preserved the coasts of the Republic from attack, and was able to give his attention to secure the safe harbouring of the East India fleet.

2. THE ORANGE REACTION. MURDER OF THE DE WITTS.

The prospect of final rescue was however so dim, that the States General determined to negotiate with Louis. When their deputation reached his camp at Doesburg, on the Yssel, they were told by Louvois that satisfaction for the allies of France and the payment of the entire expenses of the war were necessary preliminaries to a treaty. The States-General were disposed to yield, but the deputies of Amsterdam in the Provincial Estates of Holland stood firm. Come what might, they declared that they would have no part in such a submission.

In the vehement discussions which had arisen De Witt had had no share. Each day of misfortune had led more definitely to his fall. As unity of command grew indispensable, the restoration of the Stadtholderate was

demanded with increasing insistence, and to this restoration he was regarded as the main obstacle. The most atrocious calumnies, especially from the pulpits of the Calvinistic clergy, who were vehemently in William's interest, were now levelled against him. He was accused of being an accomplice of Louis, and of having sent to Venice a large sum of public money for his own use. On June 21 he was attacked in the streets and left for dead; and on the same day an attempt was made at Dordrecht upon the life of his brother Cornelius. One of the ruffians was captured and hung; the others, who were well known, found, to William's disgrace, a safe refuge in his camp.

This deed only stimulated the reaction. One by one the towns of Zealand, and then of Holland, proclaimed William their Stadtholder. He was summoned to Dordrecht, where he found the streets gay with orange and white flags, the white, in punning reference to the Grand Pensionary's name, below the orange. On July 1 the Provincial Estates of Holland and Zeeland sent to the towns, where it was received with enthusiasm, their vote for the abrogation of the Perpetual Edict; and on July 6 the Prince was proclaimed Stadtholder by both provinces, with all the privileges of his ancestors, the election of the mayors of towns being alone reserved. In this vote Guelders, Utrecht, and Overijssel were unable to concur, since they were in the hands of the French; while Friesland and Groningen retained as Stadtholder the son of their former governor, Henry Casimir of Nassau. At the same time the States-General named the Prince, henceforward William III., Captain and Admiral General of the Republic for life, saving the privileges of Henry Casimir. From this moment Louis had to reckon with the resistance, not merely of a valiant and stubborn people driven to desperation, but of such a

Attempted
murder of
De Witt.

Abrogation
of the
Perpetual
Edict.

people swayed by a will as proud and as tenacious as his own.

Of this reaction the national need had been the immediate cause. It represented, also, the triumph of the democratic spirit over the merchant aristocracy, which had so long kept the mass of the people, as it had kept William, under its control. A terrible crime now signalled this triumph. The enmity against the De Witts had been disarmed neither by the murderous attack upon them nor by the dignified address in which, after recounting the services of nineteen years, John De Witt resigned to the Provincial Estates of Holland his charge as Grand Pensionary. The populace determined on a full accomplishment of their design. The blow fell first upon Cornelius, who, accused of plotting the murder of William, was enticed to the Hague, and there, by order of the Court of Holland, put to the torture, and ordered to be banished from Holland and West Friesland. As he lay crippled from the rack, the mob surrounded the prison to prevent his departure. By a feigned message his brother was induced to visit him there. Means were found to remove the guards who protected the prison from attack. Then, bursting open the gates, the crowd rushed to the room where the brothers were expecting their fate. They found Cornelius stretched on the bed, while John de Witt read aloud from the Bible. A blow struck the reader on the face and covered him with blood. Then Cornelius was dragged to his feet. Almost before the brothers had exchanged a last kiss he was hurled to the bottom of the stairs. Pushing their victims before them, the mob rushed into the street, and there the butchery was completed. As John de Witt, struck to the earth, raised himself on his knees, and, holding his clasped hands to heaven, opened his lips to utter a last prayer,

he was dashed backwards ; a man placed his foot upon his throat, and crying aloud, 'At last the Perpetual Edict is repealed,' blew out his brains with a pistol. The bodies were stripped and horribly outraged, and then, in the presence of a Calvinistic clergyman, were dragged through the streets to the scaffold and hung by the feet amid the jeers of the people.

Upon no one did this foul deed throw more disgrace than upon William. By his ungenerous coldness after the first attack, and by his protection of the Conduct of William. assailants, he had made it evident that he was not likely to hinder the bloody work in hand. Not a word had escaped him to control the popular passion. When appealed to for troops to quell the riot he had turned a deaf ear, and when the murder was completed he not only protected the ringleaders, but actually conferred upon them public preferment. The poor excuse that can be made for him is that by active steps to prevent this blind desire for vengeance he might have imperilled his newly acquired position.

3. NEGOTIATIONS WITH LOUIS. CLOSE OF THE FRENCH ATTACK.

The States-General had meanwhile (June 29) submitted their fresh proposals to Louis. They offered him Maestricht and its dependencies, a portion of the 'Generality' (see p. 8), and six millions of livres. They demanded in return that their political and religious independence should remain intact. Louis has himself recorded his regret that, acting under the advice of Louvois, he refused this magnificent conclusion to the war, which, by placing in his hands a belt of fortresses from the Meuse to the mouth of the Scheldt, would have nullified the power of the Republic to oppose him whenever he should

Ill-considered rejection of the Dutch offers by Louis.

determine to incorporate the Spanish Low Countries with France. Louvois persuaded him to require, in addition, satisfaction to his allies, the immunity of all French subjects in the United Provinces from the ordinary dues and customs, the suppression of every commercial edict to the disadvantage of France issued since 1662, the establishment and support of Catholic churches, with a payment of twenty-four millions of livres. And he insisted that every year a deputation should approach him at Paris to present him with a gold medal in token that they held their liberty at his grace. The reply of the States-General was that to accede to such demands would be to accede to dismemberment, the reversal of their constitution, the ruin of their trade, and national dishonour.

Charles II. had meanwhile rejected the solicitations of the embassy which had been sent to him also, and had commissioned Buckingham, Arlington, and the Earl of Halifax to the French camp, with power to act in concord with Louis. On their way they visited William at Bodegrave, and urged him to accept the offered terms.

William's determination expressed to the English ambassadors.

He told them that France might have Maestricht and the Rhine towns, but nothing more. 'Do you not see,' said Buckingham, 'that the Republic is lost?' The answer illustrated the new spirit which prevailed. 'I know one sure means of never seeing it—to die on the last dyke.' From William the commissioners went to Louis. They found him willing to add on behalf of England demands for an unconditional surrender on the vexed question of the flag, free fishing in Dutch waters, the command of the shores of Zealand, and the absolute sovereignty of the rest of the United Provinces for William.

The joint demands were sent to the Prince, and laid by him before the States-General, who returned an

unequivocal rejection. William would not even answer the despatch of Louis directly; ^{His refusal of the joint demands of Louis and Charles.} he contented himself with forwarding him the copy of an extract from the formal resolution of the assembly. To stimulate further the national spirit he caused the dishonouring conditions to be posted on the public places of every town.

This uncompromising tone had been strengthened by a fresh piece of good fortune. On July 14 an Anglo-French fleet of 160 vessels was outside the Texel. ^{Failure of allied fleet to attack the Dutch coasts, July 1672.} with fifty partially equipped ships, could not have disputed their entrance. But a curious conjunction of wind and tide, long afterwards regarded as the visible interposition of Providence, came to the aid of the Republic, and before it was over there gathered so fierce a three days' tempest that the shattered armament was compelled to return discomfited to the shores of England, without disembarking a single man.

All active military operations against Holland were now necessarily at an end. There was not a Dutch town south of the inundation which was not in the hands ^{End of the French invasion.} of the French; and nothing remained for the latter but to lie idle until the ice of winter should enable them to cross the floods which cut them off from Amsterdam. Leaving Turenne in command, Louis therefore returned to St. Germain on August 1. A medal, still harping on his favourite image was struck to his glory, in which the sun was represented passing through his twelve dwellings, pictured by the twelve principal conquered towns.

Elsewhere the invasion had been foiled. The Duke of Luxemburg, aided by the forces of Cologne and Munster, had easily made himself master of Overysse. He next fell upon Groningen. On June 30 he took Cœvorden, and

then attacked the town of Groningen itself with 22,000 men. Its fall would have led to the fall of Delfzyl, and the mouth of the Ems would have been open to the English fleet. The small garrison however of 4,400 men defended themselves against an incessant bombardment and frequent assaults with so much vigour that at the end of six weeks the besiegers retired with heavy loss. They were now recalled from Overysse by new events.

Invasion of
Overysse and
Groningen.
Failure at
town of
Groningen,
August
1672.

4. FAILURE OF FIRST COALITION AGAINST LOUIS.

The alarm with which Europe had been watching the progress of Louis began to find expression. Switzerland, even in her Catholic cantons, was so warm in behalf of the Republic that it was only by force that her regiments in the service of Louis were kept to their duty. Spain was doing her best to help the Dutch to defend themselves, though unable yet to take the offensive; while Leopold, though for a long time held back by the Partition Treaty, was so alarmed by the dangers to the peace of the Empire from the extension of French power to the Rhine, that he formed on June 23 an alliance with Frederick William, the Grand Elector of Brandenburg, by which each engaged to raise 12,000 men at once, ostensibly to preserve the Peace of Westphalia and the internal peace of the Empire; and another with the States-General on October 27, by which he was to receive a subsidy on joining the Grand Elector in the field. No peace was to be made with Louis without the consent of himself and the Grand Elector until the war finally closed.

Alliance of
Leopold and
the Elector
of Branden-
burg, June
23, 1672.

Of Leopold
with the
States
General,
Oct. 27, 1672.

Louis had acted with his usual promptitude. He

withdrew Turenne with 16,000 men to Westphalia, and placed Condé with 17,000 to guard Alsace. Duras was stationed on the Meuse; Luxemburg remained with a small force at Utrecht. On September 12 the Austrian general Montecuculi, the Duke of Lorraine, and the Grand Elector effected their junction, intending to cross the Rhine and join William. Reinforced by the troops of

Winter
campaign;
discomfiture
of the allies
by Turenne.

Munster and Cologne from Overysse, Turenne drove them back to Friedberg. At the end of November however they succeeded in crossing at Weissenau, only to find that Turenne had by forced marches placed himself in their path. Completely outgeneralled, they were compelled in December to recross the river and, closely pressed, to retreat to Darmstadt. All through the winter Turenne pushed them home. While Louvois, jealous of the Great Captain's fame, was sending him reiterated orders to go into winter quarters, he gave the allies not a moment's repose, and by the beginning of March had driven them across the Weser; nor did he leave them until, utterly baffled, the Austrians had retired into Franconia, the Brandenburg contingent to Halberstadt. He again established his wearied troops in Westphalia.

William had been meanwhile endeavouring to take advantage of this diversion. His first attempts, on Naarden and Woerden, had been foiled by Luxemburg. Undiscouraged, he suddenly threw himself with 35,000 men upon Duras, drove him across the Meuse, and on December 15 invested Charleroi. But before Condé could hasten from Alsace to the rescue, the Count of Montal had succeeded by a desperate attack in forcing William's lines and relieving the place. The Prince had no course left but to retreat in haste to Amsterdam. The victories of Turenne now deprived the Dutch of the ally in whom

William
before
Charleroi;
failure of his
enterprise,
December
15, 1672.

they most trusted. Frederick William, utterly disheartened, and tempted by liberal offers from Louis, **The Grand** agreed, on June 6, 1673, to remain strictly **Elector** neutral, to withdraw his garrisons from all **makes peace,** Dutch towns, to stay beyond the Weser, and **June 6, 1673.** to allow French troops to pass into Germany to punish any infraction of the Treaty of Munster. By fresh arrangements with the Archbishop of Cologne and the Elector of Hanover Louis also secured the continued occupation of Overysse, and so deprived the Dutch of all hope of future aid from the side of Westphalia.

Sweden now intervened. Fettered by fear of Denmark from taking an active part in the conflict, and unwilling **Mediation of** to see England without a rival at sea, she **Sweden ;** thought her engagements with Louis suffi- **Conference** ciently satisfied for the moment by sending, in **of Cologne** September, 1672, both to Louis and Charles **opens, June** to offer her mediation ; and in June, 1673, a conference **1673.** was opened at Cologne. Before the absolute refusal of the Dutch—who, as Charles complained to his Parliament, treated his ambassadors ‘with the contempt of conquerors, and not as might have been expected from men in their condition’—to listen to the extravagant demands of the two Kings, nothing could be done. In July, Sweden endeavoured to secure some relaxation of these demands.

The moment was unfortunate, for Louis was **Capture of** in the flush of a new success. Maestricht, **Maestricht** after a four weeks’ siege, had fallen before the **by Vauban.** genius of Vauban.

The end of August found the Dutch as uncompromising as Louis, for they had just fought and won a desperate campaign upon their own element. Charles had in the spring made all ready for another descent upon their coasts, for he saw in a striking victory over the Republic the sole chance of extricating himself from the

increasing difficulties of his position at home. He had collected 8,000 men at Yarmouth under the French general Schomberg, to be transported to Zealand when

the way should have been cleared by a defeat of the Dutch fleet. On June 7 Rupert and Estrées met Ruyter and Tromp with almost equal forces. The day was bloody but indecisive. The conflict was renewed on the 14th, when the Dutch fought with such fury that

the English were driven back to the Thames. In the middle of August they set out again, this time with Schom-

berg's men on board. On the 21st took place, close to the Zealand coast, the battle upon which hung the fate of the Republic. From daylight till dark the terrible duel lasted. The church towers and housetops along the shore were crowded with anxious spectators. Not until 7 in the evening did Rupert lose hope of victory. Then, as Ruyter prepared for a last desperate onset, he gave the signal for retreat, and the allied fleets sailed sullenly back to Yarmouth.

William now replied once more to Louis and Charles. The French might have Maestricht, Zutphen, and Hulst. To England he would grant the salute, and nothing more. Cologne might retain Rhynberg. But Munster should have not an acre of land. The States-General further declared that after September 15 they would only make peace in concert with the Emperor and Spain.

5. SECOND COALITION AGAINST LOUIS. PEACE BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE REPUBLIC. EVACUATION OF THE UNITED PROVINCES BY THE FRENCH.

William's tone was determined too by the fact that a coalition against Louis, more powerful than the last, had now been formed. Spain, profoundly moved by the

capture of Maestricht, had managed to raise money to supply her army, and, even to subsidise Leopold. On August 15 the latter issued a manifesto to the Diet, explaining that he went to war to defend the Empire ; and on the 30th three separate treaties were signed by the parties to the new alliance.

Treaties
between
Leopold and
the Dutch ;
Spain and
the Dutch ;
the Duke of
Lorraine
and the
three
powers,
August 30,
1673.

By the first, Leopold agreed to march 30,000 men to the Rhine, where the Dutch would meet them with 20,000. By the second, Spain promised the Dutch to join her forces to those of the Empire, and, for a fresh guarantee of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to insist upon France restoring to the Republic all her conquests ; while she herself was to regain the limits of the Peace of the Pyrenees and to retain Maestricht and Vroonhoven. By the third, the errant Duke of Lorraine, who furnished 18,000 men to the coalition, was to be restored to his estates at the end of the war. Peace was to be made only by the mutual consent of all the contracting powers. Active operations began at once. William, outmanœuvring Condé, now in command in the United Provinces, captured Naarden (August 28), and, marching right forward to the Rhine, joined Montecuculi, who had slipped by Turenne, a little below Bonn, which fell before their united efforts on November 12. The effect was immediate. Cologne and Munster made peace ; the Electors of Trèves and Mayence joined the coalition.

Capture of
Bonn by
William and
Lorraine,
November
12, 1673.

But far more important was it that, driven by the need of money, which Louis could only partially satisfy, and heartily tired of a war in which he had experienced little but defeat, Charles, after a conflict of several months, yielded to the conditions imposed upon him by Parliament, to whom this Cabal war, unlike the former, had from the first been distasteful, and, in the teeth of his engagements

with Louis, made peace with the Dutch. By the Treaty of London (February 19, 1674) the Republic yielded the honour of the flag from Cape Finisterre northwards, Charles II. agreed to pay 800,000 crowns, and granted compelled to make peace with the Republic. February 19, 1674. to England the retention of all her conquests outside Europe. All future disputes between the rival East India Companies were to be submitted to arbitration. Charles promised that he would give no help to the enemies of the Republic. He managed however to evade the recall of the English regiments in the French service ; and his ambassadors at Cologne, where the conference lingered on until the end of March, remained to act in the French interest.

But even these defections did not fully represent the weakening of Louis's cause. In January 1674 the coalition was joined by Denmark, and in March by the Electors Palatine ; in April Leopold had gained the Dukes of Brunswick and Lüneburg ; in May he induced the Diet to declare war in the name of the Empire ; and on July 1 the Grand Elector once more threw in his lot with the enemies of France. Louis at once determined to concentrate all his strength. Bitterly repenting his refusal eighteen months earlier of a splendid termination of his enterprise against the Republic, he saw himself forced to relinquish it without having wrung from her a single concession, and with Maestricht and Grave alone out of forty large towns to represent his conquests.

Denmark
joins the
coalition,
January
1674.

CHAPTER XX.

THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFLICT IN ENGLAND,

I. THE TEST ACT. FEBRUARY 4—MARCH 29, 1673.

IT is necessary now to recur to the progress of the parliamentary conflict in England. The subsidies of Louis, the supplies previously voted, and the spoil of the Stop of the Exchequer had enabled Charles to dispense with an appeal to Parliament for nearly two years. These funds being exhausted, and Louis not being prepared to satisfy his needs, he met the Houses on February 4, 1673. Assuming a tone of confidence, he put lightly aside the question of the standing army, whose 'dark hovering on Blackheath' was exciting much suspicion, stating indeed that several more regiments would be necessary in the spring ; and he gave the usual assurances to the Church.

Charles
resolves to
maintain the
Declaration
of In-
dulgence,
February
1673.

Then, trusting to waive all attack upon the Declaration of Indulgence by a strong expression of his personal will, he ended his reference to it by the words : 'And I will deal plainly with you, I am resolved to stick to my Declaration.' Shaftesbury followed with the famous 'Delenda est Carthago' speech, in which he expressed the necessity of beating the Republic, as being 'England's eternal enemy, both by interest and inclination,' to the ground.

On many questions the Commons were unexpectedly compliant. They introduced a bill for the monthly supply of 70,000*l.* for eighteen months 'for the King's extraordinary occasions,' thus avoiding direct reference

to the war, of which the country was now weary, but were careful to proceed no further with it for the moment. They refrained from attacking the Stop of the Exchequer, the War, or the Cabal. This was because they had chosen to challenge the King on one matter alone.

On February 8 took place the first debate on the Declaration. In its support the old arguments were used; the advantage of trade, the increase of population which toleration always promoted, the folly of causing discontent at home while a war demanding all the nation's energies was on hand. The distinction between the prerogative in temporal and spiritual matters was dwelt upon. As the master of a ship may throw over the cargo in a storm, or one may walk over another man's grounds in an emergency, so when there is sufficient occasion the King may dispense with the law. 'Can government,' it was boldly asked, 'be without arbitrary government?' On the other side the distinction advanced was utterly repudiated. Granting that the King had power to pardon crime in individual cases, he had none to license crime by dispensing with law. The Declaration broke through no fewer than forty Acts of Parliament, repealable by Parliament alone. The debate closed with a vote, carried by 168 to 116, that 'Penal statutes in matters ecclesiastical cannot be suspended but by Act of Parliament.'

Beyond the challenge thus thrown down to the King, the debate was important as showing the distance travelled by public opinion since the passing of the second Conventicle Act. A suggestion that the House itself should prepare a bill 'for the ease of His Majesty's Protestant subjects that are Dissenters' was unanimously adopted. The Anglican *furor* had evidently to a great extent passed away. The Commons were no longer on their defence against Pro-

Arguments
for and
against it.

Ease of
Protestant
Dissenters.

testant dissent, but were engaged in providing that the Church of England should not be 'devoured by Papists.'

The vote of February 8 had been followed by an address to the King. Obtaining from him only an evasive request that the Commons would themselves prepare a bill in the same sense as the Declaration, they pressed 'for a full and satisfactory answer ;' and enforced their demand by a vote (February 28) that no one refusing

the oaths or the sacrament according to the Anglican rites should be capable of holding any office under the Crown. Charles hereupon appealed to the Lords for their advice. They coldly replied that his previous answer referring the question to the Commons 'in a parliamentary way' was 'good and gracious.' On March 7 they joined the Lower House in desiring the King at once to order all Jesuits and Catholic priests, except those in attendance on the Queen and the foreign ambassadors, to leave the kingdom within thirty days ; to instruct the justices to execute the penal laws against them with all rigour ; and to call upon all officers and soldiers at once to take the oaths and receive the sacrament. Pressed to yield by his ministers, who were

becoming alarmed for their own safety, by Louis, who saw that unless supplies were granted his ally must necessarily make peace, and by the female favourites, whose sources of wealth were endangered, Charles on March 8 cancelled the Declaration to which only a month before he had declared his fixed resolve to adhere.

The concession was too tardy. The Commons were anxious to put an end to the Catholic Question. A bill for a Test Act, suggested by Arlington to destroy Clifford, had already been before them. On March 12 it was read a third time. In the interval it had been pointed out that if passed in the terms of the vote of

Attack on
the
Declaration.

Charles
cancels the
Declaration,
March
1673.

February 28 it might be inoperative for its purpose, since the Pope could grant dispensation to take the oaths and even to receive the Anglican sacrament. He was however precluded from any such step regarding cardinal matters of faith. The Act therefore was framed to include an explicit denial of the doctrine of Transubstantiation. In the Lords, in spite of the passionate resistance of the greater part of the Catholic peers under the leadership of Clifford, who broke out upon it as 'monstrum, horrendum, ingens,' it passed by a large majority. On March 29 it received the royal assent. Only then did the Commons pass the Subsidy Bill.

Parliament had at last won the victory for which it had been striving since the Restoration. James, to the great loss of the nation, resigned his post of Lord High Admiral. The second part of Clifford's horoscope was now fulfilled. He laid down the Treasurer's staff, went into strict retirement, and shortly died—it was reported by his own hand—of the disappointment of his hopes. The Cabal was shattered, and from this moment Charles abandoned all attempt to secure favour for the proscribed creed. The influence of James however was sufficient to secure the nomination of Sir Thomas Osborne, soon created Earl of Danby, to succeed Clifford as Lord Treasurer—an appointment which turned Arlington, who thus suffered a second rebuff, into a keen though concealed opponent of the Government.

Meanwhile the bill for the ease of Protestant Dissenters had been read a third time in the Commons. Difficulties arose only at the last moment. In the Lords the Bishops opposed it with vehemence, and secured its return to the Commons clogged with unacceptable amendments. By passing the Bill of Supply the Commons had lost their hold on

Passing of
the Test
Act, March
29, 1673.

The Cabal
shattered.

Loss of the
bill for the
ease of
Protestant
Dissenters.

events. Charles, though honestly anxious to see the measure become law, adjourned the Parliament, and the bill was for the time lost.

2. REFUSAL OF SUPPLIES. SHAFTESBURY IN OPPOSITION.
PEACE WITH THE DUTCH. OCTOBER 20, 1673—FEBRU-
ARY 24, 1674.

The very fact that precautions had been taken against the Catholics appeared to increase the general alarm. Much had indeed taken place during the recess to justify this feeling. The Test Act had been largely evaded, and the 'flaunting of Papists' in White-hall was evident to all. Louis's demand for the establishment of Catholic churches in the conquered Dutch towns had roused the Protestant feeling of Englishmen to the utmost; while the national jealousy of France had been excited to fever pitch by the belief that the conduct of Estrées, who both in the last battle and in that of Solebay had avoided giving any effective assistance, had been prompted by the desire of Louis to see the two great naval powers destroy each other's strength. Rupert, in his conviction that this was the case, had become the leader of a vehement anti-French party. Then there was the standing army, under the command of Schomberg, a Frenchman, though a Protestant, with a declared Catholic second in command; and, lastly, the marriage of James to the Princess of Modena—a marriage known to have been arranged in deference to the personal wishes of Louis—not only opened up the prospect of a long Catholic succession, but expressed in a definite form the alliance of the court with the French and Catholic cause. When therefore Parliament met in October, 1673, it was in a fighting mood. The silencing of some leading members of the old Opposition by the personal influence of the King could avail but little against the rising tide

of passion. The most influential members of the country party rose one after another to urge the House to refuse a supply until their grievances had been redressed. 'Here is money asked of us,' said Lord Cavendish, 'to carry on a war we were never advised about ; and what we have given is turned to raising of families and not paying the King's debts.' Lord Cornbury, Clarendon's eldest son, had 'begged for the King, and wanted for him, and would willingly do it again,' but he too was for refusing supply. 'Do this,' said another, 'and we may deliver ourselves both from France and Rome.' **Refusal of supplies.** A vote was accordingly carried to refuse any **'Evil counsellors.'** supply before the end of the eighteen months' assessment, unless the obstinacy of the Dutch should render it necessary, and before the dangers from Popish counsels, and other grievances, had been removed. Of these grievances the standing army was first named. The member who declared that these forces had not been raised for the war, but the war made for raising the forces, expressed the general belief. Passing then to 'evil counsellors,' they had just uttered Lauderdale's name when they were prorogued until January 7.

When the King again faced Parliament he no longer asked for money to continue the war, but to secure peace. **Falsehood of Charles.** And this time he did not hesitate, at the instance of Louis, to meet the great council of the nation with a gross and deliberate lie. To remove their suspicions he would lay his treaties with France, and all the articles of them, without the least reserve, before a small committee of both Houses ; and he added, 'I assure you there is no other treaty with France, either before or since, which shall not be made known.' The treaty which was shown was however the *second* Treaty of Dover, of December 1670, which, in order the better to deceive Parliament, had been executed afresh as late as

February 1672. The original treaty of June 1, 1670, with the article providing for the announcement of the King's conversion and the subsidy from Louis for that purpose, was carefully concealed. The speech, we learn from Lord Conway, who was behind the scenes, was produced 'by the consultations of many days and nights'; and we are told that 'the King fumbled in delivering it, and made it worse than in the print.'

The fraud availed little. The Houses went steadily on with the work which had been interrupted. They were now under guidance which rendered them doubly formidable. Shaftesbury had during the recess been dismissed. Since the cancelling of the Declaration his sympathies had never been with the court. Probably he had been told by the disappointed Arlington the true story of the Dover Treaty; and the vexation of one who thought himself a master of intrigue at having so long been a dupe, would of itself be enough to account for the immediate change in his attitude after the prorogation. In the Lords he organised a regular opposition, the members of which met frequently to arrange the plan of attack. On the day after the King's speech he carried an address for the banishment from London of all Papists or reputed Papists, not householders or in attendance on peers. The dread of a Catholic succession, henceforward his watchword, was expressed in a vote to prepare a bill for the education of the royal children as Protestants, and for securing all future marriages in the royal line with Protestants under the penalty of exclusion. Provisions equally drastic were inserted in the proposed bill for the education of the children of Catholic peers; the practice of sending them to Catholic schools on the Continent was especially to be prohibited.

In the Commons there arose a renewed outcry against

'evil counsellors,' which on January 13, 1674, took a definite shape in an address to the King to remove Lauderdale and Buckingham from all their employments and from his presence and councils for ever. Articles of impeachment were then proposed against Arlington, the 'great conduit-pipe' of all the previous actions of the government. His defence however was so able, and his friends so numerous and earnest, since it was understood that he was now out of favour, that he secured a majority of 166 to 127.

It was at this point that Charles announced that terms of peace had been made to him by the Dutch which he could accept. Parliament eagerly welcomed the close of the ill-starred war, and the Treaty of London (see p. 219) was signed on February 19. The King now, unable to extract a farthing from the Commons, put an end to the session, and so to all progress with the attacks from both Lords and Commons. The Houses did not however separate (February 24) until the Habeas Corpus Bill, with its extended provisions against arbitrary rule, though it did not pass the Lords, had secured a permanent place in men's minds by passing all its stages in the Commons, and until an address had been sent up praying for the disbanding of all troops raised since January 1, 1663. The course of affairs in the recess was to be determined by events on the Continent.

Attack on
Lauderdale,
Buckingham,
and
Arlington.

Failure of
Charles to
get money
from Parlia-
ment.

CHAPTER XXI.

LOUIS : WILLIAM : CHARLES : PARLIAMENT.

1674-1677.

I. CAMPAIGN OF 1674.

THE campaign of 1674 displayed the advantages possessed by a single power ably led against a coalition, however extensive. Louis, as usual, was beforehand with his foes. While Turenne and Condé held the Upper Rhine and the Spanish Low Countries, and Schomberg faced the

Spaniards in Roussillon, Louis himself invaded Franche Comté, and in less than two months once more carried the French frontier on the east to its natural barrier, the Jura mountains. Condé meanwhile confronted the superior forces of William on the

Meuse and the Sambre. He cautiously bided his time until the Prince, unable to induce him to give battle, began to withdraw his troops ; then he dashed at the rearguard, routed it at Seneff, and captured the whole baggage train.

A second and a third attack failed to dislodge William's main body from the strong position which he held ; and three days of terrible carnage—no fewer than 25,000 men were left dead or dying on the field—ended with no decisive advantage. The campaign in the Low Countries closed with the loss to France of only Dinant and Huy on the Meuse, and Grave.

The fighting on the Rhine displayed more than ever the superiority of Turenne's generalship. With greatly inferior forces he met the imperialists at Sinsheim (June 16), between the Rhine and the Necker, and drove them back across the latter river.

Conquest of
Franche
Comté.


Condé in
Flanders.
Battle of
Seneff,
August 11,
1674.

Turenne on
the Rhine.

Then followed, during July and August, the first of the terrible 'wastings' of the Palatinate on both sides of the Rhine. Turenne was determined that the enemy should find no subsistence there, and he made the whole land a desert. Strongly reinforced, the imperialists again crossed at Mayence, and marched up the left bank to Spire; there, finding Turenne prepared to defend Lower Alsace, they recrossed, and reached Strassburg just in time to anticipate him, as he came with all haste by the other bank. Having effected a junction with a fresh army brought up by the Grand Elector, they prepared to chase him out of Alsace. The emergency called out all Turenne's powers. With splendid confidence he promised Louis that, if fully supported, he would by the end of the year drive the enemy beyond the Rhine. The redemption of his pledge forms one of the most memorable feats of modern warfare.

For a month, by a masterly use of his small force, he kept the enemy from penetrating the rough country which he held. On November 29 he suddenly carried his whole army across the Vosges to Lixheim, near Sarreburg, on the western side of the chain. He then, with the mountains as a screen between him and the enemy, rapidly traversed the whole line of the Vosges from north to south, picking up reinforcements on the way. At the southern end, where the chain bends sharply to the west, he divided his army into four bodies, and, keeping his ultimate plan profoundly secret, sent them each by a separate route back over the angle thus formed, with orders to rendezvous at Belfort on the eastern side, the famous bulwark of France which guards the gap between the Vosges and the Jura. So well was he obeyed that after three weeks' wrestling with all the difficulties of snow-covered and almost trackless mountains, he found himself at Belfort on December 27 with a wearied but eager army of 40,000 men. Without a day's delay he

The Vosges
campaign,
December
1674.



swept northward upon the unsuspecting foe, who, as he anticipated, had scattered themselves throughout Alsace when they learned his retreat; routed them at Mulhausen, drove a large body across the Swiss frontier, and on January 5 utterly defeated the Grand Elector at Colmar; then, pushing on, chased the enemy before him in confusion to Strassburg. Panic-stricken, and quarrelling among themselves, they hurried across the river, and within a week from the battle of Colmar Turenne had fulfilled his promise. Not a German soldier remained on the French side of the Rhine.

None the less, Louis was daily becoming more anxious to separate his enemies. With the Dutch he had good hopes, for they had now no direct interest in the war. Charles, on concluding his separate peace, had offered his mediation, and London again became the centre of diplomatic intrigue.

2. WILLIAM OF ORANGE. CONNECTION WITH ENGLAND. HIS POWER IN THE UNITED PROVINCES.

William was at this time exercising much influence upon English politics. In confidential communication with the Shaftesbury cabal, he had through them practically driven Charles to make peace; and he was not without hope that he might even oblige him to join the coalition against France. Up to the battle of Seneff therefore he had declined the English mediation. That event however, and the powerful movement which was arising at home for peace, changed his view. Conciliatory letters passed between the uncle and nephew, and William suggested that he should visit the King in London. But Charles, to gratify Louis, coldly declined the proffered visit. He went still further. Though fully aware of the exasperation caused by the last three prorogations, he determined on a fourth. He was resolved to be henceforth

his own foreign minister ; he had forced Arlington to sell his office of Secretary of State to Sir Joseph Williamson, who possessed no influence ; Buckingham had been thrown over on the ground of the late vote of the Commons ; Danby, by virtue of his usefulness in finding money and in manufacturing votes had, under the protection of the Duchess of Portsmouth, the conduct of all home business, but of that alone. Concealing his intention even from him to the last moment, Charles announced to his silent and astounded council that Parliament would not meet for business until April 1675.

The effect of this 'master-stroke,' as he deemed it, was immediate, but in a direction opposite to his hopes.

William, in angry disappointment, at once gave up all thoughts of accommodation with France. He stayed all conciliatory action on the part of the States-General ; and induced them to refuse the proposed suspension of arms at sea, and to demand not only the abrogation of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, but even the enforcement of the conditions of that of the Pyrenees.

This firmness, and the knowledge of William's influence in England, at once altered Charles's fickle resolutions. He made up his mind to bind the Prince to the interests of the Crown by a step which had long been discussed—a marriage with Mary, the eldest daughter of James.

The first suggestion of this alliance had originally been but one of several expressions of the anxiety which arose from the childlessness of the Queen. The possibility of putting forward Monmouth, his favourite son, as heir had been mentioned ; while as early as 1669 Buckingham had urged a parliamentary divorce, and Shaftesbury when in office had supported the idea. Charles however, to his credit, never seriously entertained a proposal so injurious to his wife,

Charles his
own foreign
minister.

Prorogation
of Parlia-
ment ; effect
upon
William.

Suggested
marriage of
William and
Mary.

nor did he give the slightest countenance to the scheme concerning Monmouth. Then came the second marriage of James, with its prospects of a Catholic succession should a son be born. Nobody at present seriously proposed the exclusion of James, and the alliance of William and Mary offered itself as a means of reconciling the doctrine of hereditary right with the abhorrence of a Catholic King. Charles had hitherto, in deference to Louis and James, rejected the idea. Now however, in spite of the remonstrances of the former, he despatched Arlington and Lord Ossory in November to the Hague, to secure, if possible, peace between France and the Dutch, and the betrothal of William to Mary. Peace it

was soon found was impracticable on William's terms. As to the marriage, it was declined on two grounds. Another child was about to be born to James, and, if this were a boy, the eventual advantage to William of such a marriage would be slight; his friends in England, too, pressed him to refuse to associate himself with James in a way which must weaken his influence with themselves.

William had meanwhile been strengthening and extending his power at home. The election of his adherent Fagel to succeed De Witt had in a great measure secured the control of the States-General; while, by obtaining the right of nominating the mayors of the towns, which had hitherto been expressly reserved to the towns themselves, he had largely annulled the republican constitution. His offices of Stadtholder, Captain and Admiral General for Holland and Friesland, had been made hereditary; while Guelders and Utrecht had, since the French conquest, been placed entirely under his control. Guelders indeed had offered him the sovereign name and power, and he was anxious to accept it. But, just as when war was at

William declines the proposal.

His power in the Republic.

their gates the people had demanded a strong executive, so, when the danger was removed, the old jealousy of despotism reasserted itself, and William was obliged by the general outcry to put aside the idea.

In this state of affairs the approaching meeting of the English Parliament excited the attention of all Europe. For a while it was doubtful whether it would meet at all, since Louis had promised Charles another subsidy if he would dissolve, or even prorogue it for a year ; and he was warmly supported by James for his own reasons. But Danby offered the strongest opposition. That able minister—the fore-runner of Harley in party management, and of Walpole in parliamentary corruption—was sincerely opposed to the influence of France. He had shaped a bold policy of his own, which, if successful, would ruin the Shaftesbury cabal at a blow ; a return, namely, to the policy of Clarendon, a cordial union between Royalism and Anglicanism, in opposition to all forms of Nonconformity and limitation of the prerogative. He had induced the King to publish during the recess a fresh body of edicts, framed in conference with the Bishops at Lambeth, enforcing the penal laws, especially against the Catholics, and he had spared no efforts to win over individual members of the Commons. The last prorogation had, in his opinion, been a dangerous measure ; a dissolution would throw the whole power into the hands of Shaftesbury and his friends. The navy meanwhile was rotting away for want of money which a Parliament alone could give. Charles accepted Danby's advice, the more readily as the development of English commerce had increased his annual revenue by 150,000*l*. The only promise he would give Louis was to dissolve Parliament should they insist on fixed times of meeting, attack either James or his ministers, or meddle with

Danby and
Parliament ;
resolves on a
return to the
policy of
Clarendon.

alliances or terms of peace. Louis fell back upon bribery. It was now that Parliament began to earn with justice the name of the 'Pensionary Parliament.' English, French, Spanish, and Dutch money jingled in the same pockets. Ruvigny had 10,000*l.* for direct bribery of members, with a large sum to enable him to keep a lavish table. The Spanish ambassador came with full hands. Van Beuninghen took a house in Westminster and exercised splendid hospitality. The Danish resident had a grant from the Republic for the same object. The Shaftesbury Opposition were equally ready. Their leader, in a letter to Lord Carlisle, had sounded the note of attack. Danby was if possible to be overthrown, and a dissolution brought about.

3. PARLIAMENT, APRIL TO JUNE 1675.

The Non-resisting Test.

It was, then, with a frank return to the policy of Clarendon that Charles and Danby met Parliament in April 1675, and the Lambeth edicts were quoted as an earnest of the intention to regard the Church in its double aspect as a Protestant Church opposed to Popery and an established Church opposed to Dissent. Danby's wholesale corruption of the Commons had so far succeeded that he was enabled to defeat the vigorous attack, which was at once made upon him on the ground of his arbitrary government of the exchequer and his lavish expenditure of public money for private and family ends. The court also scored a success in the rejection of a resolution incapacitating placemen from sitting in Parliament. So evenly however were parties balanced, and so exasperated had feeling become, that it was only after a scene of unparalleled disorder following an even division, when

Partial
success of
Danby.

blows were exchanged and, but for the promptitude of the Speaker, blood would undoubtedly have been shed on the floor of the House, that a resolution for an address to the King to recall the English troops in the French service was defeated by a single vote. From this point the Commons again became impracticable.

The rapid progress of Louis in the Spanish Low Countries, and still more the growth of the French navy, roused such jealousy in England and threw such strength into the hands of the Opposition that Louis instructed Ruvigny to offer a truce, should it become necessary, to soothe this irritation. So pressed was Charles by his own people, by Spain, and by the Republic, to take measures for the defence of the Spanish Low Countries and to compel Louis to make peace, that he declared to Ruvigny that he was like a besieged fortress. The Commons took up their old position of regarding themselves as on guard against Popery and France, and they passed a resolution to consider no bills whatever except such as might come down from the Lords.

Danby determined to make his great effort in the Upper House, where he was sure of a majority. The meaning of the conference at Lambeth was shown when he brought forward the famous *Non-resisting test* passed by the Lords. 'Non-resisting Test.' It was proposed that no one should hold office or sit in either House unless he had first taken the oath imposed on Nonconformist ministers by the Five Mile Act, to attempt no alteration in the government of Church or State. The object was to drive Catholic peers from the Lords and Presbyterian members from the Commons ; the Anglican clergy, the Parliament, and the executive would then form one dominant party, freed from all risks of opposition. It was understood that, if the Test were passed, the court would at once yield to the demands of Parliament as to foreign policy.

Against every stage of this audacious measure the opposition lords, led with remarkable power by Shaftesbury, fought for fifteen days with persistent courage. They pointed out that, so far from the bill affording safeguards against Popery, any Papist might, as the oath was drawn, take it without hesitation, and they secured its amendment as follows: 'I will not endeavour the alteration of the Protestant religion, now established in the Church of England, or of the government of Church and State.' Whether the bill would have passed the Commons is doubtful. But parties were so equal in a matter in which neither France nor Popery was directly concerned that it was possible. That stage however

was never reached. A dispute suddenly sprang up between the two Houses on the old question of the right of appeal to the Lords. That which had happened in 1668 happened again. Neither House would give way an inch.

Shaftesbury exerted himself to the utmost to make reconciliation impossible. The dispute absorbed the whole attention of both Houses, and there was no opportunity

for introducing the bill in the Commons. Danby was thus at the outset completely baffled, and Charles was compelled in June to prorogue the Parliament until October. When it again met the situation was profoundly modified by events on the Continent, which more than ever made it necessary for Louis to secure the neutrality of England.

4 REVERSES OF LOUIS IN 1675. SECRET TREATY WITH CHARLES II.

In the spring and early summer of 1675, Louis, always beforehand, had captured Liège and Limbourg, and had recovered Dinant, Huy, and Givet. The line of the

Meuse was thus secured from the French frontier to Maestricht, while that of the Moselle was blocked by the possession of Trèves. The junction of the imperialists with the Spaniards was now therefore fully guarded against. Turenne faced Montecuculi in Alsace. By compelling Strassburg to keep its neutrality, and therefore to refuse the imperialists a passage across the Rhine, he forced them to pass into Lower Alsace at Spire. He then threw a bridge over the river a little

Turenne's successes. below Strassburg and marched along the right bank into the Palatinate, thus getting to Montecuculi's rear. His antagonist at once recrossed to contest the country between the Rhine and the Necker, where Turenne had won his former victory at Sinsheim. After six weeks' manœuvring Turenne took the offensive, intending to drive Montecuculi behind the Black Forest. In July he succeeded in cutting his line, and thus obliged him to leave the valley of the Rhine and retreat to Sasbach, on the slopes of the Black Forest, to the east of Strassburg. Here Turenne came up with him. As he was visiting his outposts before the attack he was heard

His death at Sasbach, July 26, 1675. to utter one of his rare expressions of confidence : ' I have them now,' he exclaimed; ' they shall not escape me again.' Hardly were the words out of his lips when a chance shot struck him in the breast, and the great commander fell dead.

The effect of this blow was for the moment disastrous to France. Montecuculi at once took the offensive.

Retreat of the French. The French retreated in disorder to the Rhine, but turned to bay at Altenheim, and fought so desperately that the imperialists left 5,000 men dead on the field. They then crossed the river hurriedly at Schelestadt, while Montecuculi passed at Strassburg and laid siege to Haguenau and Savern, the fall of which would have entailed that of Philippsburg. But Condé

flew to the rescue, and these fortresses were preserved. So skilful were his operations that before the end of the year the allies had abandoned Alsace and recrossed the Rhine. It was his last exploit. Weary of action, he retired at the end of the campaign to a country life in his own domains.

Meanwhile disaster had happened on the Moselle. Créquy had been utterly beaten before Trèves by the old Duke of Lorraine on September 3, and Trèves itself had been captured after a desperate defence. The Swedes too, who had at length entered Brandenburg, had been thoroughly beaten (June 18) by the Grand Elector, and forced to retreat to Mecklenburg. Their evil fortune had followed them at sea. The Dutch and Danish fleets had inflicted upon them a crushing defeat in the Baltic, which led to the loss of the possessions which they had acquired in North Germany by the Peace of Westphalia.

It was now Louis whose thoughts were turned towards peace. The state of his own kingdom impelled him in the same direction. The drain of war and diplomacy had exhausted the treasure which Colbert had collected, while general discontent was once more spreading among the overburdened peasantry; armed revolt had even broken out in Brittany, and in Bordeaux, the old centre of turbulence. Ruvigny redoubled his efforts in England to secure a French party. But a French party, as such, he found it impossible to secure: on the contrary, it was clear that the next session would be of a vehemently anti-French character, especially as Danby himself had no love for France. It could be only by assisting one or the other side in the domestic struggle that Louis could hope to neutralise this spirit. He therefore applied to Shaftesbury and his friends. Their terms were

Defeat of
Créquy and
capture of
Trèves by
the allies,
September
1675.

Distress in
France;
Louis
anxious for
peace.

simple. If Louis would help them to overthrow Danby and secure liberty of conscience for Protestants, they would withdraw their opposition to his schemes. This explains those closetings of Shaftesbury with James which so puzzled people at the time, and which established against Danby a coalition of the Nonconformists, the Catholics, and Louis. James received 20,000*l.* for distribution at the end of the session on condition that the English troops were not recalled nor any vote passed hostile to France.

But Louis was bent on a still surer way of securing the inaction of England. More than ever he pressed upon Charles through the potent influence of Louise de K roualle the necessity of being free of the control of Parliament. By August 19 he had drawn from him, by promise of 100,000*l.* a year, an engagement to dissolve his Parliament if it were still violent against France or refused to provide him with money. Thus on both sides he was safe.

He soon had cause to congratulate himself on his precautions. When Parliament met, October 13, 1675, the request for supplies to pay the debts of the Crown and to build ships was listened to with an ominous silence. The reply when it came was a bill to incapacitate anyone from sitting in either House without taking an oath against Popery, and an absolute refusal to pay the debts. In view indeed of the daily growing strength of the French at sea a large addition of ships was voted ; but the intense distrust of the King was shown by the fact that, besides the usual appropriation clause being passed, a proposal to lodge the money, not as usual in the Exchequer, but in the hands of the Council of the City of London, was lost by only seven votes.

Meanwhile the Opposition, under Shaftesbury's

Alliance of
Louis and
the
Shaftesbury
Opposition.

Engagement
of Charles
with Louis.

Parliament
refuse
supplies,
October
1675.

leadership, hopeless of overthrowing Danby so long as the present Parliament continued, consisting as it did largely of men dependent on his bounty, Unsuccessful proposals for a dissolution. was pressing in both Houses for the dissolution which Louis was urging directly on Charles. But the present members, especially those elected during the reaction at the beginning of the reign, had all to lose and nothing to gain by the proposal, and no division was taken; in the Lords, where James and the Catholic peers supported it, it was lost by two votes only. Foiled in this attempt, Shaftesbury determined to gain his ends by rendering business impossible. It was easy to do this by raising the former dispute on the subject of appeals to the Lords. It at once became manifest that nothing else would be looked at until the Lords yielded, and Shaftesbury took care that they should not yield. Charles was forced to close the session. But he bitterly disappointed Shaftesbury and his friends. The practical certainty that a new Parliament would consist of men still more vehemently opposed to the prerogative again won the day. Instead of dissolving, he prorogued Parliament for fifteen months, to February 1677. He then, with cool audacity, demanded his subsidy from Louis. This had been promised for a dissolution only. But to Louis, as has been seen, English neutrality was now more than ever essential. That neutrality was safe if he could keep Charles dependent on him for these fifteen months. How accurately Danby had gauged the situation is shown by the fact that Ruvigny was informed that the money had been already entered in the English estimates for the coming year. Louis gave way without hesitation. He was rewarded when, in spite of all that Danby could do, Charles further consented to an agreement that neither monarch should listen to any

Parliament
prorogued.

Second
engagement
with Louis.

proposition from abroad contrary to the other's welfare, or make a treaty with the Dutch or any other State except by mutual consent. The meaning of this latter clause was that Charles was afraid lest the Dutch, by an alliance with Louis, might become supreme at sea; and that Louis dreaded an alliance of England and the Republic against himself. Danby, though he took part in the negotiation, utterly refused to sign it, declaring that his head would not be safe. The King was obliged to write out and sign the treaty with his own hands.

The dishonesty of this transaction was flagrant. Ever since his separate peace with the Dutch in 1674, Charles had been posing as an impartial mediator in the great European quarrel, and his representatives, of whom Temple was one, were already at Nimwegen, the town selected for the negotiation. Various causes delayed the arrival of their French colleagues until June 1676. Even then the conference was not complete. The allies were waiting to see what would be the result of the year's campaign.

5 CAMPAIGN OF 1676.

The fighting of 1676 was more remarkable by sea than by land. The care bestowed on the French navy by Colbert and Lionne, and the inducements to the *noblesse* to enter the sea service, had borne noble fruit. In Duquesne France had an intrepid and skilful leader. In 1675 he had beaten the Spaniards at Messina, and had since been riding triumphant in the Mediterranean. At length a greater adversary, Ruyter, with a powerful Dutch fleet, appeared. Duquesne undauntedly faced the renowned sea-king. On January 8 and April 22, 1676, he fought two fierce but indecisive contests. The latter however brought

The French
fleet;
Duquesne
in the
Mediterranean.

upon the Dutch irremediable disaster. Ruyter, the saviour of the Republic, even more to it than Turenne had been to France, was slain, and he left no one to take his place. With him passed away the last of the great antagonists with whose names we have become familiar. Turenne and Condé, Tromp and Ruyter, Monk and Rupert, Lionne and De Witt, all have gone, and those who have taken their places are smaller men. In June Duquesne again attacked the Dutch and Spanish fleets in the Bay of Palermo, and this time won a complete victory. The French remained masters of Sicily.

On land (May 1676) Louis, with the aid of Vauban, captured the towns of Condé and Bouchain; he then returned to St. Germain, leaving Schomberg in Flanders and Luxemburg in Alsace. The latter however was unable to prevent the imperialists from laying siege to Philippsburg.

Almost everyone now desired peace. The Republic was exhausted; the death of Ruyter had caused deep discouragement; and there was bad blood between the Dutch and the Spaniards—that ‘cursed race,’ as William did not hesitate to call them. The failure of William in July to capture Maestricht on the one side, and the failure of Louis to preserve Philippsburg (September 8) on the other, joined to the rising tide of passion in England, all tended to strengthen the peace influences. Louis now offered to William, for a separate peace, terms which appealed at once to his personal and national pride; he was to have the sovereignty of Maestricht and Limburg: the southern boundary of the United Provinces was to be moved so that, starting at Ostend and passing by Ghent to Maestricht, it should include Antwerp. Safeguards were to be given against future attack; and William was

Battles
with the
Spaniards
and Dutch.
Death of
Ruyter,
April 22,
1676.

Demand for
peace in the
United
Provinces.

to be supported by France in extending his authority over the Republic. For a while, but only for a while, William wavered in his loyalty to his allies ; he then uncompromisingly declined the proposals. The coalition against Louis was anticipating decisive successes in the next campaign, though the congress at Nimwegen was sitting. A great council had been called at Wesel to arrange the plan of campaign, for which vast preparations were being made. But that upon which they most rested their hopes was the English Parliament.

William
refuses
Louis's
offers.

6. THE WAR AND PARLIAMENT, 1677.

Necessity had again brought Charles (February 25, 1677) to face the Commons. So low had his credit sunk that he had been unable to raise a loan in London ; while Danby promised him that, if he would break with France, supplies far exceeding what Louis could offer would be forthcoming. Louis could only take all the precautions in his power. By an ordinance forbidding the seizure of English vessels, which the Dutch, to evade the liabilities of war, were employing to carry their goods, he conciliated, on the eve of the session, the good-will of the London merchants, whose influence was vast and whose opposition had been passionate. He sent to Courtin, the new French ambassador at London, 80,000*l.* for bribery, and he renewed his alliance with the Whig lords, James, and the Nonconformists, to oppose Danby and secure a dissolution. Courtin was ordered to give Charles no rest ; every day he was at Whitehall, and he never left the court until eleven at night. Well might Charles declare that he was like a besieged place.

Louis
conciliates
the London
merchants

A blunder of the Whigs gave Danby at the outset a

great advantage. Resting their case upon a statute of Edward III. which prescribed annual Parliaments, they maintained that by the prorogation for fifteen months the present House had ceased to exist. It was easily shown that the statute did not apply, and that it had been virtually repealed by the Triennial Act. In the Commons the motion raised vehement opposition, for the old reasons. The enemies of Danby appeared now as the enemies of Parliament too. The result was an immediate triumph for the minister. The Lords declared that Buckingham, Shaftesbury, Salisbury, and Wharton, the chief movers, must ask pardon of the House. On their refusal they were sent to the Tower, and were thus excluded for the time from influencing the course of affairs.

Danby at once took advantage of this momentary eddy in the political current. With the help of all the moderate men he carried an unconditional vote for 600,000*l.* He next, to quiet the anti-Catholic feeling, brought in a bill for better securing the Protestant religion in case of a Catholic succession. Drastic as its provisions were, the mere fact that it appeared to sanction a Catholic succession was enough to cause it to be regarded as a bill for the protection of Popery, and, as such, to awake so much jealousy that it never passed its second reading in the Commons. Besides, feeling was at the moment turned into its old channel by the alarming progress of Louis, who during March and April had stormed Valenciennes, the strongest fortress on the Scheldt, and captured Cambrai and St. Omer ; while his brother, the Duke of Orleans, had inflicted upon William, who had marched to relieve St. Omer, a disastrous defeat at Cassel on April 11. Louis's ally, Charles XI. of Sweden, had in the

Danby's
successes.

Bill for
securing
Protestant
religion.

Capture of
Valen-
ciennes.
Defeat of
Orange at
Cassel,
April, 1677.

previous December gained a great victory over Christian V. of Denmark at Lunden.

Parliament was deeply moved by these tidings. A unanimous address was at once sent by both Houses to the King praying for the recall of the English troops serving with France. A second address on March 26, repeated on April 5, urged him to declare war against France, with offers of unlimited support. As Courtin informed Louis, the English would give everything for a war with France, 'even to their shirts.' Charles was far from sharing their sentiments. To him every defeat of William was grateful, not only as bringing peace nearer, but as weakening the Prince's dangerous influence.

But, indomitable under defeat, William was as far from yielding as ever. His personal ascendancy had compelled the support of the States-General. He had reorganised his army after the rout of Cassel. In July he marched with 50,000 men upon Charleroi, hoping to be joined by the Duke of Lorraine, and intending after its capture to advance right into France. On August 6 he was before the town. But he had not yet served his apprenticeship in misfortune. The French were vigilant and active as ever. Louvois, 'the greatest quartermaster ever known,' flew to Lille; Luxemburg got to William's rear and so threatened him that he had to raise the siege and repass the Sambre with nothing but the recapture of Link to show for his labour and loss.

The Duke of Lorraine had fared yet worse at the hands of Créquy. Leaving a strong force to oppose the Duke of Saxe-Eisenach, who had crossed by Philippsburg into Alsace, this great pupil of Turenne so harassed Lorraine by skilful manœuvring and vehement attack, that from Mouzon

Charles
urged by
Parliament
to instant
war.

Persever-
ance of
William.

Créquy's
victorious
campaign on
the Rhine.

he drove him back upon the Rhine. Still following, he placed himself between his enemy and Alsace. Leaving him awhile, he turned upon Saxe-Eisenach, forced him to take refuge on an island on the Rhine, and there to capitulate. Without delay he returned upon Lorraine, who had placed his troops in winter quarters, passed the Rhine on November 8, and, before the Duke could move, invested and captured the coveted post of Freiburg. D'Humières, between the sea and the Scheldt, had taken St. Ghislain, and Louis, after a campaign to which the allies had looked as decisive, saw his arms everywhere triumphant.

William's position became continually more difficult. He was now the mark for universal abuse. Never, it was

The Dutch
desire
peace. said, had there been a commander who had lost so many battles and failed in so many sieges. The foreign officers in the Dutch

service contemptuously threw up their commissions. The peace party in the Republic was daily becoming more confident, and he thought it best not to appear at the Hague. His position was now saved by Louis himself. The Dutch were indeed anxious for peace. But no peace would be grateful which did not secure their great interest, commerce. Louis was asked if he would grant the repeal of all the hostile tariffs since 1662, and a satisfactory barrier to the Spanish Low Countries. He refused. Negotiations at once ceased. The States-General voted a large increase of the army. They with-

Reaction
against
peace. drew a demand they had made upon William for an account of the supplies previously given.

Still more important was it that, when he announced an intention of visiting Charles at London, they gave him full powers to treat in the name of the Republic.

When Parliament reassembled after a short adjourn-

ment on May 31, 1677, the Commons at once declared, in answer to the King's demand for money to secure his alliances, that they would give no money for alliances which were not first placed before them. This was a new departure of a most serious kind. Foreign alliances beyond everything else had hitherto been regarded as the prerogative of the Crown, and Parliament, while exercising much influence upon them, had made no direct assertion of right. For Charles to give way would have been to confess his utter defeat in the running fight for the prerogative which is so important a factor of the history of the reign. He refused to entertain the claim for a moment, and ordered the Houses to adjourn themselves, giving them to understand that they would not sit until winter.

But this adjournment left him penniless and perplexed. Money must be got somehow. There were two ways of obtaining it from Parliament—by securing a peace on the Continent satisfactory to the allies, or by declaring war against France. His efforts in the former direction soon proved abortive, for since the triumphs of the last campaign Louis was less than ever disposed to be moderate. But Charles refused to yield to Danby's pressure to declare war against France. He could use the English feeling to more profit than by embarking in a struggle which would simply place him more and more in dependence on Parliament. He had simply to take another step on the familiar road ; for so long as the war lasted, and the temper of Parliament remained the same, he had an article saleable to France. Danby, when overruled on the main question, proved himself a firm and audacious bargain-driver. He demanded from Louis (July 1677) 1,600,000*l.* For this he promised that Parliament should not meet until May, 1678, and that, to discourage the allies, they should

Claims of
Parliament
to control
foreign
alliances,
June 1677.

Distress of
Charles.
Another
secret
treaty with
Louis,
July 1677.

be informed of his intention. Charles was thus able to carry on the ordinary expenses of government, and Louis gained the prospect of nine months' freedom from English interference in the negotiations at Nimwegen.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE PEACE OF NIMWEGEN.

I. MARRIAGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY. EFFECT ON ENGLISH POLICY.

IT was at this moment that William came to England, on Charles's invitation. In spite of the fact that nothing could be less in keeping with the latter's engagements to Louis, the time seemed opportune for reviving the scheme of the Prince's marriage with Mary. Charles hoped that William would feel the interests of the Crown to be directly his own, and would thus be led to support them against his present friends among the Whigs. James believed that the marriage would disarm the violence of the Opposition to his own accession, which as the anti-Catholic spirit rose was daily becoming keener, by enabling men to look past himself to a Protestant consort of the future Queen. William felt that the close connection with the English royal house must strengthen him against both his foreign and domestic troubles, besides giving him a hold upon English foreign policy. The wooing was therefore a short one, especially as it was advisable to give Louis no time for remonstrance. On November 3 bonfires were blazing in the streets of London in honour of the betrothal, and on the 15th the marriage took place.

The new influence was at once felt. The feeble reso-

lutions of Charles were shaped by the firm will of the younger man ; and on November 22 fresh conditions of peace, which had emanated directly from William, were secretly proposed to Louis. Of all his conquests, Franche Comté alone, with Cambrai, Aire, and St. Omer, were to remain in his hands. The fortifications of Philippsburg were to be razed ; the Duke of Lorraine was to be restored to the full possession of his estates. Vague promises were made to satisfy Louis's ally, Sweden, and he was to retain Messina until that was done. It was not to be expected that Louis, in the very flush of his triumph, should accept terms which would rob him of the north-eastern frontier, which had so long been the object of French ambition. 'Rather than that,' he wrote to Courtin, 'I would risk losing my own towns, if my enemies, which is not likely, were in a condition to conquer them.'

Danby and William at once made capital of this refusal. Charles's irritation at his fresh failure was carefully fostered ; and he was easily persuaded to throw over his compact with France and summon Parliament in January. Before it met Louis made a last effort. He offered an increased bribe to Charles and a large present to Danby ; and he withdrew from his haughty attitude so far as to give up his demand for Luxemburg, Courtrai, and Ypres. Both bribes and offers were, through Danby's steady conduct, refused. Not only so, but on

Treaty of
England
with the
Republic,
January 10,
1678.

January 10, 1678, a treaty was signed at the Hague, embodying William's terms, and binding England and the Republic to compel the assent of both France and Spain. Ostend was

handed over to Charles provisionally as a *place d'armes* on the Continent. He raised 12,000 men, ordered the equipment of thirty ships, and recalled his troops in the French service. On February 7, confident of the con-

currence of Parliament, he opened the session with a speech which meant war with France, and he demanded supplies for ninety ships and 40,000 men.

But the Shaftesbury Opposition utterly distrusted the honesty of Charles's purpose. The marriage of William, as brought about by Danby, was now regarded with suspicion; they affected to believe that it was the result of an agreement with Louis himself, and that the King's warlike language was merely to induce Parliament to give him an army, which he would straightway use to secure despotic power. The welfare of Protestantism abroad and the checking Louis's aggression no longer occupied their thoughts. To overthrow

Selfish
policy of the
Opposition.

Danby and to secure liberty of conscience for Protestant Dissent at home were their sole objects, and for these they were ready now to render Louis free of all interference from Charles. In fact, since Danby joined William, they joined Louis. Unable to oppose openly a war of which they had been the most vehement advocates, they determined to insist upon conditions of peace so onerous that Louis would be justified in continuing the war, but if possible to render Charles powerless to join in it. In the first part of their plan they succeeded. They carried an address to the King, demanding that France should be reduced to the terms of the Peace of the Pyrenees, and that no commercial relations should be held with her by England or England's allies until that was done. But farther than this they could not make head against Danby's pensioners

Votes of
Parliament
in favour of
the war.

and the moderate men. By a large majority it was voted that 30,000 men and 90 vessels should be raised to support the alliance with the Dutch, and on February 18 a resolution to raise a million sterling, 'to enable his Majesty to enter into an actual war with the French King,' was agreed to.

2. CAPTURE OF GHENT AND YPRES BY LOUIS. PROPOSALS FOR A SEPARATE PEACE WITH THE DUTCH.

The suspicions of Charles's honesty were as usual well founded. Unable from habit, even if willing, to take a great resolution, though one in which the whole nation Chicanery of Charles. would have supported him, the King now secretly made a fresh attempt to accommodate matters with Louis, by offering the alliance of England for 600,000*l.*, on condition that Louis would give up Valenciennes and his other conquests on the Scheldt.

But Louis was less than ever disposed to yield, for he had just struck another unexpected blow. He had determined to extort peace, as De Witt had extorted it by the Chatham exploit. Sending Créquy across the Rhine to oppose the Germans, he ostentatiously made preparations which seemed to threaten Ypres, Mons, Namur, and Luxemburg. The Spaniards hurriedly drew troops for their defence from all the towns where no attack was anticipated, among them the great city of Ghent. Suddenly Louis concentrated his forces, and appeared before Ghent on March 4, having previously ordered D'Humières to meet him there with his corps. Denuded of its defenders, Ghent was in his hands by the 12th. Repeating his stratagem, he threatened Bruges; and, when the troops from Ypres were drawn off to its succour, he invested and took that fortress on the 25th.

The effect upon public feeling in England was such, that Charles, to keep his people within bounds, was obliged to send troops to Ostend, while privately assuring the French ambassador that he had no desire for war, and would do all in his power to avoid it. He was in a pitiable state of perplexity. Afraid of the popular outcry, but unwilling to commit himself to war,

Capture of
Ghent and
Ypres by
Louis,
March 1678.

Effects of
this exploit.

he went on with his vain endeavours to find a compromise satisfactory both to Louis and William. His difficulties were increased by the state of things in the United Provinces. There too, the union of William with the English royal family was looked upon with the keenest suspicion, which was further increased by the discovery of a secret article in the treaty of January, binding Charles and the States-General to assist each other against their rebellious subjects—a discovery which prevented the ratification of the treaty.

Upon the Republic therefore the capture of Ghent and Ypres had the effect which Louis had intended.

The Republic determines on a separate peace. Now that their own independence was beyond question, and that he declared himself willing to satisfy one of their essential demands by abandoning to Spain a strong barrier for her

Low Countries, the Dutch thought only of their other great interest, commerce, which was every day passing into the hands of England. The States-General represented to William the necessity of a separate peace, and they went the length of disbanding a third of their army. Louis, informed of this disposition, at once furnished his deputies at Nimwegen with instructions.

Offers of Louis. Always scrupulously faithful to his allies, he in the first place insisted on full satisfaction to Sweden. Of his conquests in the Empire he would retain alone Freiburg or Philippsburg ; in other respects the Peace of Westphalia should be scrupulously observed. To Spain he would concede a barrier extending from the sea to the Meuse, guarded by Nieuport, Dixmude, Courtrai, Oudenarde, Ath, Mons, Charleroi, and Namur,

April. retaining Ypres in his own hands. To the Dutch he offered Maestricht and the most favourable commercial relations. Partial restoration was promised to the Duke of Lorraine. If these terms were promptly

accepted, he would throw in either Charlemont, or Dinant and Bouvines.

A violent conflict went on in the Provinces. Led by Amsterdam and the principal towns of North Holland, the merchants clamoured for peace. Against them were Temple and William, who was supported by the whole body of nobles. The Prince hurried to the Hague and spoke vehemently against so shameful an abandonment of his allies. In the end all that the peace party could do was to secure from Louis a three months' truce, with a removal of commercial restrictions, and the sending a pacific mission to England and Brussels.

Meanwhile the news of their action had reached England. Charles evidently saw in it an excuse for withdrawing from his forced connection with the Republic. He laid the matter before Parliament (April 29), in a tone of anger at such a step having been taken without his consent, and requested its advice. At the desire of the Commons he placed before them the various treaties he had mentioned in his speech. After several days of

eager debate a resolution of the most unpromising character was carried by a narrow majority. The King was desired at once to join the coalition for carrying on the war ; to secure the continued co-operation of the Republic ; to obtain the consent of all the allies to a total prohibition of any commercial relations with France ; to invite further assistance ; and to secure a promise that no peace should be made without the consent of all. To this vote, so different from what he desired, Charles made no reply on the ground that the Lords had not concurred. But on May 11 he sent a message warning the Commons that unless a supply were speedily given him he should be forced to lay up his ships and disband his troops—the

William and Temple frustrate the endeavours for peace.

Temper of the Parliament.

very step to which the Shaftesbury party, in fulfilment of their pledges to Louis, were now bent upon driving him. The message raised a tempest in the House. As Colonel Birch said, 'This is a work of darkness from the beginning.' But so well had Danby marshalled his forces that the court secured a majority of one against continuing the discussion. He was unable however to prevent a general resolution against the whole conduct of affairs, praying especially for the removal of Lauderdale and other 'evil counsellors.' Charles at once prorogued the Parliament for ten days.

3. SECRET TREATIES OF CHARLES WITH LOUIS. THE DISBANDING QUESTION IN PARLIAMENT.

The truce offered by Louis, with the suggested terms of peace, had in the meantime been submitted to the other members of the coalition. By one and all they were rejected in language of the utmost defiance. Louis therefore again set himself to secure a separate peace with the Republic. But he lost no opportunity of strengthening his own position. Assembling a strong force at Courtrai on May 16, he passed the Lys, and from the little town of Deynse, close to Ghent, wrote a conciliatory letter to the States-General. For a time William, supported by the nobles, and now by some of the towns, though not by Amsterdam, stood firm against any compromise. His resolution however was changed by unfavourable news from England, and he consented to a deputation being sent to confer with Louis.

The belief of Birch that the whole matter was 'a work of darkness' was fully justified. Charles had been again in secret negotiation with Louis, who had offered him 240,000*l.* in the course of three years should he suc-

ceed in bringing about a peace. But Danby, who was determined that if England was to be at the beck of France it should be for a good price, demanded that sum yearly for three years, the payment to begin at once.

Louis decided to meet Charles half-way. On May 27, by a secret agreement drawn up and signed by Charles alone—for Danby again refused to put his head in peril by adding his name—it was arranged that Charles should do his best to secure peace on terms favourable to Louis within two months ; that, if unsuccessful, he should recall and disband his troops, except 3,000 to be left in Ostend, and should prorogue Parliament for four months, on condition of receiving the subsidy demanded, half of which was to be paid at the expiration of the two months.

The suspicions of the Commons again tended to reduce Charles to the powerlessness which Louis desired.

The Commons insist on disbanding. On the very day of the compact, May 27, they demanded either immediate war with France or immediate disbanding. A week later, after two similar votes, they insisted that the disbanding should take place by the end of June ; though they afterwards altered the date, as regarded the forces in the Spanish Low Countries, to July 27, and they provided money for the purpose. They gave him too a further supply for other uses, after rejecting without a division his request for an increase of 300,000*l.* to the revenue. When however the Lords endeavoured to extend the date, they at once repelled the assumed right of the Upper House to meddle with a 'bill of money,' by tackling the bill to raise funds for disbanding on to that for the further supply, so that they must both fall or pass together. Charles, having passed the bill, prorogued the Parliament, July 15.

He had an excuse, more than sufficient in his eyes

for evading the engagement to disband; for the whole aspect of affairs abroad, and with it his intentions, had again undergone a complete change.

Up to the end of June peace with the Dutch and Spain had seemed assured. William himself regarded it as useless to struggle any longer against the universal cry. He wrote a conciliatory letter to Louis, which was answered in the tone befitting an injured father to a repentant son. The States-General ordered their deputies to sign the treaty before the end of the month; and Spain expressed her concurrence. Only at the last moment a misunderstanding suddenly declared itself, which threatened an immediate renewal of the war on the part of every nation engaged.

4. EXPECTED RENEWAL OF WAR. ANOTHER TREATY OF ENGLAND WITH THE DUTCH. SEPARATE PEACE BETWEEN LOUIS AND THE DUTCH.

In promising to give back to Spain the towns which were to form her barrier, Louis had avoided pledging himself to do so as a preliminary to peace, though this was understood by the Dutch and the Spaniards. He now demurred to giving them up until the demands of Sweden should be satisfied. This would have compelled the Dutch to maintain a large army on the Yssel, when their greatest desire was to disband. In a moment the Provinces were in a blaze, and William regained his ascendancy. Though every one now longed for peace, the fortunes of war had been so evenly balanced, that any unexpected pretension on one side or the other was sufficient to throw all back into confusion.

Charles underwent the same revulsion of feeling. He refused to ratify his secret treaty with Louis, or to dis-

Question of
the cession of
the Spanish
barrier.
Effect of
Louis's
action on
the Dutch
and
Charles.

band his troops in the Spanish Low Countries, declaring that his people would chase him from his kingdom if Louis were suffered to extend his conquests. He sent off Temple once more (July 6) in haste to make a strict alliance with the Republic; and on July 26 a treaty was framed binding the Dutch to continue the struggle, and England to declare war, if Louis by August 11 did not declare himself ready to give up the towns at once. Louis had thus fifteen days wherein to settle the question upon which depended the breaking up of the coalition or the immediate renewal of war.

Treaty of
England
with
Republic,
July 26,
1678.

Day by day the interval passed without an answer from Louis. He could not bring himself to break through his rule of fidelity to his alliances. At length he was set free by the action of the Swedes themselves. One of their deputies took upon himself to declare that Sweden would raise no objection to a separate peace if the Republic promised not to assist her foes. Louis thereupon ordered the treaty to be signed, on condition that Spain should make a similar engagement regarding both himself and his allies. This demand led to further delay, and on the 9th, within a day of the stipulated time, all was still in doubt. When at ten on the next morning they met for the last conference, the French commissioners, Colbert, Estrades, and Avaux, felt how vast were the issues depending upon that day's work. Carefully as the exhaustion of France was kept from the knowledge of Europe, they knew that the continuation of war would be a terrible calamity for their country, and that Louis, haughty as might be his language, had probably reached the limits of what it was possible for him to conquer at the time. They knew too that Temple had arrived the evening before at Nimwegen to frustrate, if possible, in concert

The Swedish
difficulty
removed.

The final
conference,
August 10,
1678.

with William, the conclusion of peace. For thirteen hours the conference sat continuously. Colbert and his colleagues fought the ground inch by inch against the settled will of William and the States-General. Only one hour before the moment at which negotiations would cease—at eleven on the night of August 10, 1678—France and the Republic signed the treaty which removed the most important member from the coalition, and gave the signal for its disruption.

By this treaty Louis confessed afresh the complete failure of his war of aggression on the Dutch. The patient Republic came out of the six years' struggle without the loss of an acre of land; the sum of her concessions was a promise of neutrality during the remainder of the war. Untouched in their territory, the Dutch were also secured in their main interest, commerce. Freedom of trade and navigation was mutually restored, and the compulsory visitation of the warships of either nation in each other's harbours removed, while all vexatious restrictions on Dutch subjects residing or trading in France were taken off. Each might henceforth trade with the enemies of the other, if properly provided with a passport, except in articles contraband of war; or, in the language of international law, a free ship was to cover the merchandise; but all goods on an enemy's ship should be liable to confiscation. The personal interests of William were provided for by the restoration of his principality of Orange, and of all the estates belonging to him in France, Franche Comté, the Charolais, and the Spanish Low Countries. Spain and any other of the allies who within six weeks from the ratification should declare themselves ready to accept peace were to be admitted as parties to the treaty.

Strange to say, the peace was signalised by the most

desperate engagement of the war. William, with all the forces he could collect, had marched to succour Mons, then invested by the Duke of Luxemburg. On August 14 he arrived before the French lines. Luxemburg knew that peace was concluded. William had certainly no official knowledge, but the probability of events must be set against his emphatic declaration that he had no information whatever. He determined to strike one more blow at Louis, and if possible to destroy his own unbroken record of defeat in the field. By an impetuous attack upon Luxemburg's lines he for a while carried all before him. But the 'hunchbacked dwarf' rallied his forces, and delivered so fierce a counter-stroke that after six hours of murderous conflict he regained the captured positions. At the close of a long day of slaughter Luxemburg still held Mons in his grip, while William, though he had failed in his main object, remained on the field of battle. The next morning the official declaration of peace arrived, and at the same hour by arrangement the two armies left Mons, the French retreating towards Ath, the Dutch to Brussels.

Battle of St.
Denys
between
William and
Luxemburg
before Mons,
August 14,
1678.

5. PEACE WITH SPAIN.

The treaty was not binding until it had been ratified. To prevent this ratification William and Temple strained every nerve. They were supported by the indignant reproaches of the allies whom the Republic had thus deserted—Denmark, Brandenburg, the Emperor, and the Bishop of Munster. Spain too put obstacles in the way. The States-General hereupon adjourned the ratification until the peace with Spain was signed, acting meanwhile as mediators.

But the internal troubles of Spain robbed her of all

Difficulty
with Spain.

real desire to continue the war. The boy-king, Charles II., had assumed the government at the age of fourteen on November 6, 1675. But the power remained with the Queen Regent. She in her turn delivered it into the hands of Fernando Valenzuela, a worthless favourite of the type of Piers Gaveston or Robert Carr. A rising of the nobles took place in consequence, and the King's natural brother, Don John, came into power, though Charles remained nominally King. The favourite was banished, and the Queen fled. Don John, in turn, soon found himself in the midst of difficulties, and was anxious to be free from the additional complications of the war. Louis, informed of the activity of the emissaries of William, who were inveighing in every town of the province of Holland against the dishonour brought upon the nation, and of the mission of Laurence Hyde from the King of England with an engagement to declare war three days after he knew that the States-General had refused to ratify the treaty, determined with his usual good sense not to endanger the advantages he had acquired. On September 17, 1678, the peace was signed with Spain.

France gave back Charleroi, Binch, Ath, Oudenarde, and Courtrai, which she had gained by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle; the town and duchy of Limburg, all the country beyond the Meuse, Ghent, Rodenhuis, and the district of the Waes, Leuze, and St. Ghislain, with Puycerda in Catalonia, these having been taken since that peace. But she retained Franche Comté, with the towns of Valenciennes, Bouchain, Condé, Cambrai and the Cambrésis, Aire, St. Omer, Ypres, Werwick, Warneton, Poperinge, Bailleul, Cassel, Bavai, and Maubeuge. The signature of this treaty was followed by the ratification of that with the Dutch. The Spaniards however, with their ingrained love of delay, attempted, when the date

came (October 31) for the ratification of their own treaty, to put it off until that with the Emperor was signed. Louis held his hand for a month ; then, thoroughly provoked, he ordered his troops to march upon Brussels. This brought the Spaniards to their senses, and on December 15 the ratifications were exchanged.

6. PEACE WITH THE EMPEROR AND THE REST OF THE ALLIES.

There remained the Grand Elector of Brandenburg, the King of Denmark, the Dukes of Brunswick and Lüneburg, the Bishop of Munster, and the Emperor. The two first, whose operations were chiefly against Sweden, at the point farthest from Louis, and who were gaining successes there, did their best, though now deprived of the subsidies of the United Provinces, to prevent the Emperor from coming to terms with France and Sweden. He however had conclusive reasons for wishing to make peace. He had in the last campaign seen the young Duke of Lorraine thoroughly beaten by Créquy, who, besides preventing the capture of Freiburg, had taken Kehl, Ruperschau, Landau, and Lichtenberg, and had destroyed the bridge at Strassburg. The Hungarians too had risen against him, and with the support of bodies of troops raised in Poland and officered by Frenchmen had gained alarming successes on the border. On February 2, 1679, peace was declared between Louis, the Emperor, and the Empire. Louis gave back Philippsburg, retaining Freiburg with the desired liberty of passage across the Rhine to Breisach ; in all other respects the Treaty of Munster, of October 24, 1648, was re-established. If the enemies of Sweden would not make peace the Emperor and the Empire would neither assist them nor

Successes
of Créquy
against the
Emperor and
Lorraine.

Peace
with the
Emperor
and Empire,
February 2,
1679.

allow them to encamp on the territory of the Empire outside their own dominions, while Louis should be free to keep garrisons in several towns of the Empire.

The treaty then dealt with the Duke of Lorraine. To his restitution Louis annexed conditions which rendered Lorraine little more than a French province. Not only

Restitution of Duke of Lorraine. was Nancy to become French, but, in conformity with the treaty of 1661, Louis was to have possession of four large roads traversing the country, with half a league's breadth of territory throughout their length, and the places contained therein : the roads, namely, from St. Dizier to Nancy, and from Nancy to Alsace, Vesoul in Franche Comté, and Metz. The town and district of Longwy also were to be placed in his hands. To these conditions the Duke refused to subscribe, preferring continual exile until the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, when at length his son regained the ancestral estates.

On the same day the Emperor and the Empire made Peace between the Emperor and Sweden. peace with Sweden. All that the allies had taken from her was to be restored, and the Emperor agreed to mediate between her and the powers that still stood out.

It was impossible for the other members of the coalition to carry on the war. The Dukes of Brunswick and Lüneburg and the Bishop of Munster surrendered their captures in Sweden, retaining one or two places which rectified their frontiers. Each received from Louis a subsidy for the concession. It needed however a final exhibition of force before Brandenburg and Denmark would give way. Créquy again passed the Rhine and took Marck and Lippstadt ; then, crossing the Weser, defeated the Grand Elector and threatened Magdeburg. On

Between France, the Dukes of Brunswick and Lüneburg, and Munster. And between Brandenburg, Denmark, Sweden, and France.

June 29 the Grand Elector consented to make restitution to Sweden, except on the Brandenburg side of the Oder, promising to build no fortress on that river. Denmark, left alone, made peace with France and Sweden in September on similar terms, and separate treaties were also concluded between Sweden, Spain, and the Republic. The Dutch, who in accordance with the treaty of 1673 should have restored Maestricht to Spain, retained that important bulwark as a recompense for their efforts in securing the barrier for the latter country.

7. CONCLUSION.

The effect of the Peace of Nimwegen was thus, speaking generally, to reaffirm the Peace of Westphalia. But, inasmuch as Louis—though foiled in the immediate purpose of the war—was the only gainer, it did not, like the Peace of Westphalia, close for any length of time the sources of strife, but, while affording to France a basis for future aggrandisement, left sore feelings everywhere, with the certainty of renewal of war.

One country alone, or rather one person, had come out of the struggle with marked discredit. The position of Charles II. of England was indeed contemptible. Peace had been made without his concurrence—in spite, indeed, of his utmost efforts. He had lived by chicanery, and his chicanery had ended in complete discomfiture. Louis now, neither needing nor fearing him, met his appeal for part at least of the money he claimed with a contemptuous refusal. In December, 1678, the Lords united with the Commons in insisting on his immediately disbanding his troops, and from that moment, baffled in diplomacy and crippled for war, he had no further voice in Continental affairs.

His position with his own people was as humiliating

as his position in the face of Europe. To the Parliament and to the Church he was an object of suspicion. His supplies were doled out with jealous parsimony, and his use of the money was vigilantly watched. From the control under which he fretted his only chances of escape had been trickery and foreign alms. His servants were indeed capable, but bitter personal rivalries prevented all co-operation ; and though the extravagances of an Opposition as unscrupulous as himself, aided by his own coolness of head and cynical good temper, afforded him before long an opportunity of establishing an apparently complete ascendancy in his kingdom, it was an ascendancy maintained only by a scrupulous observance of conditions which he had now for nineteen years in vain endeavoured to evade.

The picture is heightened by contrast. Louis stood before Europe upon a pinnacle of glory. How he had used the instruments of ambition by which he found himself surrounded at the close of the wars of the Fronde ; the renowned commanders, the veteran troops, the skilful diplomatists, the great administrators, among whom he stood the adored and unquestioned chief : how, with a people contented to be at length freed from the desolation of civil war, and a treasury soon overflowing through the genius of Colbert, he had leaped at two bounds to a position which made him at once the admiration and the terror of Europe ; how he had created navies and had sent out his armies north, south, and east, to confront all Europe in arms ; how he had defeated coalitions, dictated treaties of peace, pensioned Kings and governments ; how he had not only baffled the jealousy of England, but had even enlisted the might of her Crown in support of aggressions which her people hated ; all this we have seen.

And, like that of Charles, his European position was

reflected in that which he held at home. To his own people he was as a god. His marshals and his armies knew no will but his word; his ambassadors in every court carried out his commands with unfailing obedience. After twenty years of imperial almsgiving and of war his treasury still to ordinary observers seemed overflowing. To such purpose had he depressed the haughty *noblesse* of France, that they who had been the rivals of the throne were now content to worship from the level of a common servitude. All great offices, the names of which recalled the days when the monarchy was still under restraint—Constable, Admiral, Lieutenant-General—were suppressed; and the rest he took so literally into his own hands that in 1681 he put them up to public auction. With the aid of the Jesuits he defied the Papacy, and over the Church his rule was absolute. For every form of intellectual effort France was then famous—religious oratory, science, art, history, literature—and one and all were devoted to the glorification of the King.

And yet at this very time there was not far distant that happy combination of events which was to place a final check to his ambition. In the breast of William of Orange there glowed ever more intensely that unquenchable hatred of France which had received its last and fiercest expression in the desperate onset upon Luxemburg's lines before Mons. Within ten years he once more arrayed Europe for the conflict, but this time with a mightier following at his back. England at length took her rightful place. The man who in his own person represented the spirit of Continental opposition to the aggressions of Louis, and the opposition of the English people to the French and Popish policy of their own Kings, found himself enabled to let loose the hatred which, thwarted so long, had grown ever keener by

repression. The happiest day of William's life was probably that on which, as King of England, he declared war against France. On that day began the long and terrible course of retributive humiliations which at length struck his lifelong antagonist to her knees, and brought upon the Great Monarch an old age embittered by disappointment and care.

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
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